COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68680 : MORTON COLLINS : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : CHARLES M. MORGAN, JR. : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 16, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 280844 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: MORTON COLLINS, Pro Se JEFFERY A. GORSKI, ESQ. Reg. No. 258-263 11510 Buckeye Road P. O. Box 69 Cleveland, Ohio 44104 LOCI 6 DORM London, Ohio 43140-0069 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Morton Collins, appeals a decision from the trial court dismissing his malpractice action against defendant-appellee, Charles Morgan. Collins assigns the following errors for our review: I. TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN MALPRACTICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED, WHERE FACTS PLEAD SUFFICIENTLY TO STATE A CLAIM PREVENT THE COURTS DISMISSAL AND SUCH FACTS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON MOVING PARTY. II. TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN MALPRACTICE FOR FAILURE TO BRING THE ACTION IN THE STATUTORY LIMITS OF PROSECUTION. III. TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF (sic) BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN MALPRACTICE FOR FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA APPLYS (sic) FOR A PRIOR FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL TO NOT PROSECUTE THE COMPLAINT BY THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN HIS FAILURE TO PROVIDE MATERIALS REQUESTED. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Morton Collins filed a grievance against Charles Morton with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel alleging legal malpractice. The Disciplinary Counsel's Office determined no disciplinary action was warranted. Collins was informed of this decision by letter on July 15, 1994. -3- Collins sued Morton on November 28, 1994 for malpractice. He alleged Morton committed legal practice when he represented him in a felonious assault criminal case. Furthermore, he alleges Morgan failed to adequately represent Collins by failing to properly investigate the case and by failing to turn over all the discovery materials obtained from the state. Morgan filed a motion to dismiss the action on January 6, 1995. He countered Collins failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and Collins' action was barred by the statute of limitations. He also alleged the ruling of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was res judicata as to Collins' malpractice allegations. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in an entry journalized on March 9, 1995. This appeal followed. We begin our analysis with the issue raised by Collins' second assignment of error whether his complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. R.C. 2305.11 imposes a one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions. The statute of limitations begins to run either when the client discovers or should have discovered his injury or when the attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction terminates, whichever is later. Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 385. When determining when the client should have discovered his injury, we look for a cognizable event whereby the client discovers or should have discovered that his injury was related to the attorney's action or inaction and realizes the need to pursue his possible remedies against the attorney. -4- Collins argues his negligence cause of action accrued when Morgan failed to turn over the records he requested. He argues he was unaware of counsel's breach of his duty to provide the documents until after his appeal was determined. However, in his complaint, Collins asserts a cause of action based upon counsel's breach of a "duty to the plaintiff as his legal representative in an ongoing criminal case" and alleges that "defendant failed to abide by a standard of professional representation." This cause of action clearly goes to the representation provided in the criminal case, not to counsel's failure to turn over material gathered during discovery. In the section of his complaint that outlines his cause of action, Collins made no reference to Morgan's failure to turn over the materials obtained during discovery. Because Collins' allegations of negligence pertained to actions taken by Morgan during the pendency of the criminal case, we conclude he should have discovered these alleged errors, at the latest, when he was convicted of the felonious assault charge in July 1992. See Gray v. Austin (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 96 (A cognizable event occurred when court entered summary judgment against plaintiff in action where alleged malpractice occurred) Morgan's representation in the criminal case terminated in July 1992 when he was convicted. Accordingly, he would have had to file his malpractice action by July 1993. Because it was not filed until November 1994, Collins' malpractice action was properly dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. -5- In light of our conclusion that Collins' malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, his first and third assignments of error are hereby overruled as moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Nevertheless, we are compelled to address the issue of whether the Disciplinary Counsel's opinion bars any further action under the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata exists when a final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, "by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them." Horisk's Salvage Pool v. Strongsville (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 121,125. Morgan argues the ruling of the Disciplinary Counsel bars Collins from bringing his subsequent malpractice action. We disagree. The Disciplinary Counsel ruling is not a "final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction" but an administrative decision. It is not a final court judgment. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JOHN T. PATTON, C.J., and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .