COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67544 ROBERT GILBERT : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION ALCAN ALUMINUM : CORPORATION, ET AL. : : Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 6, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 251134 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees: MARCIA E. HURT, ESQ. ALFRED R. COWGER, JR., ESQ. JONATHAN D. GREENBERG, ESQ. 1301 East Ninth St., 17th Floor WALTER & HAVERFIELD P.O. Box 6977 1300 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44101-1977 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - DYKE, J.: Appellant was employed by appellees for six years. At the end of his employment in November of 1987 appellant was the Director of Security at Alcan Aluminum Corporation ("Alcan"). Appellant was laid off due to a reorganization within the company and at the meeting in which he was discharged, appellant was promised by the president of Alcan that he would receive favorable references. After nearly four years of looking for similar employment, appellant enlisted the help of several friends to call his references and act as if they were potential employers. Appellant wanted to find out if poor recommendations were contributing to his difficulty in finding a new job. After receiving a less than favorable reference from a Mr. Marsico in Alcan's human resources department, appellant filed a complaint alleging seven separate causes of action against Alcan, based upon the poor references given by Marsico when appellant's friends called. The court below granted Alcan's motion for summary judgment on all but one of the claims, which was voluntarily dismissed by appellant. Appellant appeals only from the court's summary judgment disposition on his claims of defamation, intentional interference with employment, promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentation. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN APPELLEE'S FAVOR ON APPELLANT'S DEFAMATION CLAIM BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT REMAIN TO BE LITIGATED, APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A - 3 - MATTER OF LAW, AND, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT APPELLEES DEFAMED APPELLANT. Appellant argues that a material issue of genuine fact exists as to whether the publication was made in response to a good faith inquiry or was done as a trick to induce slander. This issue is relevant only to the element of publication. While the journal entry simply granted summary judgment without further explanation, we find that appellant's defamation claim was lacking as to several elements, rendering the above issue of fact irrelevant. Defamation may be defined as a false publication causing injury to a person's reputation, or exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting him adversely in his trade or business. Matalka v. Lagemann (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 134, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Appellant failed to provide any evidence to support his assertion that the two instances of publication of a bad reference from Marsico caused him any injury or affected his ability to find work. Marsico's affidavit, attached to appellee's brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, states that he never spoke to anyone other than Mitchell and Parker, who were asked by appellant to obtain a reference for him. Appellant's brief in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment failed to allege that any potential employer had ever spoken to anyone at Alcan and received a bad reference. We can not infer from the evidence provided that because Marsico gave unfavorable references to Mitchell and Parker, that he must have given unfavorable references to other employers, - 4 - who then must have decided against consideration of appellant for employment. Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part: * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. We find that no genuine issues of fact remain in dispute and that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellant, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, that being that no proof was adduced to support appellant's claim that he was injured or affected by the publications to Mitchell and Parker. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN APPELLEES' FAVOR ON APPELLANT'S INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT CLAIM BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT REMAIN TO BE LITIGATED, APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT APPELLEES HAD INTERFERED WITH APPELLANT'S POTENTIAL EMPLOYMENT. Appellant argues that appellees interfered with possible employment when Robert Disney, one of appellant's colleagues, - 5 - learned of the negative references. Robert Disney was in a position to recommend appellant for a position with Chase Manhattan. Again appellant is asking that an inference be made to the effect that had Robert Disney not found out about the negative reference, which he did from appellant himself, he would have recommended appellant for a job and appellant would then have been offered the job. Appellant provided no evidence to support this vague allegation, while appellees attached deposition testimony from the person in charge of hiring at Chase Manhattan to rebut the inference that appellant would have even been offered the job, given his lack of experience in the banking field. Reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No genuine issue of fact remained as to this claim. Therefore, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN APPELLEE'S FAVOR ON APPELLANT'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT REMAIN TO BE LITIGATED, APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT APPELLEES HAD BROKEN A PROMISE UPON WHICH APPELLANT HAD RELIED TO HIS DETRIMENT. Appellant claims that a jury question existed as to whether there was detrimental reliance upon the promise Alcan's president made at the time appellant was laid off. Appellant averred in his affidavit attached to his brief in opposition to appellees' motion - 6 - for summary judgment that the president assured him that he would receive outstanding or excellent references from Alcan. Appellant's assertion is not well taken. To establish a claim based upon promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms; reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; that the reliance was reasonable and foreseeable; and that the party claiming estoppel was injured by the reliance. Healey v. Republic Powdered Metals, Inc. (1992), 85 Ohio App.3d 281, 284. Again, appellant has failed to provide evidence to support the element of any damages or injury from the actions of anyone at Alcan. Appellant very well may have relied upon the president's promise, however that reliance is not detrimental without some form of injury. Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN APPELLEE'S FAVOR ON APPELLANT'S FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT REMAIN TO BE LITIGATED, APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT APPELLEES HAD DEFRAUDED APPELLANT. Appellant argues that he was detrimentally affected by Alcan's president's representation that appellant would receive outstanding or excellent references, because he could have taken steps to counter the bad references if he had not been relying on the fraudulent misrepresentation. Appellant's argument is illogical. - 7 - The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the elements of fraud as follows: "(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, (b) which is material to the transaction at hand, (c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance." Burr v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 69, paragraph two of the syllabus, quoting Cohen v. Lamko, Inc. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 167. The comment made by the president of Alcan can hardly be characterized as a fraudulent misrepresentation. The president at most gave appellant an assurance of a future event. This is not even a representation of a fact under the first element of fraud. Appellant has submitted nothing to support his claim that the statement was made falsely, or with knowledge of its falsity, or with any intent to mislead. Furthermore, no damages have been shown to support a claim under fraud. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled. The trial court's ruling granting appellees' motion for summary judgment is affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, P.J., AND DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .