COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68187 DONALD PHILLIPS : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION FARMERS INSURANCE OF COLUMBUS, : INC. : : Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JULY 13, 1995 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-264841 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: CLAUDIA R. EKLUND, ESQ. D. JOHN TRAVIS, ESQ. Sindell, Lowe & Guidubaldi Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & 610 Skylight Office Tower Norman 1660 West Second Street 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44113-1454 Cleveland, OH 44115 GARY L. NICHOLSON, ESQ. 6th Floor, Bulkley Bldg. 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 - 2 - PATTON, C.J. Plaintiff-appellant, Donald Phillips ("appellant") appeals the ruling of the trial court granting defendant-appellee, Farmers Insurance of Columbus Inc.'s ("appellee") motion for summary judgment. On August 15, 1992, appellant's minor daughter, Darla Phillips was driving appellant's 1992 Crown Victoria when she was involved in a head-on collision with an underinsured driver. At the time of the accident, appellant owned two vehicles, the 1992 Crown Victoria and a 1991 Ford pickup truck. Each vehicle was covered by separate insurance policies issued by appellee. As a result of the accident, appellant presented an underinsured motorist coverage ("UM coverage") claim against appellee under policy number 25122183039, which covered the 1991 Ford. Appellant concedes that he obtained additional insurance coverage on the 1991 Ford through Allstate Insurance Company and the policy was effective beginning June 24, 1992. Appellant's insurance policy with appellee was issued before June 24, 1991. The policy included an automatic termination clause which stated that if other insurance is obtained on the 1991 Ford, any similar insurance afforded under this policy for the 1991 Ford will cease on the effective date of the other insurance. Pursuant to the termination clause in the policy, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. - 3 - Appellant's first assignment of error states: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING AN AUTOMATIC TERMINATION CLAUSE IN AN INSURANCE CONTRACT WHERE SUCH CLAUSE IS IN CONFLICT WITH AN "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE IN THE UNINSURED MOTORIST PROVISIONS. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment because the automatic termination clause was in conflict with the "other insurance" clause in the uninsured motorist provisions. Specifically, appellant asserts that the "the other insurance" clause in Part II of the policy is inconsistent with the automatic termination clause and therefore the contract must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. The first question is whether the two provisions create an ambiguity in the policy. The insurance policy states the following: Part II - Uninsured Motorist Other Insurance * * * 3. ... [I]f any other Automobile Liability Insurance applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. Part V. Conditions C. Automatic Termination * * * If other insurance is obtained on your insured car, any similar insurance afforded under this - 4 - policy for that car will cease on the effective date of the other insurance. Ohio law has held that when interpreting an insurance contract, construction must be given which will harmonize and give effect to all its provisions. Moreover, no provision should be completely disregarded as inconsistent with other provisions unless no other reasonable construction is possible. Stith v. Milwaukee (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 147, 148. The facts and the contested provisions in the insurance contract in Stith, supra, are practically identical to the facts and the provisions in this case. In Stith, the court held that the provisions may be read clearly and unambiguously, and we agree. It is axiomatic that a motion for summary judgment shall only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment shall not be granted unless it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317. Moreover, upon motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56, the burden of establishing that material facts are not in dispute, and that no genuine issue of fact exists, is on the party moving for summary judgment. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. - 5 - (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 66. However, in that Civ. R. 56(E) requires that a party set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, such party must so perform if he is to avoid summary judgment. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, at paragraph seven of the syllabus. Viewing the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the appellant we conclude no genuine issue of material fact exists. The provisions in the insurance contract can be read clearly and unambiguously. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. Appellant's second assignment of error states: II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "OTHER OWNED VEHICLE EXCLUSION" IS VALID IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN MARTIN V. MIDWESTERN GROUP INS. (1994), 70 OHIO ST.3D 478. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it ruled that the "other owned vehicle exclusion" was valid because of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478. Specifically, appellant claims that the court in Martin, held that UM coverage protects people, not vehicles, and any provision which eliminates UM coverage because the insured was in an owned vehicle not covered by the policy was invalid. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. - 6 - We agree with the appellant that Martin, supra, stands for the proposition that UM coverage follows the person not the automobile. However, we find that Martin, is not applicable to the facts in this case. Martin does not address automatic termination provisions, which is the main issue in the present case. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA BLACKMON, J. DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .