COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67614 MAURICE MINTER : : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : : OPINION RENDA COPES : : Defendant-Appellee : and : CUYAHOGA SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT : AGENCY : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 15, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Court Division, Case No. 9370722. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Maurice Minter, pro se 10702 Way Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44105 For minor child: Linda Julian, Esq. 1370 West 6th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-appellant: Timothy G. Spackman Assistant County Prosecutor 1910 Carnegie Avenue, 2nd Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 2 - O'DONNELL, J.: Appellant, The Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, appeals from a June 10, 1994 judgment of the trial court ordering appellee, Maurice Minter, to pay one dollar per month child support. The matter which gave rise to this appeal began on June 29, 1993, when the Juvenile Court ordered Minter to pay $291.67 per month in support of his minor child, Marsaun, to appellee Renda Copes through The Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency. On July 28, 1993, Minter and Copes filed a joint objection to the support order and requested that the support be paid directly to Copes rather than through the Agency. Minter and Copes alleged that direct support would be in the best interests of the child and further alleged that Minter already provided Copes with amounts greater than those required by the court. On September 15, 1993, the Agency filed a notice of appearance in this action and Referee John W. Menzies scheduled the matter for hearing on November 23, 1993. At that hearing, Minter testified that he paid Copes $259 per month, including $49 per month for Marsaun's medical insurance. No cancelled checks, money orders or other documentary evidence has been provided regarding these payments. On the basis of the testimony, however, Referee Menzies found that a substantial reduction in the amount of court-ordered child support, from $291.67 to $1 per month, would be "in the best interests of the child and his parents." - 3 - The Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency timely objected to the referee's report and further requested that counsel be appointed for the child. On March 24, 1994, Judge Richard Hoose overruled the referee's report, appointed Linda Julian as attorney for the child pursuant to R.C. 3111.07, and remanded the matter to the referee for an additional hearing. At that hearing, no new evidence was presented and the parties agreed that no changes in the facts of the case had occurred. The referee therefore again recommended that Minter's court-ordered support be reduced to one dollar per month. Despite objection by the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, Judge Timothy Cotner adopted the recommendation and reduced the obligation to one dollar per month. The Agency now appeals, raising four assignments of error. I. The Agency's first three assignments of error share a common basis in law and fact and will, therefore, be addressed together. I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEVIATING DOWNWARD 99.97% FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE SCHEDULE AND WORKSHEET, IN NOT FOLLOWING THE MANDATES OF R.C. 3113.215 (B)(2)(c)(i), R.C. 3113.215 (B)(2)(c)(ii), R.C. 3113.215 (B)(3)(a-p) AND MARKER VS GRIMM (1992) 65 OHIO ST.3D 139. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY USING A 99.97% DOWNWARD DEVIATION AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE DIRECT PAYMENT STATUS FOR THE OBLIGOR. - 4 - III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S REQUEST, THAT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM BE APPOINTED FOR THE CHILD. The Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency believes the court abused its discretion by ordering Minter to pay one dollar per month in child support in contravention of R.C. 3115.215 and by allowing direct payments in contravention of R.C. 2301.36(A) and by failing to appoint a Guardian ad Litem for the child. As neither Minter nor Copes has filed briefs with our court, the issues for our resolution are whether the trial court abused its discretion in reducing Minter's child support obligation to one dollar and in permitting direct payment of that amount, and whether the court should have appointed a Guardian ad Litem for the child. For the following reasons, we determine the trial court has abused its discretion in all of these matters. R.C. 3115.215(B)(2)(c) provides that a court shall not order an amount of support which deviates from the amount set forth in the child support guidelines unless the court: "(i) *** determines that the amount calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule *** would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child." (Emphasis added.) "(ii) *** enters in the journal *** that that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interests of the child and findings of fact supporting that determination." Under this statute, in order to justify any deviation from the child support guidelines, a court must find both that the - 5 - amount set forth in the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate and not in the best interests of the child, and these findings must be journalized. In Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed R.C. 3113.215 and stated in its syllabus: "2. The terms of R.C. 3115.215 are mandatory in nature and must be followed literally and technically in all material respects." (Emphasis added.) "3. Any court ordered deviation from the applicable worksheet and the basic child support schedule must be entered by the court in its journal and must include findings of fact to support such determination." In the present case, the entry of Judge Cotner adopted the report of the referee which found that deviation from the guidelines would be in the best interests of the child, but it did not make the further required findings pursuant to R.C. 3115.215 (B)(2)(c). Therefore, that entry fails to comport with both R.C. 3115.215(B)(2)(c) and the holding in Marker v. Grimm, supra, and thus the decision of the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion. Next, we consider the provision of R.C. 2301.26(A) which provides in part: "*** the court shall require that support payments be made to the child support enforcement agency of the county as trustee ***." Clearly, the court has not adhered to the mandatory requirement of this section, nor explained in its journal any - 6 - reasons for deviation pursuant to R.C. 2151.49 or 3113.07. This is additional error. Further, the court failed to consider R.C. 2151.281(G) which provides that a court shall appoint a guardian ad litem in cases involving dependent children where "*** the court believes that the parent of the child is not capable of representing the best interest of the child ***" On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing Minter's support obligation to one dollar per month, in failing to comply with R.C. 2301.25(A), and in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. Therefore, appellant's first three assignments of error are well taken. II. The fourth assignment of error contends: IV. THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT TRANSFER A CASE FOR RULING FROM THE ASSIGNED VISITING JUDGE TO ANOTHER WHERE THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW ANY JOURNAL ENTRY OR OTHER ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE FROM THE ORIGINAL ASSIGNED VISITING JUDGE TO ANOTHER VISITING JUDGE. The record below reveals that this matter was assigned to Chief Judge Leodis Harris, and then, by journal entry, assigned to Judge Hoose. The matter was finally referred, by journal entry, to Judge Cotner. Juv. R. 20(G) provides that: - 7 - With the consent of the Supreme Court of Ohio and after receipt of the appropriate judicial assignments, visiting/retired judges may preside over special dockets in order to ensure compliance with case management docket time frames. Appellant has failed to exemplify any error in the record regarding the procedure employed by the Juvenile Court in assigning its cases. We, therefore, find that this assignment of error is not well taken. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the court is ordered to consider the provisions of R.C. 2151.281(G), to follow the mandatory terms of R.C. 3115.215 literally and technically in all respects, and to strictly follow and apply the provisions of R.C. 2301.36(A). Judgment reversed. Case remanded. - 8 - This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J., and DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR. TERRENCE O'DONNELL JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate .