COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68242 : RONALD SHEPHERD : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : LOUISE SHEPHERD : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 31, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Division Common Pleas Court Case No. D-227577 JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, reversed in part. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: TYRONE E. REED, ESQ. MARK STURIK, ESQ. 12025 Shaker Blvd. JILL FRIEDMAN HELFMAN, ESQ. Suite 575 Behrens & Gioffre Co., L.P.A. Cleveland, Ohio 44120 1700 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Ronald Shepherd, appeals the trial court's order dividing the property and ordering spousal support to defendant-appellee, Louise Shepherd. Ronald Shepherd assigns the following five errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED SPOUSAL SUPPORT WHICH WAS NOT BASED UPON THE NEED OF THE SPOUSE. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT SPECIFY THE FACTORS IT UTILIZED TO REACH IT'S (sic) AWARD TO THE SPOUSE. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT STATE A DATE CERTAIN UPON WHICH ITS SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD WAS TO TERMINATE. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED AN UNWARRANTED AND EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE SPOUSE WAIVED HER RIGHT TO SPOUSAL SUPPORT. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision. The apposite facts follow. In an action filed July 28, 1993, Ronald Shepherd sought a divorce from his wife, Louise Shepherd on the grounds that they had been living separate and apart for one year. The parties were owners of real property valued at $50,000. The existing mortgage on the property was $24,000. The $412.00 monthly mortgage was being paid by Ronald Shepherd. Louise Shepherd owned a 1987 Cutlass automobile valued at approximately $1500. Ronald Shepherd leased a 1994 Jeep Cherokee for $450.00 per month. The parties' -3- household furnishings were valued at $10,000. Both parties had been employed by the Cleveland Board of Education for over twenty years, and each was entitled to a pension. In 1993, the parties signed an agreement which provided, if grounds for divorce were found to exist, Louise Shepherd would keep the marital home and would pay the applicable taxes, insurance, and utilities. The mortgage payments would be made by Ronald Shepherd. The parties agreed to share equally in the payment of back taxes owed to East Cleveland. The parties agreed to maintain separate bank accounts and to pay their own income taxes, personal debts, and attorney fees. The parties agreed Louise Shepherd would keep the personal property in the marital home with the exception of Ronald Shepherd's clothes and tools. Ronald Shepherd would keep the Jeep and Louise Shepherd would keep the Cutlass. In addition, each party waived any rights to the other's pension. In her August 2, 1994 Brief in Support of Property Division, Louise Shepherd alleged her pension had a value of $18,670.00 and Ronald Shepherd's pension had a value of $54,223.00. She also alleged that Ronald Shepherd earned approximately $50,000 per year and Louise Shepherd earned $20,000. Louise Shepherd argued she was entitled to $900.00 per month for 8 years. In an order issued October 14, 1994, the trial court ordered spousal support in the amount of $600.00 per month. In a November 7, 1994 judgment entry, the trial court awarded Louise Shepherd the marital home and its furnishings. Ronald Shepherd was ordered to continue paying the mortgage on the home and to pay Louise Shepherd -4- $612.00 per month in spousal support. The parties were allowed to retain their pensions free from claims by the other party. Ronald Shepherd filed an appeal and was granted a stay of execution pending appeal on November 14, 1994. In his first, second, and fourth assignments of error, Ronald Shepherd challenges the trial court's order of spousal support. He argues there was no showing that Louise Shepherd needed spousal support; that the trial court did not properly consider the statutory factors listed in R.C. 3105.18; and that the trial court's support award was unwarranted and excessive. Determination of the need for sustenance alimony and the amount to be awarded falls within the broad discretion of the trial court. Schneider v. Schneider (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 164,167. However, the trial court must consider the statutory factors in R.C. 3105.18 and identify the rationale for the award so it can be reviewed by a superior court. Id. "The trial court must indicate the basis for its award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law." Kaechele v. Kaechele (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 159,163. Under R.C. 3105.18, when awarding spousal support, the court should consider the parties' ages, income, earning abilities, physical, mental and emotional condition, assets and liabilities, education, retirement benefits, the employability of the spouse seeking support, the lost income production capacity resulting from the marriage, the tax consequences of the support award, the -5- duration of the marriage, and any other relevant, equitable factor. Although there was evidence on many of the above listed factors in the record, the trial court failed to make any findings of fact relevant to these factors. The journal entry does not contain sufficient information to allow this court to assess the equitability of the spousal support award. Consequently, we remand this case to the trial court for the issuance of findings of fact to assist us in our evaluation of the spousal support award. Ronald Shepherd's first, second, and fourth assignments of error are well taken. The issue raised by Ronald Shepherd's third assignment of error is whether the trial court erred in failing to establish a date when the spousal support award was to terminate. In Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64,69, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "except in cases involving a marriage of long duration, parties of advanced age or a homemaker-spouse with little opportunity to develop meaningful employment outside the home, where a payee spouse has the resources, ability and potential to be self-supporting, an award of sustenance alimony should provide for the termination of the award, within a reasonable time and upon a date certain, in order to place a definitive limit upon the parties' rights and responsibilities." (Emphasis added.) In this case, the record reveals that Louise Shepherd was 51 years old at the time of the divorce. The parties had been married for 28 years. Without question, Louise Shepherd was a party of advanced age and had been in a marriage of long duration. Louise -6- Shepherd did not have a college education and was earning only $20,000 per year. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide for the termination of the spousal support award. In his fifth assignment of error, Ronald Shepherd argues the separation agreement signed by the parties in 1993 constituted a waiver by Louise Shepherd of spousal support. However, the separation agreement made no mention of spousal support. The trial court has the authority to make orders of spousal support. Since the parties did not reach an agreement on the issue of spousal support, the trial court retained the authority to resolve the issue. Because we find Louise Shepherd had not waived her right to spousal support when she signed the separation agreement, we overrule Ronald Shepherd's fifth assignment of error. Because we find the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to enable us to review the propriety of the spousal support award, we remand this case for further findings of fact as to the factors in R.C. 3105.18. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. -7- Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. It is ordered that Appellant and Appellee share the costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, C.J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .