COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67511 CITY OF SOLON : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION SAMIR BOTROS : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION AUGUST 24, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING Criminal appeal from Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 94-TRD-3500 JUDGMENT Affirmed DATE OF JOURNALIZATION APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: BLAIR N. MELLING, ESQ SAMIR BOTROS, PRO SE CLARENCE B. RADER, III, ESQ. 7261 Winchester Road Melling, Melling & Bell Solon, Ohio 44139 31 Columbus Road P.O. Box 46311 Bedford, Ohio 44146 - 2 - JAMES M. PORTER, J., Defendant-appellant Samir Botros, appearing pro se, appeals from his conviction following a bench trial for failing to stop at a red traffic light in violation of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Solon ( 414.03(C)). Defendant contends that the City had not met its burden of proof upon each element of the offense charged. We find no error and affirm. This case arose out of a collision at the intersection where Inwood Drive dead-ends from the west at SOM Center Road in Solon. A traffic light regulates traffic at that point. For traffic travelling southbound on SOM Center Road there is one lane of traffic which could proceed through the light or turn right to enter Inwood Drive. For the northbound traffic on SOM Center Road, there is a through lane and a center left hand turn lane for access to Inwood Drive. Three witnesses testified at trial: the defendant; Renee Cheraso, whose vehicle was struck by defendant; and Linette Bush, an independent witness who was following the Cheraso car. The testimony of Mrs. Cheraso and Mrs. Bush was consistent, but directly conflicted with defendant's testimony. Mrs. Cheraso testified that she was travelling northbound on SOM Center and was stopped in the turn lane at the Inwood Drive intersection. After she observed the light turn red, she began to complete her left-hand turn and was struck by defendant's southbound vehicle. - 3 - Mrs. Bush, who was following Mrs. Cheraso's car, testified that she was also travelling northbound on SOM Center and was entering the Inwood Drive left turn lane. As she was approaching, she noticed that the traffic light was yellow, looked away, and then looked back in time to observe the accident. The defendant testified that as he approached the intersection, the light was green when he was one car length away from the intersection. He testified he was travelling either 30 m.p.h. or 35 m.p.h. He noticed that Mrs. Cheraso's vehicle was in the turn lane with her signal on but he stated "I figure I'm going for it. I'm going through." Police were called to the scene and issued a citation to defendant for going through a red light. The police did not testify nor was an accident report offered in evidence. Based on this record, the trial court found defendant guilty as charged and this appeal ensued. Defendant's sole assignment of error states as follows: I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY FAILING TO FIND THAT THE CITY OF SOLON HAD NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF UPON EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. A. THE COURT IGNORED MATERIAL EVIDENCE WHICH CREATED A REASONABLE DOUBT AT [SIC] TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE. 1. THE TESTIMONY BETWEEN WITNESSES WAS CONTRADICTORY. 2. THE PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT AND MS. CHERASO WERE WRONGFULLY WEIGHED IN FAVOR OF THE CITY. - 4 - 3. NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED REGARDING WHETHER THE LIGHT WAS RED. 4. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED PRECLUDED THE APPELLANT FROM ENTERING THE INTERSECTION IN VIOLATION OF A RED LIGHT. 5. THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY VIOLATING HIS PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. Although defendant advances various arguments, the essential dispute seems to rest with his contention that the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of Mrs. Cheraso and Bush over his own. This boils down to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or an argument that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is not the duty of this Court to second guess the factual determinations made by the trial court. As recently stated by this Court in State v. Phelps (Jan. 5, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 66804, unreported at 11: The trial court, as the trier of fact, must judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19. A reviewing court will not reverse the trial court on the weight of the evidence where there is substantial, credible evidence to support the trial court's decision. State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 56. We must defer to the trial court's judgment and ruling. In this case, defendant was convicted of violating Cod. Ord. 414.03(C) which states in relevant part: Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed - 5 - is shown except as provided in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) hereof. That defendant was operating a motor vehicle and that he failed to stop at the stop line or before entering the intersection was not disputed. The only disputed element of the offense which defendant claims has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that the traffic light was red when he entered the intersection. However, the record reveals sufficient evidence on which the court could base his conviction. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259; Cleveland v. Isaacs (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 360, 363. Mrs. Cheraso affirmatively testified that she was able to see the traffic light at all times and that it was red before she proceeded to make her left hand turn. Mrs. Bush, in the following car, testified that as she entered the same turn lane she observed the traffic light to be yellow, looked away, and then turned back to observe the accident. Although she did not see the light change to red, the fair inference is drawn that the light would change to red quickly and was red when defendant entered the intersection. The defendant's own testimony that he decided "to go[ing] for it. I'm going through" also suggests that he sped up to beat the stop light which was changing from yellow to red. State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, requires that, "[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest - 6 - miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." The same standard applies when there is a bench trial. See Inger Interiors v. Peralta (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 94, 96; State v. Phelps, supra; State v. Harris (Sept. 29, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65681, unreported; State v. Alamin (Aug. 12, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63352, unreported. We cannot say that the trial court reached a decision that operated as a miscarriage of justice. Defendant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, P.J., and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. JAMES M. PORTER JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which .