COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68334 VICTORIA MERKLY : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JAMES J. SCHNEIDER, ET AL. : : Defendant-appellants : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : June 8, 1995 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 143966 JUDGMENT : DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellants: JEFFREY F. SLAVIN, ESQ. TIM L. COLLINS, ESQ. REG. NO. 0002657 REG. NO. 0033116 Suite 1225 3300 Terminal Tower 75 Public Square 50 Public Square Cleveland, OH 44113 Cleveland, OH 44113 - 2 - PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App. R. 11.1 and Loc. R. 25, the record from the court of common pleas and the briefs. In 1978, plaintiff Victoria Merkly and defendant-attorney James Schneider entered into a contingency fee agreement whereby Schneider would prosecute a wrongful death claim with the Industrial Commission of Ohio. Schneider later brought in defendant-attorney Stanley Vrabec as co-counsel to assist with the workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff eventually received an award and the attorneys each collected fees based upon the contingency fee arrangement. Plaintiff filed this action in 1988, seeking partial reimbursement of attorney fees. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 21, 1989, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants brought a timely appeal to this court in case no. 58984, but we found the summary judgment lacked finality because the trial court had failed to determine the amount of the judgment. On May 30, 1991, we temporarily remanded the case with orders for the trial court to enter the amount of judgment, specifying that dismissal would follow if a proper journal entry was not forthcoming. Unbeknown to this court, on January 24, 1990, the trial court recorded a journal entry indicating it had granted judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $14,100. However, the parties did not notify this court at the time the judgment had been entered, nor - 3 - did they submit the journal entry as ordered. Consequently, we dismissed the appeal on October 21, 1991. Defendant Vrabec filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. When the trial court denied that motion, Vrabec appealed in case no. 66149. We again dismissed the appeal for want of a final appealable order under authority of Pitts v. Dept. of Transportation (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 37, because an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not a final appealable order. Vrabec then filed a complaint with this court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to issue a final appealable order. Although cognizant that the trial court had purported to issue a final order in January 1990, we could not afford that order finality because it had been made at a time when this court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction of the case. Cf. State ex rel. Richard v. O'Donnell (Aug.25, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63886, unreported, affirmed (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 451 (no clear legal duty for common pleas judge to rule on motion for default judgment after notice of appeal had been filed by relator.). The trial court may have had authority to enter clerical corrections under Civ.R. 60(A), but entering a dollar amount caused a substantive change in the judgment. See Albertson v. Ryder (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 765, 770. In any event, we found our prior dismissals operated as the law of the case; therefore, we granted the writ. See Vrabec v. Sutula (Oct. 21, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67743, unreported. - 4 - The trial court complied with the writ of mandamus and on November 3, 1994, reissued judgment on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, referencing its earlier order to that effect. On November 29, 1994, it again reissued the final order, this time listing the names of defendants and certifying there was no just reason for delay. Defendant Vrabec filed a notice of appeal on December 29, 1994. We lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal since defendant did not file his notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by App.R. 4(A). The journal entries filed by the trial court are, for all intent and purposes, identical. The November 3 judgment entry states: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $14,100.00 plus interest at 10% per annum from date of judgment plus costs. Reference Vol. 1222 p. 992. The November 29 journal entry states: Judgment for pltf. in the amount of $14,100.00 plus interest at 10% per annum from date of judgment plus costs against defts James J. Schneider and Stanley F. Vrabec. Reference Vol. 1222 p. 992. There is no just cause for delay. The November 29 judgment entry differs from the November 3 entry in two minor respects. First, the November 29 entry lists the names of the co-defendants. This is not a material change in the judgment. Neither defendant had been dismissed from the - 5 - 1 action , and both had joined in the joint motion for summary judgment. Adding the names of the codefendants to the November 29 judgment was superfluous and did not change the nature of the judgment itself. Roth v. Roth (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 768. Second, the November 29 entry uses language from Civ.R. 54(B) to certify there is no just reason for delay. The addition of this language does not change the judgment. It is well-established that a trial court may not use Civ.R. 54(B) language to convert an interlocutory order into a final order. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88-89; Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 352, 354. Conversely, the trial court may not extend the time for appeal by taking a final order and adding Civ.R. 54(B) language. See General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 21. In this case, the trial court had no reason to certify no just reason for delay because there were no unadjudicated claims. The cross-motions for summary judgment each addressed the separate counts relating to Schneider and Vrabec. There is simply no basis for concluding the summary judgment rendered on November 3 did not resolve both counts raised in the complaint. 1 The record does contain a document directed to defendant Vrabec and styled as a "Release of Lien and Satisfaction of Judgment" filed November 1, 1991. That document is a nullity because it purports to release Vrabec from the judgment entered on January 24, 1990, a judgment we have found to be a nullity. It follows that any attempt to levy on a null judgment would itself be a nullity. In any event, Vrabec is the party pursuing this appeal, so we must necessarily presume neither he nor plaintiff consider the satisfaction of judgment viable. - 6 - The trial court may not re-enter judgment in order to circumvent the App.R.4(A) limitation period. See Kertes Ent., Inc. Orange Planning Zoning Comm. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 48; Mack v. Traveler's Ins. Co. (June 29, 1989), Cuyahoga App. No. 57052, unreported. Because defendant did not file this appeal until December 29, 1994, more than thirty days after the November 3, 1994 judgment, we lack jurisdiction. Dismissed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants her costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, CHIEF JUSTICE PATRICIA BLACKMON, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .