COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68824 : IN THE MATTER OF JANICE KRUMINS, : : JOURNAL ENTRY : and : OPINION : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 26, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court -- : Juvenile Court Division : Case No. 9472047 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For appellant, Cuyahoga County Sharon Hawk Support Enforcement Agency: Assistant County Prosecutor P.O. Box 93894 Cleveland, Ohio 44101-5894 For appellee, Janice Krumins: Janice Krumins, Pro Se 13736 Madison Avenue, No. 4 Lakewood, Ohio 44107 For appellee, Egon Krumins: Egon Krumins, Pro Se 22447 Lake Road Rocky River, Ohio 44116 -2- NAHRA, J.: Appellant the State of Ohio, Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"), appeals the order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which approved the referee's report in this child support case. CSEA instituted this action on November 28, 1994. In its complaint, it alleged "[r]elator, Egon Krumins and defendant, Janice Krumins," to be the parents of the minor child Erika Krumins, born October 15, 1989. CSEA further alleged that: 1) either it or the mother had supported Erika since June 1, 1990; 2) the mother was a recipient of public assistance; and 3) the responsibility for collection of support for Erika had been assumed by CSEA. CSEA requested the trial court to order the following relief from the father: 1) to reimburse CSEA or the mother for past support; 2) to provide health insurance for Erika; and 3) to pay a reasonable amount of child support pursuant to law. The case proceeded to a hearing before a referee on February 13, 1995. Although CSEA was the plaintiff, it was not served with a subpoena. Thus, the hearing was held with only the parents present as parties. Subsequently, the referee issued his report. Among his pertinent findings were the following: the mother had received public assistance since November 1994; the father was employed; and the mother made "no claims for past child support" because the father had made "regular" contributions for Erika's care and support. -3- The referee recommended the father pay an amount of child support below the applicable amount stated in the child support schedule "by agreement" and CSEA be dismissed as a party to the action it had filed. However, the referee also recommended the money deducted from the father's pay be remitted to CSEA, the father immediately notify CSEA of any change in his employment or source of income, and both parents immediately notify CSEA of any reason that would terminate the support order. The trial court ultimately adopted the referee's report. It is from this order the CSEA filed its timely appeal, presenting four assignments of error for this court's review. I. CSEA's first and second assignments of error are addressed together as follows: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING CSEA, AS CSEA IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE INTERESTS OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST THE STATE OF OHIO. CSEA argues the federal and state statutory scheme for the administration of child support obligations indicates CSEA was intended to be a "real party in interest" in child support establishment proceedings; therefore, the trial court could neither dismiss it as a party nor fail to consider its interest in the -4- proceeding. This court has previously addressed this argument and has agreed. [T]he pecuniary interest of the state in child support matters arises from the probability that the state may be able to recoup some of the funds which have already been expended in support of the child. See, Crittendon [v. Crittendon (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 484]; Vance v. Banks (Apr. 14, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64872, unreported. Since the state is responsible for the support of these children, any money recouped from their parents is money that the state can return to the public fisc. * * * State statute requires that support payments be made to the department of health and human services or child support enforcement agency regardless of whether the parent is a public assistance recipient or not. See, R.C. 3111.28 and R.C. 3113.06. After the payment of support is made by the parent/obligee, the CSEA disburses the proper amount of support to the child through the parent/obligor. It is this regulation of child support orders which presents the CSEA with a legitimate government interest in assuring that all child support orders are properly satisfied by the obligor. * * * [I]t is necessary for the CSEA to be a party to ensure not only that the child's interests are protected but also that the pecuniary interests of the state are protected. * * * We * * * find that the State of Ohio has an interest in all child support cases by virtue of either the residential parent's assignment of rights as public assistance recipients or the interest in enforcing child support awards in order to protect and ensure the integrity of the public fisc. * * * It is the statutory duty of the child support enforcement agency of each individual county to develop a method which allows for the proper collection and enforcement of child support. R.C. 5101.31. Only by -5- being joined as a proper party to these child support actions can the support enforcement agencies properly effectuate that duty, thereby protecting the best interests of the child and the public fisc. * * * From a thorough reading of Chapters 3111. and 3113., together with the mandate of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, it is clear that the general assembly intended that the child support enforcement agencies be proper parties to all actions for the collection of child support; any other result would hinder the legitimate state interest spelled out by the general assembly for the enforcement of child support orders as well as the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D, supra. Therefore, the dismissal of the CSEA in all of the cases presented before this court was improper * * * . In the Matter of: Lozada (June 29, 1995), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 67463, 67553, 67639, 67654, 67659, unreported. See, also, State of Ohio, CSEA ex rel. Graham v. Graham (June 22, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67962, unreported; State of Ohio, CSEA ex rel. Lamier v. Lamier (Aug. 24, 1995), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 67637, 67638, 67640, 67655, 67660, unreported. Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's first and second assignments of error are sustained. II. CSEA's third assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FOLLOWING THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 3113.215 IN ORDERING A DEVIATION IN CHILD SUPPORT. CSEA correctly points out that the child support guideline worksheet prepared by the referee in this case indicates the correct amount of annual child support was $4,980.00; however, the -6- referee recommended the father pay only $1,600.00. CSEA argues this lower amount was arrived at without compliance with the dictates of R.C. 3113.215(B)(1), which requires explicit findings of fact to support any deviation from the guidelines. Once again, this court agrees. The Ohio Supreme Court has explicitly dealt with the latitude which R.C. 3113.215 gives to trial courts in determining awards of child support. In Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, the court held, in paragraphs two and three of its syllabus: 2. The terms of R.C. 3113.215 are mandatory in nature and must be followed literally and technically in all material respects. 3. Any court ordered deviation from the applicable worksheet and the basic child support schedule must be entered by the court in its journal and must include findings of fact to support such determination. Since the holding in Marker, the general assembly has changed some of the wording of R.C. 3113.215; however, the requirements of the section regarding deviations to child support orders still remain the same. * * * The acceptable procedure for ordering an amount of child support which deviates from the amount "rebuttably presumed" to be the correct amount is for the court to fully comply with the requirements of R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b). Marker, supra, at 141. In the Matter of: Lozada, supra. (Emphasis in original.) See, also, State of Ohio, CSEA ex rel. Graham v. Graham, supra; Minter v. Copes (June 15, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67614, unreported. In this case, the referee noted on the worksheet that "Mother has access to father's credit card for child's needs and father makes significant in-kind contributions for the care and support of -7- the child." However, this was insufficient to support the deviation, since the referee failed to specify monetary values and also failed to explain how the deviation was in the "best interests of the child." Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139. Therefore, CSEA's third assignment is also sustained. III. CSEA's fourth assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 3113.217(C) BY NOT ISSUING A SEPARATE ORDER REGARDING HEALTH INSURANCE. CSEA argues the support order was also improper for its silence on the issue of health insurance which was raised in the complaint. Again, CSEA's argument has merit. R.C. 3113.217(C), states, in pertinent part, as follows: (C) In any action or proceeding in which a child support order is issued or modified *** [t]he court shall issue a separate order that includes all of the following: (1) A requirement that the obligor under the child support order obtain health insurance coverage for the children who are the subject of the child support order *** (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the record in this case contains no separate order as required by R.C. 3113.217(C) regarding health insurance for Erika. The trial court's failure to comply with the mandate of this statute was plain error. In the Matter of: Lozada, supra; State of Ohio, CSEA ex rel. Graham v. Graham, supra. Accordingly, CSEA's fourth assignment of error is also sustained. -8- The order of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. -9- This cause is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellees its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, P.J., and McMONAGLE, TIMOTHY E., J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .