COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68618 : ACCELERATED DOCKET FRED YOUNG : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION AMERITRUST COMPANY, ET AL. : : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 17, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-242855 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: RICHARD W. DUNN, ESQ. JAN L. ROLLER, ESQ. 1350 Illuminating Building BONNIE M. GUST, ESQ. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 DAVIS AND YOUNG CO. 1700 Midland Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant Fred Young appeals from an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants- appellees Ameritrust Company ("Ameritrust") and DRM Landscaping/ Snow Removal ("DRM") in this personal injury slip and fall action. Plaintiff filed this personal injury action in the trial court on November 20, 1992. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that on or about April 10, 1989, "he slipped on a sheet of ice and fell to the ground and injured his back and spine" at an Ameritrust bank located at 16501 Euclid Avenue in the City of Cleveland. Plaintiff alleged Ameritrust and DRM were negligent by failing to remove and properly salt snow and ice on the premises. Defendants filed a joint answer denying the substantive allegations in plaintiff's complaint and raised various affirmative defenses. Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment pursuant to leave of court on November 4, 1994. Defendants' motion argued that plaintiff failed to show defendants (1) had any duty, or (2) breached any duty to remove the snow and ice from the public sidewalk abutting the bank where plaintiff fell. Defendants' motion was supported by plaintiff's own deposition testimony. Plaintiff's brief in opposition argued defendants did not properly clear or salt the sidewalk and was supported by plaintiff's newly executed affidavit. Defendants' reply brief made additional legal arguments. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary - 3 - judgment in an order journalized on January 26, 1995. Plaintiff timely filed this accelerated appeal and raises the following sole assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE EXISTED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. Plaintiff's sole assignment of error lacks merit. Plaintiff argues the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because the evidence demonstrates defendants removed newly fallen snow and negligently failed to apply salt to the entire sidewalk abutting the bank. Plaintiff argues that defendants left an untreated icy spot where he fell. Based on our review of the record, plaintiff has failed to show the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendants in this case. Plaintiff argues that defendants are liable for creating or aggravating a hazardous condition on the sidewalk by negligently removing a natural accumulation of snow. However, neither the removal of the top layer of a natural accumulation of snow nor the use of salt transforms the condition into an unnatural accumulation of snow. Coletta v. University of Akron (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 35, 36-37 (snow); Hill v. Avery (Mar. 14, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 58110, unreported at p. 2 (salt). Moreover, even if plaintiff fell on an unnatural accumulation of snow as he contends, plaintiff did not present any evidence that plowing and salting by defendants made the sidewalk abutting the commercial premises more dangerous than it would have been in its natural state. Myers v. Forest City Ent., Inc. (1993), 92 Ohio - 4 - App.3d 351, 353-354. The Court in Brigner v. Jewett's IGA Foodliner (July 20, 1992), Madison App. No. CA91-11-033, unreported, stated in this context as follows: To quote from Yanda v. Consolidated Management, Inc. (Aug. 16, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57268, unreported: *** if the position competently advocated by appellants is followed to its logical conclusion, an Ohio landlord who does absolutely nothing to clear ice and snow from his properties, and allows such elements to accumulate as they will, will be entirely immune from liability as a consequence of his inaction. On the other hand, a landlord who does what he can to combat the dangerous conditions frequently recurring in our climate will be opening himself up to potential lawsuits from those who slip and fall on the inevitable patches of ice and snow eluding the plow, shovel and salt. We choose not to discourage the diligence of landlords who exercise ordinary care in undertaking to clear their properties of ice and snow in a reasonable manner. Id. at 5-6. See, also Hill v. Avery [, supra]; Laughlin v. Robinson (Aug. 23, 1991), Columbiana App. No. 90-C-47, unreported. While these three cases, unlike the present case, involve landlord-tenant situations, the basic tenets set out are applicable here as well, despite the differences in duties. Id. at p. 3. Accordingly, plaintiff's sole assignment of error in this accelerated appeal is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 5 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE SARA J. HARPER, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate .