COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68425 IN RE: AMANDA STAPLER, : JOURNAL ENTRY INCOMPETENT : : AND APPELLEE : : OPINION DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 16, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Probate Court, No. 1037928. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Whitecliff Manor Health: Daniel F. Lindner, Esq. 55 Public Square, Suite 1450 Cleveland, OH 44113 For Amanda Stapler: Alan G. Gelbman, Esq. 14600 Detroit Avenue, Suite 1150 Lakewood, OH 44107 For Earl E. Stapler: Earl E. Stapler, Esq. 11510 Buckeye Road, No. 2 Cleveland, OH 44104 For Old Republic Insurance Timothy Fitzgerald, Esq. Co.: Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 -2- DAVID T. MATIA, J.: Whitecliff Manor Health Care Center ("Whitecliff"), appellant, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Probate Court accepting an "agreed judgment entry" on a motion to surcharge the former guardian of Ms. Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. Appellant raises three assignments of error concerning the trial court's ruling that appellant's motion to intervene was moot and the trial court's affirmance of a judgment entry prepared by the appointed referee. This court, finding error, reverses the decision of the trial court. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 24, 1989, Earl Stapler was appointed guardian of Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. On that same date, Old Republic Surety Company ("Old Republic"), posted a bond for Mr. Stapler as guardian for any loss which may occur due to Mr. Stapler's malfeasance in performing his guardianship duties. At all times pertinent to this opinion, Amanda Stapler was receiving home services from Whitecliff, appellant. On February 16, 1994, Mr. Stapler was removed as guardian due to his failure to file a partial account pursuant to R.C. 2109.30. On March 28, 1994, Alan Gelbman was appointed successor guardian of the estate and filed a guardian's bond with the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Mr. Gelbman subsequently filed a motion to surcharge the former guardian, Mr. Stapler, and Old Republic for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate. At that time, the outstanding debt equalled the amount owed Whitecliff, appellant, -3- for services rendered. There remains a dispute between the parties as to the total amount due appellant. On November 14, 1994, a hearing was held before a referee on the motion to surcharge. Present at the hearing were Mr. Stapler, Mr. Gelbman, Old Republic and a representative for Whitecliff, appellant. While there is nothing in the record to establish exactly what had transpired at the hearing, appellant claims the referee would not allow its representative to introduce evidence and ordered the representative to leave the room in violation of R.C. 2109.61. Mr. Gelbman claims appellant's representative was ill-prepared and asked the referee to be excused after becoming frustrated with the proceeding. Old Republic similarly asserts appellant's representative was ill-prepared and voluntarily left the hearing. After appellant's representative left the hearing, the parties agreed that Mr. Stapler pay Mr. Gelbman a total of $4,200 for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate and for services/expenses incurred by the successor guardian. That same day, the agreement was memorialized in an agreed judgment entry which disposed of the motion to surcharge upon payment by Mr. Stapler. On November 8, 1994, four days later, appellant's attorney filed a motion to intervene and a notice of appearance. On December 22, 1994, the former guardian made the $4,200 payment to the successor guardian as agreed to by the parties. The probate court entered a settlement and dismissal entry on the motion to surcharge and denied appellant's motion to intervene as moot. -4- Appellant timely filed this appeal. II. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Whitecliff's, appellant's, first assignment of error states: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS MOOT WHEN IT WAS FILED PRIOR TO THE COURT'S AFFIRMATION AND APPROVAL OF THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE AND WHEN OHIO STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE APPELLANT IS A PROPER PARTY TO THE SURCHARGE ACTION AT ISSUE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to intervene which was filed before judgment was entered. Specifically, appellant argues it was an interested party in the ward's estate and had been injured by the malfeasance of the former guardian, Mr. Stapler. Moreover, appellant's attorney filed the motion to intervene in a timely manner, i.e., approximately one month before the probate court affirmed the agreed judgment entry. Finally, appellant argues its ability to recover from the ward's estate has been impaired by the agreed judgment entry as the doctrine of res judicata would be invoked. For these reasons, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: ABUSE OF DISCRETION. A motion to intervene is governed by Civ.R. 24 which reads in part: -5- (A) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (B) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law and fact in common. *** The statute under which appellant asserts it is a necessary party to the motion to surcharge is R.C. 2109.61 which reads in part: An action may be prosecuted on the bond of a fiduciary against any one or more of the obligers thereof by any person who has been injured by reason of the breach of any condition of the bond. Such action shall be prosecuted for the benefit of all persons who are interested in the estate and who have been similarly injured. Any such person or any obligor on the bond who is not already a party to the action may intervene therein or be made a party thereto by supplemental, amended, or cross-petition. A decision whether to grant or deny a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Likeover v. Cleveland (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 154; Brahim v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine (Oct. 15, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63228, unreported. Absent a showing that the trial court abused its -6- discretion, a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decision. Likeover, supra. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re Adoption of Charles B (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 88; Young v. Equitec Estate Investors Fund (Dec. 22, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67480, unreported. C. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE. Initially, we note that the denial of a motion to intervene is a final appealable order and as such is properly before this court. Likeover, supra. In the case sub judice, there is no dispute of these facts: (1) appellant was at no time a party to the motion to surcharge, (2) appellant is a creditor of the ward's estate since it was not paid for services rendered and (3) appellant timely filed its motion to intervene approximately one month before the probate court entered final judgment. It has been held that the basis of the alleged right to intervene must be balanced against the trial court's convenience and potential prejudice to the rights of the original parties. Likeover, supra. In this case we can find no potential for prejudice to the rights of the original parties since all parties agree appellant is entitled to compensation for services rendered. How much compensation though is still a matter in dispute. Moreover, there may be a question existing as to -7- whether the language of the agreed judgment entry would act as a bar to appellant's attempt to recover from the ward's estate. Given these facts and keeping in mind that Civ.R. 24 is to be liberally construed, we find it unreasonable and impractical for the trial court to deny appellant the opportunity to protect its interest in the ward's estate. See Blackburn v. Hamoudi (1986), 20 Ohio App.3d 350; Civ.R. 24, staff notes. The court's failure to permit appellant to intervene in the motion to surcharge constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. III. SECOND AND THIRD ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Whitecliff, appellant, states as its second and third assignments of error: II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO SAID ENTRY. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WHEN NO COPY OF SAID JUDGMENT ENTRY WAS SENT TO THE APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION. In the interest of judicial economy, an appellate court is not required to consider an assignment of error if the court of appeals considers the assignments moot by reason of its reversal on another assignment. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Accordingly, due to this court's disposition of appellant's first assignment of error, the issues raised in appellant's second and third assignments of error have been rendered moot. -8- Judgement reversed and remanded for further proceedings. -9- This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. HARPER, P.J. and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68425 IN RE: AMANDA STAPLER, : JOURNAL ENTRY INCOMPETENT : : AND APPELLEE : : OPINION DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Probate Court, No. 1037928. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Whitecliff Manor Health: Daniel F. Lindner, Esq. 55 Public Square, Suite 1450 Cleveland, OH 44113 For Amanda Stapler: Alan G. Gelbman, Esq. 14600 Detroit Avenue, Suite 1150 Lakewood, OH 44107 For Earl E. Stapler: Earl E. Stapler, Esq. 11510 Buckeye Road, No. 2 Cleveland, OH 44104 For Old Republic Insurance Timothy Fitzgerald, Esq. Co.: Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 -11- DAVID T. MATIA, J.: Whitecliff Manor Health Care Center ("Whitecliff"), appellant, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Probate Court accepting an "agreed judgment entry" on a motion to surcharge the former guardian of Ms. Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. Appellant raises three assignments of error concerning the trial court's ruling that appellant's motion to intervene was moot and the trial court's affirmance of a judgment entry prepared by the appointed referee. This court, finding error, reverses the decision of the trial court. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 24, 1989, Earl Stapler was appointed guardian of Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. On that same date, Old Republic Surety Company ("Old Republic"), posted a bond for Mr. Stapler as guardian for any loss which may occur due to Mr. Stapler's malfeasance in performing his guardianship duties. At all times pertinent to this opinion, Amanda Stapler was receiving home services from Whitecliff, appellant. On February 16, 1994, Mr. Stapler was removed as guardian due to his failure to file a partial account pursuant to R.C. 2109.30. On March 28, 1994, Alan Gelbman was appointed successor guardian of the estate and filed a guardian's bond with the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Mr. Gelbman subsequently filed a motion to surcharge the former guardian, Mr. Stapler, and Old Republic for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate. At that time, the outstanding debt equalled the amount owed Whitecliff, -12- appellant, for services rendered. There remains a dispute between the parties as to the total amount due appellant. On November 14, 1994, a hearing was held before a referee on the motion to surcharge. Present at the hearing were Mr. Stapler, Mr. Gelbman, Old Republic and a representative for Whitecliff, appellant. While there is nothing in the record to establish exactly what had transpired at the hearing, appellant claims the referee would not allow its representative to introduce evidence and ordered the representative to leave the room in violation of R.C. 2109.61. Mr. Gelbman claims appellant's representative was ill-prepared and asked the referee to be excused after becoming frustrated with the proceeding. Old Republic similarly asserts appellant's representative was ill- prepared and voluntarily left the hearing. After appellant's representative left the hearing, the parties agreed that Mr. Stapler pay Mr. Gelbman a total of $4,200 for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate and for services/expenses incurred by the successor guardian. That same day, the agreement was memorialized in an agreed judgment entry which disposed of the motion to surcharge upon payment by Mr. Stapler. On November 8, 1994, four days later, appellant's attorney filed a motion to intervene and a notice of appearance. On December 22, 1994, the former guardian made the $4,200 payment to the successor guardian as agreed to by the parties. The probate court entered a settlement and dismissal entry on the motion to surcharge and denied appellant's motion to intervene as moot. -13- Appellant timely filed this appeal. II. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Whitecliff, appellant, first assignment of error states: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS MOOT WHEN IT WAS FILED PRIOR TO THE COURT'S AFFIRMATION AND APPROVAL OF THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE AND WHEN OHIO STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE APPELLANT IS A PROPER PARTY TO THE SURCHARGE ACTION AT ISSUE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to intervene which was filed before judgment was entered. Specifically, appellant argues it was an interested party in the ward's estate and had been injured by the malfeasance of the former guardian, Mr. Stapler. Moreover, appellant's attorney filed the motion to intervene in a timely manner, i.e., approximately one month before the probate court affirmed the agreed judgment entry. Finally, appellant argues its ability to recover from the ward's estate has been impaired by the agreed judgment entry as the doctrine of res judicata would be invoked. For these reasons, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: ABUSE OF DISCRETION. A motion to intervene is governed by Civ.R. 24 which reads in part: -14- (A) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (B) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claim or defense and the main action have a question of law and fact in common. *** The statute under which appellant asserts it is a necessary party to the motion to surcharge is R.C. 2109.61 which reads in part: An action may be prosecuted on the bond of a fiduciary against any one or more of the obligers thereof by any person who has been injured by reason of the breach of any condition of the bond. Such action shall be prosecuted for the benefit of all persons who are interested in the estate and who have been similarly injured. Any such person or any obligor on the bond who is not already a party to the action may intervene therein or be made a party thereto by supplemental, amended, or cross-petition. A decision whether to grant or deny a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Likeover v. Cleveland (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 154; Brahim v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine (Oct. 15, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63228, unreported. Absent a showing that the trial court abused its -15- discretion, a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decision. Likeover, supra. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re Adoption of Charles B (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 88; Young v. Equitec Estate Investors Fund (Dec. 22, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67480, unreported. C. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE. Initially, we note that the denial of a motion to intervene is a final appealable order and as such is properly before this court. Likeover, supra. In the case sub judice, there is no dispute of these facts: (1) appellant was at no time a party to the motion to surcharge, (2) appellant is a creditor of the ward's estate since it was not paid for services rendered and (3) appellant timely filed its motion to intervene approximately one month before the probate court entered final judgment. It has been held that the basis of the alleged right to intervene must be balanced against the trial court's convenience and potential prejudice to the rights of the original parties. Likeover, supra. In this case we can find no potential for prejudice to the rights of the original parties since all parties agree appellant is entitled to compensation for services rendered. How much compensation though is still a matter in dispute. Moreover, there may be a question existing as to -16- whether the language of the agreed judgment entry would act as a bar to appellant's attempt to recover from the ward's estate. Given these facts and keeping in mind that Civ.R. 24 is to be liberally construed, we find it unreasonable and impractical for the trial court to deny appellant the opportunity to protect its interest in the ward's estate. See Blackburn v. Hamoudi (1986), 20 Ohio App.3d 350; Civ.R. 24, staff notes. The court's failure to permit appellant to intervene in the motion to surcharge constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. III. SECOND AND THIRD ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Whitecliff, appellant, states as its second and third assignments of error: II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO SAID ENTRY. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WHEN NO COPY OF SAID JUDGMENT ENTRY WAS SENT TO THE APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION. In the interest of judicial economy, an appellate court is not required to consider an assignment of error if the court of appeals considers the assignments moot by reason of its reversal on another assignment. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Accordingly, due to this court's disposition of appellant's first assignment of error, the issues raised in appellant's second and third assignments of error have been rendered moot. -17- Judgement reversed and remanded for further proceedings. -18- This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. HARPER, P.J. and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68425 IN RE: AMANDA STAPLER, : JOURNAL ENTRY INCOMPETENT : : AND APPELLEE : : OPINION DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Probate Court, No. 1037928. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Whitecliff Manor Health: Daniel F. Lindner, Esq. 55 Public Square, Suite 1450 Cleveland, OH 44113 For Amanda Stapler: Alan G. Gelbman, Esq. 14600 Detroit Avenue, Suite 1150 Lakewood, OH 44107 For Earl E. Stapler: Earl E. Stapler, Esq. 11510 Buckeye Road, No. 2 Cleveland, OH 44104 For Old Republic Insurance Timothy Fitzgerald, Esq. Co.: Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 -20- DAVID T. MATIA, J.: Whitecliff Manor Health Care Center ("Whitecliff"), appellant, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Probate Court accepting an "agreed judgment entry" on a motion to surcharge the former guardian of Ms. Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. Appellant raises three assignments of error concerning the trial court's ruling that appellant's motion to intervene was moot and the trial court's affirmance of a judgment entry prepared by the appointed referee. This court, finding error, reverses the decision of the trial court. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 24, 1989, Earl Stapler was appointed guardian of Amanda Stapler, an incompetent. On that same date, Old Republic Surety Company ("Old Republic"), posted a bond for Mr. Stapler as guardian for any loss which may occur due to Mr. Stapler's malfeasance in performing his guardianship duties. At all times pertinent to this opinion, Amanda Stapler was receiving home services from Whitecliff, appellant. On February 16, 1994, Mr. Stapler was removed as guardian due to his failure to file a partial account pursuant to R.C. 2109.30. On March 28, 1994, Alan Gelbman was appointed successor guardian of the estate and filed a guardian's bond with the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Mr. Gelbman subsequently filed a motion to surcharge the former guardian, Mr. Stapler, and Old Republic for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate. At that time, the outstanding debt equalled the amount owed Whitecliff, -21- appellant, for services rendered. There remains a dispute between the parties as to the total amount due appellant. On November 14, 1994, a hearing was held before a referee on the motion to surcharge. Present at the hearing were Mr. Stapler, Mr. Gelbman, Old Republic and a representative for Whitecliff, appellant. While there is nothing in the record to establish exactly what had transpired at the hearing, appellant claims the referee would not allow its representative to introduce evidence and ordered the representative to leave the room in violation of R.C. 2109.61. Mr. Gelbman claims appellant's representative was ill-prepared and asked the referee to be excused after becoming frustrated with the proceeding. Old Republic similarly asserts appellant's representative was ill- prepared and voluntarily left the hearing. After appellant's representative left the hearing, the parties agreed that Mr. Stapler pay Mr. Gelbman a total of $4,200 for the outstanding debt of the ward's estate and for services/expenses incurred by the successor guardian. That same day, the agreement was memorialized in an agreed judgment entry which disposed of the motion to surcharge upon payment by Mr. Stapler. On November 8, 1994, four days later, appellant's attorney filed a motion to intervene and a notice of appearance. On December 22, 1994, the former guardian made the $4,200 payment to the successor guardian as agreed to by the parties. The probate court entered a settlement and dismissal entry on the motion to surcharge and denied appellant's motion to intervene as moot. -22- Appellant timely filed this appeal. II. