COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67985 REBECCA LYNCH : : ACCELERATED DOCKET : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : MALRITE COMMUNICATIONS : OPINION : : PER CURIAM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV-270694. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: John Kennedy Lynch, Esq. Robert Lynch, Esq. Lynch & Lynch Co., L.P.A. 711 Statler Office Tower 1127 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For Defendant-appellee: Linda Hauserman Harrold, Esq. Lester W. Armstrong, Esq. Belkin & Harrold Co., L.P.A. 25101 Chagrin Boulevard, #210 Cleveland, Ohio 44122 - 2 - PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158; App.R. 11.1(E). Plaintiff-appellant Rebecca Lynch appeals the trial court's order granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee Malrite Communications Group, Inc. The appellant filed the action for wrongful discharge and handicap discrimination. The appellant filed her complaint alleging that she was hired by the appellee on November 28, 1983, and thereafter received several promotions; that she was given no reprimands, warnings suspensions or other disciplinary actions; that she was considered a permanent employee; and that various statements were made to her indicating that her performance was exemplary. Ms. Lynch alleges that her employment was terminated without warning or reason on September 15, 1992. The complaint states that on or about January 1992, the appellant began to experience symptoms of multiple sclerosis while at work. These symptoms included dizziness, headaches, abdominal pain, nausea and blurred vision, and although the symptoms were evident, the appellant continued to perform her assigned duties. - 3 - Subsequent to the termination of her employment, the complaint states that the appellant was presented with a document which constituted a promise not to sue the appellee. The document was presented with the understanding that without her signature and agreement not to sue, the appellant would not receive her final compensation, including pay for profit sharing, unused vacation and unused sick days. The appellant alleges that "Despite the lack of consideration for this agreement, and in the context of extreme coercion and duress, and in light of the symptoms of multiple sclerosis known by Malrite and its agents, plaintiff signed this document." Complaint at paragraph 7. The complaint sets forth four causes of action: breach of contract, promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress and handicap discrimination pursuant to R.C. 4112.02(A) and 4112.99. The docket reflects that on June 14, 1994, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss and to strike. After opposition and reply the trial court entered the following order on the status form: Defendant Malrite Communication's motion filed 6/14/94 to dismiss and to strike is GRANTED. At the top of the status form, an X was made in the box next to "OTHER - SUMM JE". This final order was journalized on September 6, 1994. The appellant sets forth four assignments of error. The first is dispositive: - 4 - TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY ITS FAILURE TO GIVE DUE NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES BEFORE CONVERTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to provide notice to the parties that it was converting the appellee's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The appellee states that since both parties filed evidentiary materials with their briefs, the trial court's failure to provide notice resulted in no prejudice to the appellant, and is therefore not reversible error. The Supreme Court has held that a court must notify all parties when it converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted into a motion for summary judgment. State, ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 94 citing to Petrey v. Simon (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 154. However, there is no indication in the case sub judice that the trial court ever intended to convert the appellee's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The clerical act of marking the "other" box marked on the status form is not an indication that the trial court intended such a conversion. It is merely an internal record keeping task. No other evidence is presented by either party that the trial court considered the appellee's motion as anything but a motion to dismiss, and this court must proceed on the assumption that the trial court chose the wording of its order to reflect its intention. - 5 - In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, all factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed to be true. State ex rel. Fain v. Summit Cty. Adult Probation Dept. (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 658. It is also noteworthy that the statute of limitations for an action brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 is six years. Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281. Here, the complaint contains allegations that the appellant was a permanent employee of the appellant, and that without notice or reason her employment was terminated. She alleges that she is a handicapped person and that her employment was terminated based upon her handicap. The complaint was filed within the appropriate limitation period for each cause of action. Assuming that each factual allegation set forth in the complaint is true, the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss. The appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. The appellants's second, third and fourth assignments of error are moot pursuant to App.R. 12. Judgment reversed and remanded. - 6 - This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee her costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. LEO M. SPELLACY, P.J. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J. ANN McMANAMON*, J. (*)Sitting by Assignment: Ann McManamon, Retired Judge of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .