COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68585 ALBERT BROOKS : : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : AND vs. : : OPINION MARGARET BROOKS : : : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 7, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Case No. D-220737 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: LYNN B. SCHWARTZ Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito The Burgess Building, Suite 400 1406 West Sixth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: JAMES B. DAVIS 67 East Washington Street P.O. Box 625 Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022 - 2 - O'DONNELL, J.: Albert Brooks appeals a judgment of the Domestic Relations Court challenging the division of property and allocation of debt in the decree of divorce. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Albert and Margaret Brooks married in 1983 and both worked at Alcoa during the marriage. No children were born as issue of the marriage. Margaret Brooks vacated the marital home June 11, 1992, and the court granted a divorce due to incompatibility on January 19, 1995. The parties had stipulated to earnings and marital assets existing as of January 4, 1995 and after three days of hearings, the court entered a division of marital assets to which appellant now objects and assigns five errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS VALUATION OF THE SEA RAY BOAT, AS SUCH IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ALLOCATION OF DEBT. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CREDITING APPELLANT WITH $5,000.00 IN ITS DIVISION OF ASSETS. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPELLEE THE 1985 NISSAN MAXIMA. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO RETURN PERSONAL PROPERTY TO APPELLEE OR REIMBURSE HER FOR SAME. - 3 - Regarding the valuation of the 1987 thirty-foot Sea Ray Sundancer boat, our review of the transcript reflects that the evidence of valuation offered by appellant was controverted by evidence of a 1988 marine survey from which it was the court's duty to establish a value. Regarding the second mortgage on the East 103rd Street property which was not a marital asset, the evidence reveals the parties obtained a second mortgage to purchase a Miles Avenue commercial real estate marital asset. Appellant believes the trial court should have divided this second mortgage obligation between the parties, while appellee asserts the court correctly divided the assets and debts. Appellant's third assignment concerns a credit allowed by the court for $5000 worth of credit card debts paid by appellant during the period of separation. Appellant urges the credit figure should be more inclusive. Next appellant suggests the trial court erred in failing to consider the value of a 1985 Nissan automobile traded for a 1992 Nissan which, at the time the court divided assets, had no equity. Appellant urges this court to remand for the trial court to consider the value of the 1985 Nissan at the time of separation instead of the value of the 1992 Nissan at the time of decree. Finally, appellant complains because the trial court ordered him to return an engagement ring and a fur coat or pay $2800 to - 4 - appellee for these items. His concern is that appellee had access to the home and may be in possession of these items and urges the court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Having listed all of appellant's assignments of error, we look to the proper standard of review for cases involving division of marital property. In Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, the court stated: There is no presumption, rebuttable or irrebuttable, that marital property be divided equally upon divorce; rather, a potentially equal division should be the starting point of the trial court's analysis before it considers the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18 and all other relevant factors. A court of common pleas has broad discretion to determine what property division is equitable in a divorce proceeding. The mere fact that a property division is unequal does not, standing alone, amount to an abuse of discretion. And in Terry v. Terry (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 228, we stated: When dividing marital property, the trial court has broad discretion to do what is equitable under facts of each case; there are no set rules for determining division of marital property. Finally, in order to determine what constitutes an abuse of discretion, we apply State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, where the court stated it connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable ***. Applying these standards to the respective claims advanced by appellant, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the 1989 30' Sea Ray boat, in not dividing - 5 - the East 103rd Street second mortgage between the parties or in allowing appellant only a $5000 credit on outstanding marital credit card debts, or in failing to consider the trade in value of the 1985 Nissan or ruling with respect to the fur coat and engagement ring. Since all of these assignments of error are governed by the same applicable law, they have been treated collectively and all are overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee(s) recover of appellant(s) costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Domestic Relations Division to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, P.J., and DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .