COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67799 : T.W. GROGAN COMPANY : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION SOCIETY NATIONAL BANK, ET AL. : : : Defendants-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 3, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 94-CVH-6015 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees: RICARDO B. TEAMOR (#0010651) LARRY ROTHENBERG (#0011146) CHRISTEL D. BEST (#0059918) WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS GEORGE E. HAMM JR. (#0059380) 323 Lakeside Avenue, West ADRIAN THOMPSON, (#0036742) Cleveland, Ohio 44113 TEAMOR, THOMPSON & ASSOCIATES 815 Superior Avenue, N.E. CHARLES E. WAGNER (#0046937) Suite 1320 MILLER, STILLMAN & BARTEL Cleveland, Ohio 44114 1610 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 2 - SPELLACY, P.J.: Plaintiff-appellant T.W. Grogan Company ("Grogan") appeals from the entry of judgment for defendants-appellees Society National Bank, as trustee, ("Society") and Edward Stillman. Grogan raises the following assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF'S NINETY (90) DAY NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER OHIO LAW Grogan, landlord, brought this forcible entry and detainer and breach of lease action against Society, lessee, and Stillman, sub-lessee. The trial court, finding Grogan's notice of default deficient, entered judgment for Society and Stillman. The notice of default that Grogan sent to Society states: We, as the present fee owner, hereby advise you that you are in default under the Lease, dated October 1, 1906 ("Lease"), by and between Benjamin T. Milligan, as the party of the first part or landlord, and Louis N. Weber, Charles G. Hall, William Lend and G.H. Ihmsen, party of the second part or tenant relative to subject premises ("premises"), which by mesne assignments you are now the party of the second part or tenant. The default is with respect to Paragraph First of the Lease in that you have not paid the real property taxes as they have become due, and to Paragraph Seventh in that the building is not maintained in a good and sufficient state of repair. Unless such taxes, including interest and penalties thereon, are paid, all necessary repairs are made to the premises and all legal requirements, laws and ordinances affecting the buildings and improvements are complied with, within three (3) months from the date you receive this letter, we shall take the necessary action in accordance with law to terminate the Lease as provided in Paragraph Eighth of the Lease, including exercising our right of forfeiture of your interest in the premises. The lease provides, in part: - 3 - - 4 - FIRST: Said second party will in addition to the rental aforesaid reserved pay all taxes, assessments and public charges of every character that may at any time during the term of this lease be levied or assessed or in any manner charged upon or against the said premises or any part thereof for any purpose whatsoever, and also the taxes upon said premises or any part thereof for any purpose whatsoever, and also the taxes upon said premises payable in December 1906 and in June 1907. * * * SEVENTH: The buildings on said premises shall be by said second party kept in a good and sufficient state of repair, and said second party shall comply with all legal requirements, laws, and ordinances in any manner affecting said buildings and improvements, the use thereof and the state in which the same shall be maintained. When a lease provides the tenant with an opportunity to cure defaults, any notice of default must specifically delineate the default. Gallagher v. Borden, Inc. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 185, 188-189. In Gallagher the landlord notified the tenant that it was in default for nonpayment of rent but failed to specify the unpaid rent. The Gallagher court found the notice of default insufficient, noting that: Inherent in the opportunity to cure a default is knowledge of what is in default. Absent knowledge of what must be corrected in order to avoid the specified penalty, the right to cure becomes a meaningless guessing game. Gallagher, 84 Ohio App.3d at 188. Similarly, the notice of default in this case failed to delineate the specific default. The lessees were left to guess as to the action they had to take to cure the default. Grogan argues that Northfield Park Associates v. Northeast Ohio Harness (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 14, requires a different - 5 - result. We disagree. Northfield held that it is unnecessary for a notice of default to specifically state that the landlord will dispossess the tenant when the lease provides that the landlord may re-enter into possession in the event of an uncured default. Northfield, 36 Ohio App.3d at 20. Northfield is distinguishable because there the lease specified the action to be taken. Here, a review of the lease would not inform the lessees of what action was necessary. Accordingly, Grogan's assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J., and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and .