COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68737 ALLEN RINGEL, B.S. MSTD : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JAMES ADRINE, ET AL. : : Defendants-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 2, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-279601 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees: ALLEN RINGEL, B.S. MSTD, PRO SE SHARON SOBOL JORDAN 1787 Beaconwood Avenue Director of Law South Euclid, Ohio 44121 LISA HERBERT, ESQ. Assistant Director of Law City Hall - Room 106 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 2 - DYKE, J.: Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Ringel, appeals pro se a summary judgment granted in favor of defendants-appellees, James Adrine and the Cleveland Police Department, in his action which alleged gross 1 negligence. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the law of agency and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permit recovery and because reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion in this case and such conclusion is adverse to the appellees. Upon review, we find appellant's arguments to be devoid of merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. On August 24, 1994 appellant was arrested and charged with Soliciting in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 619.09 in Case No. 94 CRB 024179. Appellant appeared at several pre-trials before the Honorable Ronald Adrine but failed to appear on his trial date and a capias warrant was issued. On September 14, 1994 appellant pro se filed an action in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that upon his arrest, Cleveland police officers used excessive force and placed him in an overcrowded, unventilated paddy wagon. The Honorable Ann Aldrich dismissed the 1 Appellant has incorrectly captioned his complaint in the name of "James" Adrine as the record demonstrates that appellant's solicitation case was assigned to the Honorable "Ronald" Adrine. Also, while appellant named Judge Adrine, he has made no specific allegations with respect to him. - 3 - complaint as frivolous to wit., lacking an arguable basis in law or fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(d). On November 3, 1994 appellant filed the instant complaint alleging identical facts and claiming gross negligence with resulting damages. Appellant alleged that he was arrested after a female pedestrian jumped in front of his car and he swerved his car to avoid hitting her. Appellant alleged that police injured his wrists while handcuffing him and that they locked him in an unventilated paddy wagon which caused him to pass out several times. He also alleged that he did not receive his Miranda rights. On January 3, 1995 appellant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that appellees were liable under the law of agency and under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On February 3, 1995 appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing inter alia that appellant's theory of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable; that appellant's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata as the matter had been dismissed as frivolous by the district court and that appellees were immune to such action pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, Revised Code, Chapter 2744. The trial court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted appellee's motion for same. The instant appeal followed. Summary judgment is proper, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B) if the trial court determines that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving - 4 - party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclu- sion and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274; see, also Delker v. Ohio Edison Co. (1989), 47 Ohio App.3d 1, 2, 546 N.E.2d 975, 976. Once summary proceedings have been properly initiated, the responding party must set forth specific facts demonstrating triable issues on all essential matters for which he bears the initial burden of proof. Mere reliance upon the pleadings is insufficient. Civ.R. 56(D); see, also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211. The issue to be tried must also be "genuine," allowing reasonable minds to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 477 U.S. at 248-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-2512, 91 L.Ed. at 211-214. See, Manofsky v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Summit, 1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 663, 666. Upon review we find that summary judgment was properly entered in this case. The law of agency and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are inapplicable to the instant facts. Additionally, a review of appellant's brief in response to appellee's motion for summary judgment demonstrates that he failed to name any specific officer and that he also failed to support his claim of gross negligence, to wit., wanton and willful conduct on the part of a specified officer. Hence, appellees are immune to appellant's gross negligence claim pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act and were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of - 5 - law. See, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(F). Also, since appellant's claims are identical to those dismissed by Judge Aldrich in his federal lawsuit, they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See, Ringel v. Cleveland Police Department (N.D. Ohio) October 11, 1994, CV No. 1896, unreported. Appellant's assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, P.J., AND HARPER, J., CONCUR ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .