COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67657 : KAREN KUBA, ET AL. : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiffs-Appellees : : and -vs- : : OPINION ANTHONY COMPOLA : : : Defendant-Appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 17, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Juvenile Court Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case No. 9270021 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellees: For Defendant-Appellant: STEVEN E. WOLKIN, ESQ. PAUL MANCINO, JR., ESQ. Belinger, Kaselak & Wolkin 75 Public Square 1040 Leader Building Suite 1016 526 Superior Avenue, N.E. Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1402 - 2 - KARPINSKI, J.: Defendant-appellant, Anthony Compola (hereinafter "defen- dant"), appeals from a juvenile court judgment entry finding that the defendant was the father of Crystal Kuba. Karen Kuba, the mother of Crystal Kuba, was previously married to Robert Kuba. In 1985, Karen Kuba filed an action for divorce in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division. In the divorce decree, the court found that the two children, Crystal and Robert, were born "as issue of" the marriage of Karen and Robert Kuba. Thereafter, on June 4, 1991, a journal entry vacated all entries pertaining to Crystal Kuba. The entry stated as follows: This matter was heard on the joint motion of the parties to correct the original journal entry (mot.# 182924). By agreement & sworn affidavit of the parties Crystal Kuba dob 8-31-82 is not a child of this marriage & all orders relating to Crystal Kuba are vacated. Cost to both parties. On January 7, 1992, Karen Kuba filed a complaint in Juvenile Court alleging that defendant was the natural biological father of Crystal Kuba. Robert Kuba, the previous husband of Karen Kuba, was also joined as a defendant in this case. Genetic testing revealed that Robert Kuba was not the father of Crystal Kuba. Robert Kuba was thus dismissed as a party in the amended complaint. A bench trial was subsequently held finding defendant to be the father of Crystal Kuba. The trial court found that the genetic test revealed a greater than 95 percent probability that defendant was the father of the child. - 3 - Defendant's first assignment of error states as follows: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN RULING THAT RES JUDICATA INAPPLICABLE [sic] TO PLAINTIFFS [sic] CLAIM. Defendant has argued throughout the trial and on appeal that the doctrine of res judicata should apply to this case and thus bar juvenile court from entering an order finding defendant to be the father of Crystal Kuba. Defendant argues that the original divorce decree entered in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, between Karen Kuba and Robert Kuba decided the issue of who is the natural father of Crystal Kuba. This argument is without merit because there is no judgment of paternity in this prior case. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment will act as a complete bar to a subsequent action. Whitehead v. Genl. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108; Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193. In the case sub judice, however, there is no prior judgment on the issue of paternity. The domestic relations court by order dated June 4, 1991, specifically vacated all orders pertaining to Crystal Kuba. Arguendo, if there were any possible conflict between two orders, the last in point of time is the judgment a reviewing court looks to for purposes of res judicata. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police v. Tegreene (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 235. When there is no prior judgment of paternity, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar a subsequent legitimation action. Collett v. Cogar - 4 - (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 114. This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's second assignment of error states as follows: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS PARENTAGE ACTION. In this assignment of error, defendant argues that there is no statutory authority allowing the trial court to grant attorney's fees in a paternity action. Defendant cites Clark v. Joseph (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 207, for the proposition that there is no statutory authority permitting the trial court to award attorney's fees in an action to establish a parent-child relationship. Clark, however, resolved the question only in response to an equal protection challenge and did not consider R.C. 3113.219. Defendant properly argues that R.C. 3113.219 authorizes a court to award attorney's fees in actions relating to support issues. R.C. 3113.219 (B) provides as follows. On or after July 1, 1992, when a court issues or modifies a support order under *** 3111.13 *** of the Revised Code or in any proceeding in which a court determines the amount of support to be paid pursuant to a support order, the court may include in the support order a statement ordering either party to pay the costs of the action, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees, fees for genetic tests in contested actions under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code, and court fees. This case is a paternity case brought pursuant to Chapter 3111. of the Revised Code. As a result of this paternity action, however, the court issued a support order. The trial court, therefore, had authority to order attorney's fees because a - 5 - support order was issued pursuant to a paternity action. Defendant has not argued that the amount of attorney's fees is unreasonable. This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's third and fifth assignments of error state as follows: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ENTERING A BACK ORDER OF SUPPORT IN THIS CASE. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS COMPUTATION OF THE EARNINGS OF THE DEFENDANT TO JUSTIFY ITS AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT. In the trial court's Journal Entry and Finding of Law and Fact, the court identifies how it calculated back support. The trial court specifically did not order back support for the time before the date of the nunc pro tunc order in domestic relations court filed on June 4, 1991. The court reasoned that it would be inequitable to award back support to Karen Kuba for the time leading up to the nunc pro tunc entry during which she was receiving child support from Robert Kuba. Defendant contends that the trial court did not consider the relevant factors when it ordered back support. This argument is without merit. A review of the trial court order reveals that the trial court considered both parties in its award. While computing the proper amount of back support, the trial court outlined in detail the incomes and economic positions of both Karen Kuba and the defendant. Furthermore, the court considered the defendant's position and held that it would be inequitable to award back support for the entire life of the child. The record does not support the claim that the court committed prejudicial - 6 - error in awarding or computing child support. This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's fourth assignment of error states as follows: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ORDERING REIMBURSEMENT FOR AN EXPERT FEE. Here, defendant challenges the trial court's order requiring defendant to pay $1,000 for expert fees. Defendant's entire argument is that the defendant should not be required to pay for an expert when the expert never testified at trial. This argument lacks merit. Under R.C. 3111.14, the trial court may award reasonable fees for experts in paternity actions. R.C. 3111.14 provides as follows: The court may order reasonable fees for experts and other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings, including genetic tests, to be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the court. The court may order the proportion of any party to be paid by the court, and, before or after payment by any party or the county, may order all or part of the fees and costs to be taxed as costs in the action. This statute clearly allows the trial court to order fees for experts in paternity actions. Nothing in this statute requires that the expert testify at trial as a prerequisite to an award of fees. Defendant has failed to show any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. This assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee(s) recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Juvenile Court Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, C.J., and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. DIANE KARPINSKI JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and .