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Whitecliff, appellant, first assignment of error states: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS MOOT WHEN IT WAS FILED PRIOR TO THE COURT'S AFFIRMATION AND APPROVAL OF THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE AND WHEN OHIO STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE APPELLANT IS A PROPER PARTY TO THE SURCHARGE ACTION AT ISSUE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to intervene which was filed before judgment was entered. Specifically, appellant argues it was an interested party in the ward's estate and had been injured by the malfeasance of the former guardian, Mr. Stapler. Moreover, appellant's attorney filed the motion to intervene in a timely manner, i.e., approximately one month before the probate court affirmed the agreed judgment entry. Finally, appellant argues its ability to recover from the ward's estate has been impaired by the agreed judgment entry as the doctrine of res judicata would be invoked. For these reasons, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: ABUSE OF DISCRETION. A motion to intervene is governed by Civ.R. 24 which reads in part: -23- (A) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (B) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claim or defense and the main action have a question of law and fact in common. *** The statute under which appellant asserts it is a necessary party to the motion to surcharge is R.C. 2109.61 which reads in part: An action may be prosecuted on the bond of a fiduciary against any one or more of the obligers thereof by any person who has been injured by reason of the breach of any condition of the bond. Such action shall be prosecuted for the benefit of all persons who are interested in the estate and who have been similarly injured. Any such person or any obligor on the bond who is not already a party to the action may intervene therein or be made a party thereto by supplemental, amended, or cross-petition. A decision whether to grant or deny a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Likeover v. Cleveland (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 154; Brahim v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine (Oct. 15, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63228, unreported. Absent a showing that the trial court abused its -24- discretion, a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decision. Likeover, supra. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re Adoption of Charles B (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 88; Young v. Equitec Estate Investors Fund (Dec. 22, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67480, unreported. C. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE. Initially, we note that the denial of a motion to intervene is a final appealable order and as such is properly before this court. Likeover, supra. In the case sub judice, there is no dispute of these facts: (1) appellant was at no time a party to the motion to surcharge, (2) appellant is a creditor of the ward's estate since it was not paid for services rendered and (3) appellant timely filed its motion to intervene approximately one month before the probate court entered final judgment. It has been held that the basis of the alleged right to intervene must be balanced against the trial court's convenience and potential prejudice to the rights of the original parties. Likeover, supra. In this case we can find no potential for prejudice to the rights of the original parties since all parties agree appellant is entitled to compensation for services rendered. How much compensation though is still a matter in dispute. Moreover, there may be a question existing as to -25- whether the language of the agreed judgment entry would act as a bar to appellant's attempt to recover from the ward's estate. Given these facts and keeping in mind that Civ.R. 24 is to be liberally construed, we find it unreasonable and impractical for the trial court to deny appellant the opportunity to protect its interest in the ward's estate. See Blackburn v. Hamoudi (1986), 20 Ohio App.3d 350; Civ.R. 24, staff notes. The court's failure to permit appellant to intervene in the motion to surcharge constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. III. SECOND AND THIRD ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Whitecliff, appellant, states as its second and third assignments of error: II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO SAID ENTRY. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTRY PREPARED BY THE REFEREE WHEN NO COPY OF SAID JUDGMENT ENTRY WAS SENT TO THE APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION. In the interest of judicial economy, an appellate court is not required to consider an assignment of error if the court of appeals considers the assignments moot by reason of its reversal on another assignment. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Accordingly, due to this court's disposition of appellant's first assignment of error, the issues raised in appellant's second and third assignments of error have been rendered moot. -26- Judgement reversed and remanded for further proceedings. -27- This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. HARPER, P.J. and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate .