COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67621 METROPOLIS NIGHT CLUB, INC. : DBA METROPOLIS : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : AND vs. : : OPINION PAUL ERTEL, ET AL. : : : : Defendant-Appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 1, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-260927 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: THOMAS A. McCORMACK KEITH R. WOLGAMUTH McCormack, Wolgamuth & Watling Co., L.P.A. 323 Lakeside Avenue West 450 Lakeside Place Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellees: KENNETH J. FISHER Kenneth J. Fisher Co., L.P.A. 3500 Terminal Tower 50 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 3 - O'DONNELL, J.: Appellant, Metropolis Night Club, Inc., appeals from the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Paul Ertel and Jacobs Investment Management Co., Inc. Appellant commenced this action, Common Pleas Case No. 260927, on November 9, 1993 alleging that appellees tortiously interfered with a contract between appellant and the General Broadcasting Company, dba Radio Station WJMO-FM, and interfered with a prospective business advantage between the same entities. On March 23, 1994, appellees moved for summary judgment asserting that this action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because appellant had earlier filed the same cause of action in Common Pleas Case No. 247015 against Flats Development Corporation and John Doe, but did not name or join either Jacobs Investment Co. or Paul Ertel in that earlier case. In the earlier case, on December 30, 1993, the trial court, in Common Pleas Case No. 247015, had granted Flats Development Corporation's motion for summary judgment which alleged that no contract existed between Metropolis and Flats Development. How- ever, that judgment was reversed and remanded by this court on December 22, 1994 in Cuyahoga App. No. 66814, unreported. - 4 - On June 22, 1994, the trial court in this case granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, which alleged res judicata based on the trial court's ruling in Case No. 247015. Appellant now appeals raising one assignment of error. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT- APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. Appellant contends the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are inapplicable because there is no "mutuality of parties" in the two separate cases it filed based on the same alleged contract. Appellees believe that appellant's claims are barred because appellant knew or should have know the identity of the John Doe defendant in the first case and failed to amend the pleadings or identify the John Doe in that case. The issue, however, for our resolution on this appeal is limited to whether or not the doctrine of res judicata applies to this case. The doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action or be forever barred from asserting it. Rogers v. Whitehall (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69. The purpose of this doctrine was explained further in Henderson v. Ryan (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 31, where the court, - 5 - after considering statutory changes regarding pleadings concluded at p. 38: "***. To save time and to relieve court congestion, parties are encouraged, if not commanded, to litigate all their claims in one action ***." The doctrine of res judicata was recently examined by the Ohio Supreme Court in National Amusements v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, at 62, wherein the court explained: "An existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were, or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit." (Citations omitted.) In the instant matter, the final judgment in Common Pleas Case No. 247015 was reversed and remanded by this court on December 22, 1994. Since there is no "existing final judgment" on which to base the doctrine of res judicata, we must reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. - 6 - This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, P.J., and DYKE, J., CONCUR JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .