COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67773 CAROL A. BECKER : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MONODE MARKING PRODUCTS, INC., : ET AL. : : Defendant-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JUNE 15, 1995 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-249719 JUDGMENT : DISMISSED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellees: JOSEPH A. CONDENI, ESQ. ROBERT S. STONE, ESQ. SMITH, CONDENI AND ABEL CO. McDonald, Hopkins, Burke & The Sterling Bldg., #505 Haber 1255 Euclid Avenue 2100 Bank One Center Cleveland, OH 44115-1807 600 Superior Avenue Cleveland, OH 44114 LAWRENCE R. HUPERTZ, ESQ. 25000 Euclid Avenue, #200 Euclid, OH 44117 - 2 - PATTON, C.J. Plaintiff Carol Becker appeals from summary judgments rendered in favor of defendants Monode Marking Products, Inc. and Fred Lambert. Because the summary judgments did not dispose of a claim relating to co-defendant Lucy Lambert, we must dismiss the appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). Civ. R. 54(B) provides that when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. If the trial court fails to make that determination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties. In Noble v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, the syllabus states, "[a]n order which adjudicates one or more but fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties must meet the requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) in order to be final and appealable." Absent the mandatory language "no just reason for delay," an order that does not dispose of all claims is not final and appealable. Id. at 96; see, also, Mezerkor v. Mezerkor (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 304, 307. Monode employed plaintiff pursuant to an employment contract that provided for a renewable one year term of employment, subject to termination by either party with fifteen days notice. Plaintiff - 3 - tendered notice of termination after she had been demoted. She filed a complaint alleging her demotion constituted a constructive breach of the employment contract. The complaint also named Fred and Lucy Lambert as individual defendants. The complaint alleged that Lucy Lambert, a co-worker at Monode, became dissatisfied with her salary after discovering from her husband Fred Lambert that plaintiff earned more than she did. Plaintiff alleged Lucy Lambert discovered what she made after Fred, a new car salesman, allegedly divulged plaintiff's salary from information contained in plaintiff's lease contract. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiff's first cause of action alleged: 15. Defendant Fred Lambert individually and in his capacity as an employee of Defendant Classic Chevrolet and an agent of Defendant GMAC violated Plaintiff's right to privacy by wrongfully communicating and otherwise publicizing Plaintiff's income to Defendant Lucy Lambert. 16. Defendant Lucy Lambert violated Plain- tiff's right to privacy by wrongfully and maliciously communicating and otherwise publicizing Plaintiff's income to officers, managers and other employees of Defendant Monode. Fred Lambert filed a motion for summary judgment in which he argued, among other things, that plaintiff had failed "to establish an actionable invasion of privacy against defendant, Fred Lambert***." The motion did not purport to address Lucy Lambert's liability, nor can the motion reasonably be construed to address her liability under the first cause of action. - 4 - The trial court's order granting summary judgment to Fred Lambert states, "Motion for Summary Judgment of Fred Lambert (filed 12/29/93) is hereby granted." This order does not dispose of the claim against Lucy Lambert. Although plaintiff did file two separate notices of dismissal, neither of these formally dismissed Lucy Lambert from the action. The notice of dismissal filed October 20, 1993 does dismiss Lucy from the fourth cause of action relating to tortious interference with a business contract, but it makes no disposition of the first cause of action relating to invasion of privacy. Moreover, while the notice of dismissal later specifically maintains plaintiff's causes of action against "Fred Lambert as stated in [plaintiff's] First Cause of Action for invasion of privacy ***," that reservation follows the sentence, "[t]he dismissals stated above are made pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 41(A)(1)." It may well be that plaintiff did not intend to pursue the invasion of privacy claim against Lucy Lambert. However, absent a specific dismissal of that claim, the trial court has no authority to presume plaintiff's intent. Because the claim against Lucy Lambert remains viable, we lack a final appealable order and must dismiss the appeal. Dismissed. - 5 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, J. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .