COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68109 VILLAGE OF CHAGRIN FALLS : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CAROL PISANI : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : SEPTEMBER 14, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Bedford Municipal Court : Case No. 94-CRB-01054 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: JOSEPH W. DIEMERT, JR. Director of Law/Prosecutor Village of Chagrin Falls 1360 SOM Center Road Cleveland, Ohio 44124 For defendant-appellant: MICHAEL TERRENCE CONWAY Attorney at Law 18848 Canyon Road Fairview Park, Ohio 44126 JOHN V. CORRIGAN, J.: Appellant was charged with resisting arrest (Bedford Mun. Court Case No. 94 CRB 01054). She was found guilty by a jury and appeals that conviction in this case. The resisting arrest charge was tried along with a charge of driving left of center (Bedford Mun. Court Case No. 94 TRD 05057). The jury found appellant not guilty of the driving left of center charge. In the journal entry of conviction, the trial court stayed the imposition of sentence effective upon appellant's posting of a bond. The required bond was posted. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on June 4, 1994, Village of Chagrin Falls Patrolman Joe Chambers was travelling southbound on Solon Road when he observed a northbound vehicle -- a white Toyota -- cross the center line. He turned the police cruiser which he was driving around, pursued the Toyota northbound and informed the village dispatch center of the license plate. After observing the Toyota weaving and travelling left of center, he activated the cruiser's emergency lights. At the time the Toyota came to a stop, Chambers received a response from the dispatch center that the Toyota was registered to appellant and that she had an active warrant for her arrest, which was confirmed with the North Olmsted Police Department. - 3 - Chambers walked up to the driver's window of appellant's vehicle. When she realized that the officer was Joe Chambers, she refused to exit her vehicle. Sergeant Zugan, a supervisor, arrived and spoke with appellant. A third Chagrin Falls officer also arrived. While the police were present, appellant used her car phone to speak to her attorney, her mother and her uncle. Although appellant acknowledged that the officers informed her that there was a warrant for her arrest, she refused to exit her vehicle until her father or uncle arrived. After the initial stop, she drove down the street until the officers were able to block her with their cruisers. A female officer, who is a member of the Moreland Hills Police Department, was called. She was also unable to persuade appellant to exit her car. Over a period of approximately thirty minutes, police officers talked to appellant in an effort to convince her to leave her vehicle. The police attempted to gain entry to appellant's car by unlocking the doors but were unsuccessful because appellant pressed the electric lock button. With the assistance of a second officer from Moreland Hills, they broke one of the car's windows, removed appellant from the vehicle and took her into custody. During the testimony of Officer Chambers, the trial court sustained objections to questions of appellant's counsel regard- ing: (1) a law suit filed by appellant against Bentleyville, for whom Chambers had worked as a police officer; (2) whether Chambers - 4 - filed a false police report; (3) whether Chambers feared for his safety when he stopped appellant; and (4) whether Chambers had any reason to dislike appellant. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court permitted appellant to make an offer of proof. Appellant's father, Michael Catalano, testified regarding a Bentleyville Police Department report dated September 6, 1992. Catalano testified that the report appeared to be signed by Chambers and that the statement by Chambers was "Wrong. Absolutely wrong." Appellant has assigned one error: THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WHEN THE JURY WAS NOT ALLOWED TO HEAR PROOF OF PROSECUTION WITNESS JOE CHAMBER'S [sic] LACK OF VERACITY AND BIAS TOWARDS HER. Appellant contends that her counsel should have been able to cross- examine Chambers regarding his veracity and motivation to lie as well as his bias toward her. Furthermore, she asserts that the trial court's restrictions on cross-examination prevented her from adequately defending herself and confronting a witness against her. In State v. Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253, certiorari denied (1993), _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 250, 126 L.Ed.2d 203, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed: Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right, but the "extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Alford v. United States - 5 - (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 691, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 219, 220, 75 L.Ed.2d 624, 627, 629. The right of cross-examination includes the right to impeach a witness' credibility. * * * A trial judge has broad discretion "to pre- clude repetitive and unduly harassing inter- rogation[.]" Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353. As stated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683, "trial judges retain wide latitude *** to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." * * * Lack of an opportunity to fully cross-examine is harmless error when there is overwhelming, untainted evidence supporting a conviction. Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 253-254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728-1729, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287-288. Green, supra, at 147-48. In this case, we must consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it limited cross- examination in the areas about which appellant complains and whether the untainted evidence is overwhelming. We recognize that all of the areas of excluded testimony -- the Bentleyville lawsuit, the Bentleyville police report, whether Chambers feared appellant and whether Chambers disliked appellant - - may have had an impact on the jury's perception of the credibil- ity of Patrolman Chambers. Nevertheless, these subjects are no more than marginally relevant to the charge of resisting arrest. - 6 - We cannot, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing appellant's counsel from cross-examining Chambers with regard to these matters. Furthermore, four other police officers testified regarding the conduct which resulted in appellant's being charged with resisting arrest. The officers negotiated with her, pursued her when she left the scene after the initial stop and employed various means to effect her arrest. All of this was necessary despite the fact that the police informed appellant that they were acting pursuant to a warrant for her arrest. In Green, supra, the Supreme Court noted that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt even without the testimony of the witness whose cross-examination the trial court limited. The Supreme Court also observed that the factfinder (a panel of judges) rejected the version of events contained in the testimony of that witness. The Green court concluded, therefore, that the panel's findings demonstrate a lack of prejudice. In this case, the testimony of the four police officers -- other than Patrolman Chambers -- is overwhelming; yet the jury acquitted appellant on the charge of driving left of center. Of course, the only evidence against appellant with regard to that charge was the testimony of Patrolman Chambers, which the jury obviously rejected. Certainly, the record demonstrates that the testimony of Patrolman Chambers was not necessary for the jury to find appellant guilty of resisting arrest. As a result, any error - 7 - in limiting the cross-examination of Patrolman Chambers was not prejudicial to appellant. Accordingly, we find that appellant's assignment of error is not well taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, P.J. and DIANE KARPINSKI, J. CONCUR JUDGE JOHN V. CORRIGAN* *SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT: John V. Corrigan, retired Judge of the Eighth Appellate District. N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .