COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67806 PAULA ANN SMITH : : Petitioner : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JUDGE BURKE E. SMITH, : JUVENILE COURT : : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 5, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: ORIGINAL ACTION WRIT OF PROHIBITION JUDGMENT: WRIT ALLOWED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Petitioner, Paula Ann Smith: MARY ANN S. JOHANEK (#0014695) 800 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Timothy Johnson: BARBARA K. ROMAN (#0014607) 1375 East Ninth Street One Cleveland Center, 20th Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Judge Burke E. Smith: GREGORY B. ROWINSKI (#0007197) JEFFREY I. SHERWIN (#0020311) Assistant County Prosecutors 8th Floor, Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - 2 SPELLACY, P.J.: Relator is a defendant in Johnson v. Smith, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Case No. 9470261, which is an action to establish the parent and child relationship. The plaintiff in Case No. 9470261 ("Johnson") is seeking to establish his relationship as the father of a child of relator. We granted Johnson leave to intervene as a respondent in this action and to file a brief. Relator--who is not married--gave birth to a boy on December 25, 1993 in Pretoria, South Africa. Relator placed her child for adoption in South Africa in accordance with the laws of South Africa. The adoption was finalized on January 18, 1994. Johnson filed Case No. 9470261 in juvenile court on February 23, 1994. The parties have stipulated that the laws of South Africa define the word "father" in relation to "illegitimate" child as meaning the mother of the child. The parties have also stipulated that only the consent of the mother of an "illegitimate" child is necessary for adoption. Relator filed a motion to dismiss Case No. 9470261 on the grounds that juvenile court is without jurisdiction to establish the parent and child relationship because that court lacks personal jurisdiction over the child and because the adoption was finalized in South Africa. Respondent denied the motion to dismiss and stated: This Court further finds that based on the evidence, the stipulation of facts, the arguments of counsel and as a matter of law that a decree of adoption from a foreign nation, irregardless [sic] of its validity, does not barr - 3 - 3 [sic] Plaintiff's action to establish his parentage of the minor child at issue, nor does said foreign decree constitute res judicata as to Plaintiff's Complaint to establish his parentage, as the Plaintiff is not attempting to overturn the foreign decree of adoption in this action, but is merely attempting to establish his parentage of the minor child which this Court finds to be a complete and separate issue from the legality and/or enforceability of the adoptive procedure undertaken by the Defendant Paula Ann Smith herein. In addition to seeking to establish the parent and child relationship in Case No. 9470261, Johnson also requests orders: restraining relator from consenting to the adoption of her child (which has already been denied by juvenile court); designating Johnson as the residential parent of the child; and obligating relator to pay Johnson support for the child. In this action, relator requests that this court prohibit respondent from further proceedings in Case No. 9470261. In Entry No. 55200 dated September 15, 1994, this court granted relator's application for alternative writ. The parties have filed stipulations and briefs pursuant to that same entry. Relief in prohibition is available only in limited circumstances. "The conditions which must exist to support the issuance of a writ of prohibition are: (1) The court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." State, ex rel. McKee, v. Cooper (1974), 40 Ohio St. 2d 65, paragraph one of the syllabus. - 4 - 4 Bobb v. Marchant (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3, 14 OBR 1, 469 N.E. 2d 847. Under some circumstances, however, a party relator in an action in prohibition need not meet all three of these criteria. Ordinarily, all three prerequisites must be present before a claim in prohibition has been stated. State, ex rel. Dayton, v. Kerns (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 295, 297; 3 O.O. 3d 441, 443, 361 N.E.2d 247, 249. However, we have held that "[i]f an inferior court is without jurisdiction whatsoever to act, the availability or adequacy of a remedy of appeal to prevent the resulting injustice is immaterial to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by a superior court to prevent usurpation of jurisdiction by the inferior court." State, ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 329, 59 O.O. 2d 387, 388, 285 N.E.2d 22, 24; Johnson v. Perry County Court (1986),25 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 25 OBR 77, 81, 495 N.E.2d 16, 21. But before we will exercise our jurisdiction to issue the writ in such instance, there must be a patent and unambigous [sic] lack of jurisdiction of the inferior court which clearly places the dispute outside the court's authority. State, ex rel. Smith, v. Court (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d, 213, 215- 216, 24 O.O. 3d 320, 321, 436 N.E.2d 1005, 1007, citing State, ex rel. Gilla, v. Fellerhoff (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 86, 88, 73 O.O. 2d 328, 329, 338 N.E.2d 522, 523. Thus, where this showing has not been made, the availability of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes the issuance of the writ of prohibition. Tilford v. Crush (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 174, 176, 529 N.E.2d 1245. Clearly, this action arises from a matter which involves the exercise of judicial power. Likewise, relator would have an adequate remedy by way of appeal. See, e.g., Worrell v. Athens Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 491, 495-96, 633 N.E.2d 1130. As a consequence, in order for relator to maintain this action, respondent judge must patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to go forward with Case No. 9470261. - 5 - 5 It is not undisputed that juvenile court has original jurisdiction over an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship. R.C. 3111.04 and 3111.06. Rather, the issue presented by this case is: whether the adoption of relator's child in South Africa makes the exercise of the jurisdiction of juvenile court "unauthorized by law." R.C. 3107.18 provides: Except when giving effect to such a decree would violate the public policy of this state, a court decree terminating the relationship of parent and child, or establishing the relationship by adoption, issued pursuant to due process of law by a court of any jurisdiction outside this state, whether within or outside the United States, shall be recognized in this state, and the rights and obligations of the parties as to all matters within the jurisdiction of this state, including without limitation, those matters specified in section 3107.15 of the Revised Code, shall be determined as though the decree were issued by a court of this state. Our initial question, therefore, must be whether an adoption which was issued by a court in this state would divest a juvenile court of authority to proceed in an action under R.C. 3111.04 to establish the father and child relationship. R.C. 3107.15 provides, in pertinent part: (A) A final decree of adoption *** issued by a court of this state, shall have the following effects as to all matters within the jurisdiction or before a court of this state: (1) *** to relieve the biological *** parents of the adopted person of all parental rights and responsibilities, and to terminate all legal relationships between the adopted person and his relatives, including his biological *** parents, so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes ***. - 6 - 6 Obviously, the purpose of an action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship is to create a legal relationship. The effect of an adoption, however, is to terminate the legal relationship between biological father and child. We must conclude, therefore, that an adoption issued by a court in this state would divest a juvenile court of authority to proceed in an action under R.C. 3111.04 to establish the father and child relationship. The remaining issue, therefore, is whether, under R.C. 3107.18 the adoption of relator's child in South Africa must be given the same effect as an adoption in Ohio. Initially, we note that R.C. 3107.18 provides that it does not apply "when giving effect to such a decree would violate the public policy of this state ***." As quoted above, R.C. 3107.15(A)(1) sets forth a clear public policy of terminating the relationship between the biological parents and the adopted child. We conclude, therefore, that giving effect to the decree of adoption of relator's child does not violate the public policy of this state. Additionally, R.C. 3107.18 expressly pertains to "a court decree terminating the relationship of parent and child, or establishing the relationship by adoption, issued pursuant to due process of law by a court of any jurisdiction outside this state, whether within or outside the United States ***." It is evident that this action arises from a court decree of adoption issued by a court outside the United States. Respondent judge and Johnson both - 7 - 7 argue, however, that the South Africa adoption decree does not comply with the requirements of due process. The parties have stipulated that, according to the laws of South Africa, only the consent of the mother of an "illegitimate" child is necessary for adoption. Johnson complains, however, that he was not given actual notice of the adoption proceedings in South Africa. Yet, due process does not require actual notice to the biological father of adoption proceedings in all circumstances. For example, in Lehr v. Robertson (1983), 463 U.S. 248, 252, 263-65, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2989, 2994-95, 77 L.Ed.2d 614--which is cited by Johnson--the Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances present in that case, due process did not require that the putative father receive special notice of adoption proceedings despite the fact that the court and mother knew that he had filed a proceeding for a determination of paternity, an order of support and reasonable visitation privileges. In reaching this conclusion, the Lehr court noted the "legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children ***." Id. at 463 U.S. 265, 103 S.Ct. 2995. In this action, the stipulations indicate that relator's newborn child "was placed *** for adoption in South Africa in accordance with the laws of that country and said adoption was duly finalized on January 18, 1994." Stipulation No. 8. As a sovereign nation, South Africa has established laws governing adoption proceedings. We cannot conclude that the absence of actual notice - 8 - 8 to a putative father of an "illegitimate" child requires that a decree of adoption issued by a court in South Africa pursuant to the laws of that country prevents Ohio courts from giving effect to the decree of adoption. As a consequence, we hold that respondent judge is without authority to proceed in the parentage action brought by Johnson. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is issued preventing respondent judge from going forward with further proceedings in Johnson v. Smith, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Case No. 9470261. Respondent judge and intervenor to pay costs. Writ allowed. LEO M. SPELLACY PRESIDING JUDGE .