COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68517 : ACCELERATED DOCKET EARL MARTIN : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : WILLIAM CROSBY, ET AL. : PER CURIAM : Defendants-Appellants : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 24, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 264265 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: WILLIAM F. SNYDER, ESQ. LOUIS J. LICATA, ESQ. LAURENCE R. SNYDER, ESQ. DONALD G. DRINKO, ESQ. Snyder Associates TERENCE K. O'BRIEN, ESQ. One Eriecview Plaza, Suite 450 750 Courthouse Square Bldg. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 and For 12 STEP STORE: NANCY A. KELLY, ESQ. JONATHAN L. STARK, ESQ. 2000 Illuminating Bldg. 1525 National City Bank Bldg. 55 Public Squiare 629 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -3- PER CURIAM: Defendant-appellant, William Crosby, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for sanctions and attorney's fees following the dismissal of a defamation complaint filed against him by plaintiff-appellee, Earl Martin. Crosby assigns the following two errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT WILLIAM CROSBY'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE 2323.51 AND OHIO CIVIL RULE 11. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE MOTION PURSUANT TO 2323.51(B)(2). After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. On January 18, 1994, Earl Martin filed a complaint against William Crosby and The 12-Step Store alleging libel per se. The complaint arose from an article in the September/October 1993 issue of "The Recovery Exchange", a bi-monthly newsletter published by Twelve-Step Store. The article described Crosby as "a Cleveland attorney who won a record verdict for a child sex abuse case against Rocky River Mayor Earl Martin." During a subsequent appearance on "The Morning Exchange," Crosby said "Earl Martin's insurance company paid $25,000 to Linda Long and her husband to settle what at that time was a pioneering incest case ***." Martin alleged that the statements were false. He alleged the sex abuse case was settled and did not proceed to verdict. He also -4- alleged Crosby was not the attorney of record in the case and did not participate in the case at all. Alleging that the statements were made with malice, Martin sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, $3,000,000 in punitive damages, attorney fees, interest, and costs. In its answer, Twelve-Step Store admitted it "incorrectly noted" that Crosby had obtained a record verdict against Martin in a child sex abuse case but denied knowing the statement was false. Twelve-Step Store also admitted the article contained a statement by Crosby that he represented Martin's daughter in the sex abuse case but denied the remaining allegations of the complaint. In his answer, Crosby admitted he did not represent Martin's daughter in the sex abuse case, and he appeared on "The Morning Exchange" but denied the other allegations in Martin's complaint. Crosby later moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Martin failed to prove that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice. Martin's complaint was dismissed with prejudice on November 14, 1994. On December 5, 1994, William Crosby filed a motion for attorney's fees under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. The motion was denied on January 5, 1995. This appeal followed. We will begin our analysis with a determination of whether the trial court erred in denying Crosby's motion for attorney fees. R.C. 2323.51(B) authorizes the trial court in a civil action to award reasonable attorney's fees to any party adversely affected by -5- frivolous conduct. Frivolous conduct is defined in R.C. 2323.51(A)(2) as follows: "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that satisfies any of the following: (a) it obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; (b) it is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) provides: An award of reasonable attorney's fees may be made pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section upon the motion of a party to a civil action, but only after the court does all of the following: (a) Sets a date for a hearing to determine whether particular conduct was frivolous, to determine, if the conduct was frivolous, whether any party was adversely affected by it, and to determine, if an award is to be made, the amount of that award. * * * (c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) of this section, allows the parties and counsel of record involved to present any relevant evidence at the hearing, including evidence of the type described in division (B)(5) of this section, determines that the conduct in question was frivolous and that a party was adversely affected by it, and then determines the amount of the award to be made. Crosby argues that the statute requires a hearing before a trial court may decide a motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51. In Pisani v. Pisani (January 19, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67599, unreported, we recognized the existence of a conflict on the issue of whether a hearing is mandatory on motions for attorney fees -6- under R.C. 2323.51 and resolved the conflict by concluding that a hearing is only required when the motion is granted. [W]here the court has sufficient knowledge of the circumstances for the denial of the requested relief and the hearing would be perfunctory, meaningless or redundant *** it makes for judicial economy and fairness to vest the trial judge with the sound discretion as to whether or not a hearing should be held. Pisani at 7. Pisani implies where the trial court lacks sufficient information to deny the motion, it might be an abuse of discretion not to have a hearing. However the burden is on the movant to show that additional information is necessary before the trial court may properly rule on the motion. Unless such a showing is made on the record, this court will presume the trial court had sufficient facts before it to deny the motion without a hearing. Following our decision in Pisani, we find the trial court did not err in failing to hold a hearing before denying Crosby's motion for attorney fees. Crosby's second assignment of error is without merit. We must now determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Crosby was not entitled to attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Having determined a trial court need not conduct a hearing before finding a claim is not frivolous, such a determina- tion rests within the trial court's discretion. Also, decisions about sanctions under Civ.R. 11 are discretionary and will be reversed only where it is shown that the trial court abused its -7- discretion. See Fant v. Sykes (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 65. Therefore, we must give deference to the trial court's decision. Upon review of the record, we find no evidence the trial court abused its discretion. An error in law or judgment is not enough. An abuse of discretion implies a decision that lacks any reasonable basis and is clearly wrong. Scandinavian Health Spa v. Civil Rights Comm. (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 480,488. While Crosby argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion, he makes no argument and we find no evidence that the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. See Castlebrook Ltd. v. Dayton Properties (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 340,346. Consequently, we overrule Martin's first assignment of error. Judgment affirmed. -8- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, CHIEF JUSTICE PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .