COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68586 LUDMILA BOBEK : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION NOTRE DAME COLLEGE : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 31, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-270885 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: JOHN C. KEALY (#0031331) 1100 ILLUMINATING BUILDING 55 PUBLIC SQUARE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: RICHARD T. PRASSE (#0024819) G. TODD DOWNS (#0052932) HAHN LOESER & PARKS 3300 BP AMERICA BUILDING 200 PUBLIC SQUARE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 - 2 - 2 SPELLACY, P.J.: Plaintiff-appellant Ludmila Bobek appeals from the entry of summary judgment for defendant-appellee Notre Dame College and raises one assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT, NOTRE DAME COLLEGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SATISFY THE EVIDENTIARY BURDEN SET FORTH IN RULE 56 OF THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. I. Bobek brought this action for breach of contract and wrongful discharge after Notre Dame, in accord with the rules and regula- tions of the Faculty Handbook, informed her in January 1994 that it had decided to not offer her a contract for the 1994-1995 academic year. Notre Dame moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Evidentiary materials reveal the following: In April 1992, Bobek and Notre Dame entered into an employment contract for the academic year 1992-1993. In March 1993, they entered into an employment contract for the academic year 1993- 1994. During this time, Bobek, an alien, was attempting to obtain permanent-resident status. On September 17, 1993, Gerald Hart- dagen, Notre Dame's vice president for academic affairs, signed several documents drafted by Bobek's immigration attorney. One of these documents, a letter to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, stated: - 3 - 3 This letter is to certify that on April 3, 1992, Notre Dame College of Ohio offered the position of Instructor in Mathematics, (full time) to Dr. Ludmila H. Bobek at the rate of $25,000.00 per year. This offer of employment was based on Dr. Ludmila H. Bobek's non immigrant visa and the offer will remain open until she is granted permanent resident status. Notre Dame College of Ohio has the ability to pay the wages offered and certifies that the job will continue under good conduct in the future. During Bobek's deposition, the following exchange took place: Q. In your Complaint, paragraph number 3 it talks about a September 17, 1993 contract of employ- ment. Next page, at the topof the next page. Do you have any idea what that September 17, 1993 matter was? Was it the (sic) oral or was it written? A. Must be a misprint with respect to -- Q. You don't remember entering into any September 17, 1993 contract, do you? A. It must be a different month, maybe March. Later, in an affidavit, Bobek averred that: The statement in the letter that my job would "remain open until I was granted permanent residence status" confirmed oral representa- tions which had previously been made to me by school officials. I relied on these representations in good faith and never had any reason to believe the school would not honor the commitment. In my deposition I did not identify this September 17, 1993, letter as a contract which I signed. However, I certainly considered the representa- tions made in the letter as part of the con- tractual obligation which Notre Dame College assumed toward my employment. - 4 - 4 II. In her assignment of error, Bobek contends the trial court erred when it granted Notre Dame's motion for summary judgment. We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Oiler v. Willke (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 404, 407. Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclu- sion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against who the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. A motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial." Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, paragraph three of the syllabus. Bobek argues the September 17, 1993, letter modified the employment contract for academic year 1993-1994. The modification of an employment contract must satisfy the essential elements of contract formation, which include consideration. Helle v. Landmark, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 1, 8; see, also, Thurston v. Ludwig (1856), 6 Ohio St. 1, 6; Richland Builders, Inc. v. Thome (1950), 88 Ohio App. 520, 527. Bobek incorrectly maintains that her continued employment acted as additional consideration. - 5 - 5 Although continued employment may furnish consideration for the modification of an employment-at-will contract, Copeco, Inc. v. Caley (1992), 91 Ohio App.3d 474, 477-478, it is insufficient where, as here, the employment contract is other than employment- at-will. Bobek also argues the doctrine of promissory estoppel pre- cluded Notre Dame from discharging her. Notre Dame asserts that Bobek failed to properly plead prom- issory estoppel. We disagree. Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 512, paragraph six of the syllabus, held that: Civ. R. 8(A) requires only that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the circumstances entitling the party to relief. A party is not required to plead the legal theory of recovery or the consequences which naturally flow by operation of law from the legal relationship of the parties. We find Bobek's complaint sufficiently pleads the claim of prom- issory estoppel. See, Watkins v. Universal Chemicals & Coatings, Inc. (Nov. 19, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-893, unreported (Complaint alleging termination without cause, wrongful termina- tion, and breach of contract sufficiently plead promissory- estoppel claim). Nonetheless, we find Bobek's promissory estoppel claim fails. In an employment context, a successful claim for promissory estop- pel requires a showing that "the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and - 6 - 6 *** [that] the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee. "Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 134, paragraph three of the syllabus. Bobek has failed to produce any evidence showing detrimental reliance. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropriate. Accordingly, Bobek's assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - 7 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J. and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .