COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67440 JULIUS J. SZABO : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : : OPINION DENISE W. SZABO, ET AL. : : : DEFENDANTS : : and : : J. MICHAEL DRAIN : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 27, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV-240465. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: Edward G. Bohnert, Esq. Bernard, Haffey & Bohnert 5001 Mayfield Road, Suite 301 Lyndhurst, Ohio 44124-2610 For Defendant-appellee: James M. Wilsman, Esq. Alice E. Rosen, Esq. Wilsman & Schoonover 1608 Bond Court Building 1300 East Ninth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1503 - 2 - SWEENEY, JAMES D., P.J.: Plaintiff-appellant Julius Szabo appeals from the trial court's order granting a directed verdict at the close of all evidence to the defendant-appellee attorney J. Michael Drain. Ms. Denise Szabo, the former wife of the appellant, was represented by Drain in the divorce proceedings filed by the appellant. The appellant asserted in his complaint that actions taken by Drain in his representation of Ms. Denise Szabo during the divorce proceedings caused him to incur substantial damages. Prior to the marriage, the appellant and Ms. Szabo entered into a pre-nuptial agreement. During the divorce proceedings, Drain attempted to have the agreement declared invalid. Toward this end, he investigated a piece of property Ms. Drain believed the appellant owned, but was not listed as an asset in the pre- nuptial agreement. Drain testified that he attempted to have the pre-nuptial agreement set aside on three grounds: the failure of the appellant to declare all of his assets; the fact that Ms. Szabo was not represented by counsel; and that she did not understand the terms of the agreement. Ms. Szabo testified that during the pendency of the marriage, she and the appellant were driving past property located at East 121st Street and Kinsman, in the City of Cleveland, Ohio. The appellant indicated to Ms. Szabo that he owned the property. When this conversation was related to Drain, he began to investigate the ownership of the parcel of land. - 3 - Drain obtained records of a foreclosure action concerning the property, and the judgment entry issued therein. He discovered that on September 3, 1982, in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court case number 35702, the court rendered judgment against Charles and Flonnie Chambliss and vested title to the property in the appellant. Drain also checked the records in the "map room" in the County Administration Building where he located the parcel number of the property located at East 121st St. and Kinsman, and checked the map book containing information on that parcel. Drain testified that the listed owner of the property in the map book was Charles and F. Chambliss. Drain admitted that he did not check the grantor/grantee index in the Cuyahoga County Recorder's Office. In 1992, Drain prepared an Exemption From Conveyance Fee form, and other required forms, and caused the 1982 journal entry to be recorded. He had no direct instructions regarding this action from his client, but did have authority to do what was best in his professional judgment (T. 40). As a result of Drain's actions, the City of Cleveland believed that the appellant was the current owner of the property, and responsible for its condition. The appellant testified that he received a telephone call from the City, and subsequently received notification that the building was in disrepair, that the interior and exterior were to be cleaned up promptly or he would be subject to prosecution. He complied with the order, and expended approximately $4,000. He received a second notice which required - 4 - him to demolish the building. The appellant was given an estimate for the demolition of the building of $54,000. The appellant testified on cross-examination that he was aware at the time he received these notices he was not the owner of the property (T. 106). He subsequently filed a separate lawsuit to determine the ownership of the land. The evidence at trial revealed that if the appellee had checked the grantor/grantee index kept by the Cuyahoga County Recorder, he would have learned that in 1986, Szabo had conveyed to attorney Beverly M. Briggs the power of attorney over the property; and that she in turn had conveyed the property to the Holy Ghost Tabernacle Church of the Living God. Evidence was presented by the appellant's expert, Dean Lemley, an employee of the Continental Title Agency Corporation, that although the 1982 entry was filed six years late, it did not vest the appellant with title, and that the filing of the journal entry actually clarified the chain of title. (T. 119, 124). Although the domestic relations court ultimately upheld the pre-nuptial agreement, the appellant was forced to expend time and attorney fees during the litigation on the issue of ownership of the property at East 121st Street and Kinsman, and the failure to include it as an asset in the agreement. The appellant testified that he directed the attorneys who represented him in the divorce to keep the time expended on these issues separately. The appellant testified as to the fee arrangements with each of the - 5 - attorneys; the hours spent on the pre-nuptial agreement; and the fees he actually paid to his attorneys. The appellant set forth one assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. The appellant argues that although there is no name for the tort committed by the appellee, Drain did, in fact, intentionally cause him injury, and that appellee's actions were generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances. The appellant argues that he has a legal right to be free from unwarranted and wrongful intrusions into his private business affairs concomitant to the right to privacy. The appellee merely argues that the appellant has not stated a cause of action, and that the trial court correctly granted the motion for directed verdict. A motion for a directed verdict may be granted at the close of all evidence. Civ.R. 50(A)(4) sets forth the standard for granting the motion: (4) When granted on the evidence. When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue. A motion for directed verdict requires the trial judge to construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against - 6 - whom the motion is directed. The motion should be sustained only if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and the conclusion is adverse to non-moving party. Wise v. Timmons (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 113. Where reasonable minds may reach differing conclusions, the motion must be denied. Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97. The appellant in the case sub judice attempts to collect damages from his ex-wife's divorce counsel. As a cause of action, the appellant alleges an un-named tort as permissible under the Restatement of Torts 2d, and asserts that the appellee interfered with his right to privacy. While it is clear that Ohio recognizes a right to privacy, Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio State 35, the appellant has cited no case where recovery was permitted for the filing of a court order with the county recorder. The appellant presented the court with only two incidents of wrongdoing by the appellee: the appellee failed to check the grantor/grantee index; and he signed the Exemption From Conveyance Fee form as the representative of the appellant. The first act may have caused the inconvenience to the appellant, but the inconvenience resulted from the failure of the City of Cleveland to correctly determine the record title holder of the property, and its failure to notify the actual owner of problems concerning the property. The appellee is not responsible for the failures of the City of Cleveland, especially when the - 7 - appellant knew he did not own the land. The second act, which undoubtedly presents ethical questions better addressed by the bar associations or the Ohio Supreme Court, has not been asserted as a basis for this suit. The court did hear evidence that the filing of the 1982 order merely clarified the chain of title; did not vest the appellant with title; and that the appellant expended money on the property even though he knew he was no longer the owner. Based upon the evidence in front of the court, the court committed no error in granting the appellee's motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence. Finally, this court should note that the appellant has cited no case in which the expenditure of attorney fees in a divorce action can be recovered as damages in a separate action. The appropriate time for raising the issue of recovery for attorney fees on issues improperly raised in a divorce action is before the domestic relations court. If there is some basis for the belief that issues were raised which should not have been, the legislature of this state, by statue, and the Supreme Court of Ohio, by rule, have enacted procedures for recovery for frivolous conduct. The place to file such motions is in the domestic relations court. The appellant's assignment of error is overrule. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES M. PORTER, J., and TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. JAMES D. SWEENEY PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .