COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68444 IRVING BELL : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION FRANCHISE WORLD HEADQUARTERS, : ET AL. : Defendants-Appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 30, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SOUTH EUCLID MUNICIPAL COURT CASE NO. 4350 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: IRVING BELL (#0026317) 5171 MAYFIELD ROAD CLEVELAND, OHIO 44124 For Defendant-Appellee, Subway Sandwiches (Subway of Miami Beach, Florida): MARILLYN FAGAN DAMELIO(#0015242) JENNIFER VINCIGUERRA (#0064213) McCARTHY, LEBIT, CRYSTAL & HAIMAN SUITE 410 - LAKESIDE PLACE 323 LAKESIDE AVENUE WEST0 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Defendant-Appellee, Franchise World Headquarters: CHARLENE MILETI (#0055532) 1800 MIDLAND BUILDING 101 PROSPECT AVE. W. CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 - 2 - 2 SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant Irving Bell, an attorney acting pro se, appeals from the denial of his motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 against defendant-appellee Subway Sandwiches and the granting of defendant-appellee Subway Franchise World Headquarter's ("Subway Franchise's") motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51. Bell raises three assignments of error: I. THE TRIAL COUIRT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS WITHOUT CONDUCTING A HEARING THEREON. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REVISED CODE SECTION SANCTIONS. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ADDRESSING, WITH ANY SPECIFICITY, APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE REFEREE'S REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. I. Bell brought this action alleging that he was verbally assaulted and threatened by an employee at a Subway restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida. Subway Franchise responded by moving to dismiss and for sanctions under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Bell then moved for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 against Subway Sandwiches. On September 20, 1994, the trial court, finding no personal jurisdiction, dismissed Bell's action. The trial court also denied Bell's motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 against Subway Sandwiches. On December 29, 1994, the trial court granted Subway Franchise's motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and denied its - 3 - 3 motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11. Bell filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 1995. II. In his first assignment of error, Bell contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 without a hearing. We lack jurisdiction over this assignment of error because Bell failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11. See App.R. 4(A). The denial of Bell's motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 was a final appealable order. R.C. 2505.02 provides: An order that affects a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial. (Emphasis added). The denial of Bell's motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 occurred during a special proceeding. This final order satisfied Civ.R. 54(B) because no claims remained outstanding. The motions for sanctions were separate and independent of the underlying action. III. In his second assignment of error, Bell contends the trial court erred when it granted Subway Franchise's motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51. - 4 - 4 We review the imposition of sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. Langer (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 151, 159. "An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State ex rel. Hillyer v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 94, 97. Under R.C. 2323.51(B)(1), a trial court may "award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to an action adversely affected by frivolous conduct." R.C. 2323.51(A)(2) defines "frivolous conduct": (A) As used in this section: *** (2)"Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following: (a) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; (b) It is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. First, Bell argues that the trial court's denial of Subway Franchise's motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 precludes it from awarding sanctions under R.C. 2323.51. We disagree. Although similar, Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 involve different standards. Second, Bell argues that his seeking personal jurisdiction over Subway Franchise and Subway Sandwiches was supported by a "good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Bell sought personal jurisdiction under Civ.R. 4.3(A)(4) and R.C. 2307.382(A)(4). Civ.R. 4.3(A)(4) provides: - 5 - 5 (A) When service permitted. Service of process may be made outside of this state, as provided in this rule, in any action in this state, upon a person who, at the time of service of process, is a nonresident of this state or is a resident of this state who is absent from this state. "Person" includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, who, acting directly or by an agent, has caused an event to occur out of which the claim that is the subject of the complaint arose, from the person's: *** (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; *** . R.C. 2307.382(A)(4) provides: (A) A court may exercise personal juris- diction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: *** (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. Bell argued the tortious injury occurred in Ohio because he continued to feel its effects after he returned from Florida. None of the numerous cases cited by Bell support this conclusion. Several cases involve jurisdiction under Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) and R.C. 2307.382(A)(1), which requires that the cause of action arise directly from the defendant's transacting business in Ohio. - 6 - 6 Columbus Show Case Co. v. CEE Contracting, Inc. (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 559, 563-564; Cincinnati Art Galleries v Fatzie (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 696, 698-699; Hammill Mfg. Co. v. Quality Rubber Prod., Inc. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 369, 373-374; L. B. Cleveland, Inc. v. Metal Purchasing Co., Inc. (Feb. 15, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 58163, unreported. In another, Price v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 315, the court found that the tort, intentional interference with contract, resulted in an injury in Ohio because at the time of the actual tort the plaintiffs were in Ohio. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that an action based on a tort that occurred in another state while the plaintiff was in that state was frivolous when personal jurisdiction was dependent on the tortious injury occurring in Ohio. Accordingly, Bell's second assignment of error is not well taken. IV. In his third assignment of error, Bell contends the trial court erred in not specifically addressing the objections to the referee's report. As noted above, Bell failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for sanctions against Subway Sandwiches under Civ.R. 11. We only have jurisdiction, therefore, - 7 - 7 over the trial court's granting of Subway Franchise's motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51. Civ.R. 53(E)(2) provides that "[u]pon consideration of the objections, the court may adopt, reject, or modify the report; hear additional evidence; return the matter to the referee with instructions; or hear the matter its self." Nothing requires the trial court to specifically address the objections. Accordingly, Bell's third assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - 8 It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the South Euclid Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, C.J. and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .