COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68666 : ACCELERATED DOCKET STANDARD FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION CITY OF CLEVELAND : : : Defendant-Appellee : PER CURIAM : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 26, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-273216 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: DENNIS REIMER SHARON SOBOL JORDON 9806 Ravenna Road Director of Law Twinsburg, Ohio 44087 City of Cleveland BARBARA A. LANGHENRY Chief Assistant Director of Law Room 106 - City Hall 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 3 - PER CURIAM: Standard Federal Savings Bank appeals the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Cleveland Board of Building Standards on its claim for damages resulting from the city's demolition of a property without providing the bank prior notice of the demolition. The trial court ruled correctly in this case and, therefore, we affirm. Standard Federal alleges in its complaint that it is a mortgagee on property located at 774-76 East 102nd Street in Cleveland, Ohio, and that it had commenced a foreclosure action upon that property. Further, the complaint alleges that the City issued a violation and condemnation notice on the premises to the owner, and subsequently demolished the property, but failed to send any notice to Standard Federal, thereby precluding the bank from making repairs, appealing the condemnation, or otherwise protecting its interest in the property. The Board of Building Standards answered, alleging, inter alia, failure to name a necessary party, and also filed an alternative motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. On February 9, 1995, the trial court treated the Board's motion as one for summary judgment, and granted it. Standard Federal now appeals and assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. - 4 - Standard Federal contends the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because a question of fact exists as to the issue of due process, i.e., whether or not Standard Federal was given notice of the violation and condemnation. The Board believes the trial court ruled correctly in this case because it is not a proper party to this action and because the complaint is insufficient to support a federal due process violation. The issue for our resolution then, is whether or not the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the Cleveland Board of Building Standards in this instance. Civ. R. 56 governs summary judgments and in State, ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St. 3d 509 at 511, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the rule's requirements: Civ. R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. The party seeking the summary judgment bears the burden of proof in showing that no material issue of fact remains to be litigated. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317. Furthermore, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d - 5 - 356. However, "[a] motion for summary judgment forces a nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial." Wing v. Anchor Media (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108 at 111. Civ.R. 56(E) codifies this concept and provides, in pertinent part: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response *** must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Chaney v. Clark Cty. Agricultural Soc. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 421. To resolve the issue presented, we must examine the nature and extent of the authority of the Board of Building Standards and the role taken by the Board in this case. Section 76-6(d) of the Charter of the City of Cleveland defines the jurisdiction of the Board to include the power to "hear and decide appeals from *** any order *** of the Commissioner of Building and Housing *** relating to *** demolition of any building ***." Here, the record demonstrates that in this case the Cleveland Board of Building Standards took no action at all. It is the Building Commissioner who is charged with the duty to send condemnation or demolition notices, not the Board. Further, the Board did not hear or decide any appeal whatsoever from the Building Commissioner in this case. Hence, the Board is not a proper party to this action because it never acted, or had jurisdiction to act in this case. After construing the evidence most - 6 - favorably to Standard Federal, reasonable minds come to but one conclusion, that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the Cleveland Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and, therefore, the experienced trial judge properly granted summary judgment in this case. The assignment of error, therefore, is overruled, and because its resolution renders the due process claim moot, we shall not consider the second assignment of error. See App. R. 12. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, PRESIDING JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .