COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68229 CITY OF BEDFORD HEIGHTS : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION F.O.P. LODGE 67 : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JUNE 8, 1995 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-270628 JUDGMENT : DISMISSED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: MARC J. BLOCH, ESQ. ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, ESQ. MARTIN S. LIST, ESQ. Landskroner & Phillips MICHELE H. SCHMIDT, ESQ. 1040 Illuminating Bldg. ROBERT M. WOLFF, ESQ. 55 Public Square Duvin, Cahn & Barnard Cleveland, OH 44113-1904 Erieview Tower, 20th Floor 1301 East 9th Street Cleveland, OH 44114-1886 - 2 - PATTON, C.J. Pursuant to the terms of their collective bargaining agreement, the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 67 (FOP) and the city of Bedford Heights referred the suspension of patrolman Craig Sirna to an arbitrator. The city had suspended Sirna and placed him on probation for one year after it learned he telephoned a city resident while on duty and threatened to file theft charges stemming from the resident's failure to pay a debt with a local merchant. Sirna left the following message on the resident's telephone answering machine: Could you please call Officer Craig Sirna, Bedford Heights Police Department *** It's very important. I need to talk to you about a mower that was picked up and never paid for. We're going to be filing theft charges. Thank you. The arbitrator issued an award finding Sirna had used "unfelicitous phraseology" in threatening criminal charges in what was, essentially, a civil matter. However, the arbitrator found a thirty day suspension without pay and a one year probation excessive under the circumstances. The arbitrator sustained the grievance in part and removed the suspension and probation from Sirna's record, reinstated lost wages and ordered an oral warning for Sirna's "use of inappropriate language." The city filed a motion to vacate the award, arguing Sirna committed acts which were illegal and, if not punished, would violate public policy. The trial court granted the motion to vacate the arbitration award and ordered a rehearing of the arbitration. - 3 - The FOP appeals, assigning three errors that challenge (1) the jurisdictional sufficiency of the city's motion to vacate the arbitration award and (2) the trial court's authority to vacate the award under the circumstances. The FOP challenges the jurisdictional nature of the motion to 1 vacate the arbitrator's award on two grounds. First, it argues the city improperly captioned the motion to vacate by listing the name of officer Sirna, rather than the FOP. Second, it argues the city failed to submit a copy of the collective bargaining agreement with its motion to vacate the award as required by R.C. 2711.14. The city's first motion to vacate the arbitrator's award incorrectly listed Sirna as the appellee. Additionally, the motion failed to contain a copy of the collective bargaining agreement as required by R.C. 2711.14(A). The following day, the city sought leave to amend its motion to vacate by amending the caption to list the FOP as a party. The motion to amend also contained a copy of the collective bargaining agreement. Assuming the failure to identify properly a party to an arbitration proceeding constitutes a jurisdictional defect in the motion to vacate the award, the city rectified that error with its timely amendment to its motion to vacate. 1 In a third argument, the FOP maintained the city had failed to file its motion to vacate the arbitration award within the three month time period set forth in R.C. 2711.13. Subsequent to filing its brief, the FOP and the city stipulated "[a]ppellee's Motion to Vacate, as amended on May 18, 1994, was timely filed under the three month statute of limitations period found in Ohio Revised Code 2711.13." - 4 - The FOP incorrectly maintains the amended motion to vacate is still defective because it simply lists "Fraternal Order of Police" without identifying the particular lodge. "The case law illustrates the liberality with which Ohio courts will permit amendments to cure defective pleadings." Patterson v. V & M Auto Body (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 573, 577; see, also, Civ.R. 15(A). The FOP does not argue a failure of adequate notice in its receipt of the motion to vacate, nor does it maintain the failure to identify the lodge prejudiced it in any manner. Absent meaningful prejudice, we simply cannot conclude there is any error that would be a jurisdictional defect. Despite the absence of a jurisdictional defect in the motion to vacate the arbitrator's award, we nonetheless determine we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the judgment vacating the arbitration award and ordering the parties to resubmit the matter to arbitration is not a final appealable order. In Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 124, the syllabus states: A trial court order which vacates an arbitration award and orders the parties to select new arbitrators and to conduct a new arbitration proceeding is not a "final appealable order" as defined in R.C. 2505.02. The trial court's journal entry states, "[p]laintiff- appellant's motion to vacate arbitrator's award is granted. The court orders rehearing of the arbitration." Under Stewart, this is not a final order because it does not determine the action. Id. at - 5 - 126; Kelm v. Kelm (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 686. No final judgment has been rendered on the arbitration award and decision. Id. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Dismissed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, J. KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .