COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68387 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION NAZIH CHEDID : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 26, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-306,450 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor FRANK CASPER, Assistant JOHN W. MONROE, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: FRANK J. McNALLY Attorney at Law 19800 Center Ridge Road Rocky River, Ohio 44116 JOHN V. CORRIGAN, J.: Defendant-appellant, Nazih Chedid, appeals from his convic- tion for the offense of trafficking in food stamps. The appellant raises three assignments of error which involve the issues of the failure of the prosecutor to provide timely pretrial discovery, the trial court's denial of a motion for acquittal, and the claim that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. The appellant's appeal is not well taken. On February 3, 1994, the appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Cuyahoga County for one count of trafficking in food stamps in violation of R.C. 2913.46. On February 22, 1994, the appellant was arraigned, whereupon a plea of not guilty was entered to the indictment. On December 8, 1994, a jury trial was commenced with regard to the one count of trafficking in food stamps. On December 13, 1994, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the one count of trafficking in food stamps. On January 3, 1995, the trial court sentenced the appellant to incarceration within the Lorain Correctional Institution for a term of six months and further imposed a fine of $1,500 plus court costs. The trial court, however, suspended the term of incarcera- tion, suspended $1,000 of the fine, and placed the appellant on six - 3 - months probation. Thereafter, the appellant timely brought the instant appeal. I. The appellant's initial assignment of error is that: THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROHIBIT PROSECUTORS FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDANT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORAL MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE, WHICH IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND DUE COURSE OF LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO. The appellant, through his first assignment of error, argues that the failure of the prosecutor to provide timely-requested pretrial discovery material required that the trial court impose a sanction as mandated by Crim.R. 16(E)(3) or, in the alternative, grant a continuance of trial. Specifically, the appellant argues that the failure of the prosecutor to provide exculpatory material prior to trial resulted in "an unfair advantage by depriving the appellant of any opportunity to review the actual documents and obtain further witnesses or information to support the appellant's case." The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442, examined the issue of the failure of a prosecutor to timely deliver requested discovery material and the duty of the trial court per Crim.R. 16 and held that: Where, in a criminal trial, the prosecution fails to comply with Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a)(ii) by - 4 - informing the accused of an oral statement made by a co-defendant to a law enforcement officer, and the record does not demonstrate (1) that the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) that foreknowledge of the statement would have benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, or (3) that the accused was prejudiced by admission of the statement, the trial court does not abuse its discretion under Crim.R. 16(E)(3) by permitting such evidence to be admitted. Id., syllabus. In the case sub judice, a review of the record fails to disclose that the appellant was prejudiced by the conduct of the prosecutor with regard to discovery requested per Crim.R. 16. In fact, the trial court directly addressed the issue of pretrial discovery and the appellant's motion for continuance and opined that: THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gasper; response? MR. GASPER: May it please the Court, I had, at a prior pretrial in this court, when the case was set the last time by this Court, I sat down with counsel and read him all the pertinent information that we would use at trial. In fact, I showed him -- he wanted to know about this de- caying stained teeth remark about his client, that's on what is known as a form one, and I have an extra copy here for counsel. I read that to him at that time. I have no problem in turning it over. THE COURT: Okay. - 5 - MR. GASPER: That which contains a physical description of his client. And that's the same thing I read to him and showed him at pretrial a month ago. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. MR. GASPER: The second report by the un- dercover officer, Sharon Dickerson; I read from that last month, and in fact, I gave it to him this morning again. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GASPER: And that is apparently the second description that he's concerned about. THE COURT: Right. MR. GASPER: And I can give him a copy. I've gave (sic) him that copy this morning. I think you copied down this information that was there in regards to the physical description -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. GASPER: -- that we read this last month to you. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. MR. McNALLY: I know -- Parries' description - - MR. GASPER: No. No. Parries is not in- volved with your case. Sharon Dickerson is the one. MR. McNALLY: It's my contention, your Honor, that originally when Officer Dickerson appeared at this store and came back to the department, and filed her report -- THE COURT: Right. - 6 - MR. McNALLY: -- her description was the copy of the one that was made, submitted by Parries. THE COURT: Officer -- MR. McNALLY: It was the original descrip- tion. And I'm claiming that that description has been sub- stituted with the later de- scription. THE COURT: All right. Well, here's the thing. The fact is you've gotten -- you've had full dis- covery, and now, that you've got copies, I think that's fine. In addition, you can cross-examine the officer about that. MR. McNALLY: Okay. THE COURT: And when that time happens, then if you need to subpoena some other officer or something, you can do that. Additionally, I'm not granting a continuance because of lack of preparation, because first, I don't believe you're not prepared. I know you're pre- pared, because I've talked to you about this case. Secondly, I don't believe that the hard copies of the document would actually change your preparation. In addition, I don't think there's been any surprise here, considering -- because I know for a fact that Frank -- Mr. Gasper gave you that, because I insisted at the last pretrial, when I continued the pretrial the last time. - 7 - So with that then, your objec- tion is noted for the record. You've preserved the record, but we're going to continue right now, and the motion is denied. MR. McNALLY: Okay. Exception, your Honor. (Tr. 8, 9, 10, 11.) The record before this court clearly reveals that: 1) de- fense counsel possessed prior knowledge of the requested discovery material; 2) defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Cleveland Police Officer Sharon Dickerson with regard to any material inconsistencies created by the requested discovery material; and 3) defense counsel failed to establish at the time of trial the existence of any material prejudice as a result of the prosecu- tor's discovery conduct. The trial court's imposition of a sanc- tion per Crim.R. 16 or the granting of a continuance of trial were not warranted. Cf. State v. Haddix (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 470; State v. Eubank (1987), 38 Ohio App.3d 141. Thus, the appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. II. The appellant's second assignment of error is that: THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S RULE 29 MOTION TO DISMISS. - 8 - The appellant, through his second assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred by denying his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal. Specifically, the appellant argues that the prosecutor failed to adduce at trial sufficient evidence tending to prove each element of the offense of trafficking in food stamps which mandated the granting of the Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal. Crim.R. 29(A), which deals with a motion for judgment of acquittal, provides that: (A) Motion for judgment of acquittal. The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, established that a trial court shall not grant a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal where the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that reasonable minds can reach different con- clusions with regard to whether the elements of the charged offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., syllabus. - 9 - In the case sub judice, the appellant argues that the failure of the prosecutor to introduce into evidence the food stamps sold to the appellant by the undercover police officer prevented a conviction and thus required that the trial court grant the appel- lant's Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal. The actual introduc- tion at trial of the food stamps sold to the appellant did not prevent a conviction for the offense of trafficking in food stamps. State v. Williams (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 232; State v. Powell (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 157. The testimony of Cleveland Police Officer Dickerson constituted direct evidence with regard to the sale of food stamps to the appellant. See Tr. 49, 50 and 51. In addition, additional direct evidence was introduced at trial which established the origin of the food stamps sold to the appellant. See Tr. 151, 157. Thus, the trial court properly denied the appellant's Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal since reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on whether the prosecutor had proven all the elements of the offense of trafficking in food stamps beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bridgeman, supra. Therefore, the appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. III. The appellant's third assignment of error is that: THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT. - 10 - The appellant, through his third assignment of error, argues that his conviction for the offense of trafficking in food stamps was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argues that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to establish that the appellant illegally purchased food stamps. In State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, the Supreme Court of Ohio examined the issue of insufficient evidence and established that: An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.) Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. R.C. 2913.14(A), which defines the offense of trafficking in food stamps, provides that: (A) No individual shall knowingly possess, buy, sell, use, alter, accept, or transfer food stamp coupons in any manner not authorized by the "Food Stamp Act of 1977," 91 Stat. 958, 7 U.S.C. 2011, as amended. Thus, the elements of the offense of trafficking in food stamps are: 1) individual knowingly; 2) possesses, buys, sells, uses, alters, accepts or transfers food stamp coupons; - 11 - 3) in a manner not authorized by the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 958; 7 U.S.C.A. 2011. During the course of trial, the prosecutor presented suffi- cient evidence to establish that the appellant knowingly pur- chased, for the sum of $190, food stamps in the amount of $250 from an undercover agent. Further, the record clearly demonstrates that the exchange of food stamps for money constitutes a clear violation of the Food Stamp Act of 1977. See Sec. 15(A) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977. State v. Gill (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 53; State v. Bolar (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 194. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to prosecution, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of trafficking in food stamps proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. The appellant's third assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 12 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into exe- cution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, P.J. and DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR *JOHN V. CORRIGAN JUDGE *SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT: John V. Corrigan, retired Judge of the Eighth Appellate District. N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .