COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68533 JEFFREY J. SUVEGES : : ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION LYNDALL G. JAMES : : PER CURIAM Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 19, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-264672 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: Peter Onysko, Esq. Lyndall G. James, Esq. 1208 Standard Building Pro Se Cleveland, Ohio 44113 6837 Pearl Road Cleveland, Ohio 44130 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant, Jeffrey J. Suveges, appeals a decision of the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing an action for conversion that he filed against defendant-appellee, Lyndall G. James, Esq., the attorney who represented his former wife in her divorce action and who served as co-trustee (with instant counsel) of a joint bank account containing proceeds from 1 the sale of the parties' marital residence. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his action on jurisdictional grounds because the Domestic Relations Court's December 17, 1993 Decree of Divorce provided for a division of funds within the account and dissolved all prior restraining orders thereby permitting the General Division of the Court to obtain concurrent jurisdiction over the account. Upon review, we find appellant's assignment of error to be devoid of merit as the above-cited decree expressly reserved jurisdiction to review an allocation of marital funds made in a prior disbursement from the account. Such reservation necessarily provides it with jurisdiction over the entire account to the exclusion of General Division of the Court. For the reasons which follow the instant dismissal is affirmed. On December 17, 1993 the Domestic Relations Division granted a decree of divorce to appellant's wife, Jane T. Suveges. (See, Jane 1 Such account is identified as Dollar Bank Account, #10659990264. - 3 - T. Suveges v. Jeffrey J. Suveges, (Case No. D224219) Such decree set forth the following relevant provisions: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant is hereby awarded the following as division of property, free and clear from any claim by the Plaintiff: ITEM VALUE 1984 Chevrolet $1,000.00 IRA in Defendant's name $14,665.65 Life Insurance Policy in $1,320.00 Defendant's name One-half value of marital $44,406.42 proceeds with interest (reflects payments of debts) * * * The Court further finds that Defendant (Appellant) removed $7,500.00 from the proceeds of the marital home to pay support. The issue of whether any portion of this sum should be credited to Defendant's support obligation shall be subject to a future hearing and the Court specifically reserves jurisdiction with regard to this issue to be heard by Bernadette Marshall on January 5, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. * * * IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all restraining orders be hereby dissolved. * * * (Decree, journalized December 17, 1993 Vol. 2292, Pgs. 336, 337) The January 5, 1994 hearing originally scheduled in the decree 2 was rescheduled for April 4, 1994. On January 26, 1994 appellant 2 Also, as indicated in appellee's motion and confirmed by our review of the domestic relations court's docket, appellant filed on December 27, 1993, Motions to Modify Spousal and Child Support and a Motion to Order Payment of Joint Debts from Joint Escrow Account, to wit., the same account which formed the basis of his conversion action. Appellant also filed an appeal of the decree on January 18, 1994 approximately two weeks before he - 4 - filed the instant action in the General Division of the Court alleging that appellee's refusal to co-sign a withdrawal slip in the amount of $44,406.42 amounted to conversion of his share of the funds. On February 28, 1994 appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Domestic Relations Division retained jurisdiction over the account pursuant to its express reservation to reconsider allocations made between the parties in a prior $7,500.00 disbursement. On May 26, 1994 the court denied appellee's motion ordering it to file a Motion for Summary Judgment by June 30, 1994. On June 20, 1994 appellee filed the requested motion. Appellant did not file a brief in opposition despite the fact that he received three extensions of time to do so. On January 9, 1995 the court treated appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment as a Motion for Reconsideration of his prior Civ.R. 12(B)(1) Motion and dismissed appellant's action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The instant appeal followed. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COMPLAINT AND IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT. Appellant argues that concurrent jurisdiction arose in this case because the domestic relations court's December 17, 1994 decree filed the instant conversion action. In light of such post- decree filings, appellants' counsel's decision to file the instant conversion action in the General Division of the Court is of concern as it places the General Division in the anomalous position of indirectly confirming a marital property division which is by no means final. - 5 - specified a property division and dissolved all prior restraining orders. Appellant also argues that the court's reservation applies only to the prior disbursement and that review of the disbursement would have no impact on the balance of funds in the account. Appellant's arguments are unpersuasive. It is well settled that: After an action has been fully litigated in the domestic relations division of common pleas court and a judgment entry has been filed granting a divorce and providing for the division of property, the exclusive jurisdiction is terminated. At that point there exists concurrent jurisdiction with the general division of common pleas court. Price v. Price (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 93 syllabus. While concurrent jurisdiction generally arises after journalization of the decree of divorce, we find that exclusive jurisdiction of the domestic relations court was not terminated in this case because the decree did not provide for a final division of marital property. The court expressly reserved jurisdiction to reconsider allocations made in a prior disbursement. Implicit in such reservation is the possibility that the court would reallocate, redivide and redistribute funds already disbursed from the account. Such process could cause the court to reallocate, redivide and redistribute funds remaining in the account thereby nullifying the $44,406.42 property division which appellant seeks to enforce (albeit indirectly) in his conversion action. In a divorce proceeding, a domestic relations court has the full equitable powers and jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic matters. See, R.C. 3105.011 Specifically, a - 6 - domestic relations court has the jurisdiction to equitably divide "all property in which one or both spouses have an interest." See, R.C. 3105.171(B) It is well-settled that when a court of competent jurisdiction obtains jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action, its authority continues until the action is completely and finally disposed of and no other court can interfere with that jurisdiction. John Weenink & Sons v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty. (1948), 150 Ohio St.3d 349, paragraph three of the syllabus. While the Domestic Relations Division granted the parties a decree of divorce, its concomitant reservation of jurisdiction to review a prior disbursement from the account necessarily applies to the entirety of the account to the exclusion of the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas. Hence, the General Division did not err in granting appellee's Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion. Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of common pleas court is affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, CHIEF JUSTICE ANN DYKE, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .