COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67564 AARON MAXIMUM SECURITY CORPORATION : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION LEWIS BERGER, ET AL. : : Defendants : : : : [Appeal by Herbert R. Whiting and : Rosalie Whiting : : Defendants-appellants] : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION MAY 25, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING Civil appeal from Lyndhurst Municipal Court Case No. 93-CVF-419 JUDGMENT Affirmed DATE OF JOURNALIZATION APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendants-Appellants: SHIA SHAPIRO, ESQ. HERBERT R. WHITING, ESQ. 1401 Rockefeller Bldg. Whiting & Associates 615 Superior Avenue 30650 Pinetree Road Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Pepper Pike, Ohio 44124 - 3 - JAMES M. PORTER, P.J., Defendants-appellants Herbert R. and Rosalie Whiting appeal from a money judgment of $3,016.77 plus interest entered against them in the Lyndhurst Municipal Court in favor of plaintiff- appellee Aaron Maximum Security Corporation for work relating to the security system at defendants' home. Defendants' contend the award was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law, and the referee's findings and report do not support the trial court's decision or contain pertinent findings. We find no error and affirm for the reasons stated below. Plaintiff is a supplier of residential security equipment. Sandor Davis, the owner and president of plaintiff, purchased the business from Lewis Berger. In May 1992, on two occasions, plaintiff performed certain alarm security services at the Whitings' residence and submitted bills totaling $3,016.77. Mrs. Whiting was shocked at the bills. She testified that plaintiff's vice-president told her not to worry about the bills and that he would send them to Berger. He then wrote on the top of the invoices "Bill to Lou Berger." Berger was a former client of Mr. Whiting and owed him for legal services. Apparently, Berger and Mr. Whiting had an understanding that plaintiff would supply security services to Whiting and Berger would pay for them to offset the legal bill. Plaintiff denied knowledge of the arrangement. When neither the defendants nor Berger paid the bills, plaintiff brought suit - 4 - against them on March 11, 1993. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Berger on April 5, 1993, and filed an amended complaint against the Whitings only on May 25, 1993. Berger died before trial. There was no cross-claim or third party claim pending against Berger by the defendants. The case proceeded to trial before a referee on August 27, 1993. At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The referee made his own findings of fact and conclusions of law and included them in his report dated February 4, 1994, recommending an award to plaintiff totalling $3,016.77 plus interest. The referee found that security services were performed at the Whitings' residence; that the invoices had written on them "Bill to Lou Berger"; that "from the totality of the evidence in this case that the charges made by [plaintiff] for its service may have been grossly excessive, however, only the plaintiff offered expert testimony as to the reasonableness of the charges." The referee held it could not speculate as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's charges due to defendants' failure to offer any proof as to their unreasonableness. Consequently, the referee fully credited and accepted plaintiff's damage evidence. The referee also concluded that the notation "Bill to Lou Berger" did not constitute "an agreement by plaintiff to forgo payment from defendants for the services rendered." - 5 - The parties filed objections and counter-objections to the referee's report and recommendations with supporting briefs. After review of the objections, briefs and record, the trial court adopted the referee's report and entered judgment on May 27, 1994 for $3,016.77 with interest. This appeal timely ensued. We will address defendants' assignments of error together as they all center on defendants' contention that the court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS HAD A BINDING AGREEMENT THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD CHARGE ITS WORK AND MATERIALS TO A THIRD PARTY (FORMER DEFENDANT LEWIS BERGER) AND NOT TO DEFENDANTS WHITING. II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACCEPTED WORK AND MATERIALS FROM THE PLAINTIFF IN RELIANCE UPON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS AND ASSURANCES THAT SAID WORK AND MATERIALS WOULD BE CHARGED TO A THIRD PARTY (FORMER DEFENDANT LEWIS BERGER) AND NOT TO DEFENDANTS WHITING. III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN THAT BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S AFORESAID PROMISE AND ASSURANCE IT MAY NOT PROCEED TO COLLECT ITS CHARGE FOR WORK AND MATERIALS FROM DEFENDANTS WHITING UNTIL AFTER IT HAS MADE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO COLLECT FROM FORMER DEFENDANT LEWIS BERGER. IV. THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE REPORT OF THE REFEREE DO NOT SUPPORT THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT. - 6 - V. THE REFEREE FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT IN RESPONSE TO EVIDENCE THAT WAS RELEVANT, MATERIAL AND PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES REFERRED TO IN ASSIGNMENTS 1, 2 AND 3 ABOVE, AND EACH OF THEM. VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO SUSTAIN THE OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS WHITING TO THE REFEREE'S REPORT RELEVANT TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1 THROUGH 5. The first three assignments of error all relate to whether or not the defendants were contractually liable for the security services supplied by plaintiff in view of the "Bill to Lou Berger" notation on the invoices. Defendants contend that this excuses them from liability to plaintiff. We do not agree. In the first place we must defer to the trial court's findings of fact. The standard for reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence is set forth in Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12 as follows: In reviewing the court's judgment, we are guided by the principle that judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the case must not be reversed, as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578. Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the findings of facts. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273. Finally, if the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict and judgment. Seasons Coal Co., supra; Gates v. Bd. of Edn. of River Local School Dist. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 83, 40 O.O.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 198; - 7 - Ross v. Ross (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 204, 18 O.O.3d 414, 415, 414 N.E.2d 426, 428. Id. at 19. We find there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the referee's critical finding that "Bill to Lou Berger" does not constitute an agreement by plaintiff to only charge Berger for the security services at the Whiting residence. Mrs. Whiting testified the bills were outrageously high, but that Greg Ponchak, the plaintiff's Vice President who performed the work, told her "not to worry because it was billed to Lou Berger so [Mrs. Whiting] told him to write it on the bill." (Tr. 8). Mr. Ponchak, for his part, testified that Mrs. Whiting would not sign the bill because it was too much money; she told him to "'put on the bill to Lou Berger on top,' so we put it on top and she signed." (Tr. 92). Sandor Davis, plaintiff's President, testified that the Whitings were referred by Berger; that Berger never said anything about paying the Whitings' bill; that Berger's past referrals paid their own bills; and that his employees put "Bill to Lou Berger" on the invoices at Mrs. Whiting's request. Mr. Whiting testified that he had no writing evidencing Mr. Berger's obligation to pay the security service bills or guaranteeing their payment and Mr. Berger was unfortunately deceased at the time of trial. (Tr. 127-28). The Whitings had no cross-claim or third party claim against Berger or his estate. - 8 - Under the circumstances and given the disputed evidence, we cannot find that the decision of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence or contrary to law. Assignments of Error I, II & III are overruled. In Assignments of Error IV, V & VI the defendants find fault with the findings of fact in the referee's report claiming they do not support the decision and did not address the issues raised by the first three assignments of error. This is another way of saying that the trial court resolved the key factual disputes in plaintiff's favor and rejected the defendants' evidence and arguments. As we have found competent and credible evidence to support the trial court's judgment, we find no merit to these three assignments of error. We have reviewed the transcript, the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the objections thereto and the court's judgment. Although the report and recommendations are concise and to the point, we believe they addressed the salient issues. Since the court's judgment recited a review of the entire record, it can not be said that there was any impropriety in the course of the proceedings. Based on the foregoing, we overrule defendants' Assignments of Error IV, V and VI. Judgment affirmed. - 9 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lyndhurst Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. JAMES M. PORTER PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which .