COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68521 JANE P. HUTCHISON : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, : ET AL. : : Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-257056 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: MICHAEL TERRENCE CONWAY, ESQ. MARY A. SPRINGMAN, ESQ. Michael Terrence Conway & Suite 840, Halle Bldg. Assoc. 1228 Euclid Avenue 18848 Canyon Road Cleveland, OH 44115-1802 Fairview Park, OH 44126 - 2 - PATTON, C.J. Plaintiff-appellant, Jane Hutchison ("appellant") appeals the trial court's ruling granting the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant-appellee, Cleveland Clinic, et al. ("Clinic"). Appellant was employed by the Clinic commencing December 15, 1986 in the communications department. Appellant applied for a position as telecommunications coordinator at the Clinic's Florida subsidiary. Appellant was offered the coordinator position and started work in Florida on December 15, 1987. On May 17, 1990, appellant voluntarily resigned from her job with the Clinic in Florida. Appellant claimed that her resignation was actually constructive discharge. Appellant stated in her deposition that she felt that she would be able to retire with the Clinic based upon the satisfactory performance review she had previously received in Ohio and the classification of her position as "full- time permanent" by the Clinic. Appellant acknowledges that she did not offer any evidence to the effect that the Clinic promised her continued employment or that she declined a specific employment opportunity while working at the Clinic. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CASE BELOW AS A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS PRECLUDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF THE MATTER. Appellant asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error by granting the Clinic's motion for summary judgment because - 3 - a material issue of fact exists. Specifically, appellant claims that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applied and the Clinic's motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. The Ohio Supreme Court in Mers v. Dispatch Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, paragraph one of the syllabus, held that: Unless otherwise agreed, either party to an oral employment-at-will agreement may terminate the employment relationship for any reason which is not contrary to law. An exception to the employee-at-will doctrine is promissory estoppel or an implied contract. Mers, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus. Mers applied traditional promissory estoppel doctrine to the employment setting: "[A] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Id. at 104, (quotation omitted). Appellant asserts that she falls within the promissory estoppel exception because she accepted a job in Florida which was labelled "full-time permanent" therefore, she was given tenure and she should not have been considered an employee-at-will. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "a promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the well-established doctrine of employment-at-will." Wing v. Anchor Media (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 110. To rise to the level of promissory estoppel, promises of job security must be clear and - 4 - unambiguous. Shaw v. J. Pollock & Co. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 656. We hold that labelling a position "full-time permanent" does not create a promise of future benefits or opportunities. Nor can the label be clearly read to mean a continued promise of employment. Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated that she relied on any alleged promise of future employment to her detriment. It is axiomatic that a motion for summary judgment shall only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment shall not be granted unless it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317. Moreover, upon motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56, the burden of establishing that material facts are not in dispute, and that no genuine issue of fact exists, is on the party moving for summary judgment. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 66. However, in that Civ. R. 56(E) requires that a party set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, such party must so perform if he is - 5 - to avoid summary judgment. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, at paragraph seven of the syllabus. Viewing the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the appellant we conclude a genuine issue of material fact does not exist. Appellant failed to show that she was not an employee-at- will and she failed to show that she detrimentally relied on a promise of continued employment with the Clinic. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. HARPER, J. NAHRA, J., CONCUR CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .