COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67372 MARIE KING : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION BURL OWENS : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 30, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-249799 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: LOUIS G. HENDERSON, ESQ. BURL OWENS, ESQ., PRO SE SHANE, SHANE & HENDERSON CO. 601 Rockwell, Suite 510 1430 The Illuminating Bldg. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - DYKE, J.: Defendant-Appellant, Burl Owens, appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Marie King, on the issue of liability in her action for personal injuries sustained as a result of appellant's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as a question of fact remains with respect to whether he was justified in driving left of center in violation of R.C. 4511.25(A). Upon review we find appellant's assignment of error to be devoid of merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The facts and procedural history of the instant case are stated as follows: On March 31, 1993, appellee filed a complaint for personal injuries sustained as a direct and proximate result of appellant's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant denied negligent operation and counter claimed for same on June 17, 1993. On October 13, 1993, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment citing State v. McWilliams (1989), 65 Ohio App. 3d 699 and attaching appellant's deposition. Appellant, so deposed, stated that on February 5, 1993, he was proceeding Southbound on Woodhill Avenue; that a car and delivery truck, parked side by side from the curb, blocked his lane of travel; that as he proceeded to cross the center line to go around the parked vehicles, he entered appellee's lane of travel and - 3 - struck her vehicle head on. The court granted summary judgment in appellee's favor on March 15, 1994 and the instant appeal followed. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER OF LAW AS DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 4511.25. Appellant claims that a triable issue of fact remains as to whether he violated R.C. 4511.25 because the facts set forth in McWilliams, supra, are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. Appellant's argument is devoid of merit. In Mc Williams, the defendant drove left of center to avoid a line of vehicles which had stopped in front of him. In doing so, McWilliams struck plaintiffs' oncoming vehicle. The court held pursuant to R.C. 4511.25(A)(2) and 4511.30 that: [A] line of vehicles stopped in a single marked lane of traffic was not 'obstruction' which justified driver's conduct in driving left of center line; it was within driver's ability to wait his turn in line of traffic and thus alleged 'obstruction' did not excuse his conduct. Id. at 699, paragraph one of the syllabus. Appellant claims that McWilliams is inapplicable because the "obstruction" the instant case was a parked car and truck. Appellant also claims that unlike McWilliams' unilateral action in driving left of center, he was following a line of cars which had been permitted to drive left of center by oncoming traffic. Appellant argues that if the car directly in front of him was permitted to pass, then it was reasonable for him to assume that he - 4 - could pass. Appellant's arguments advance form over substance and disregard the public safety concerns explicit in R.C. 4511.25. They also erroneously suggest that when traffic conditions permit a violation of the law, then such violation is proper. We wholly reject appellant's arguments. In McWilliams, the court citing Mapes v. Opper (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 140 as the case which "accurately sets forth Ohio law governing the circumstances under which an obstruction will excuse the conduct of driving left of center" stated that: In order to avoid liability for injuries resulting from this failure to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle on public highways, a motorist must show that something over which he had no control, or an emergency not of his own making, made it impossible for him to comply with the statute. A self-created emergency, one arising from circumstances under his control, cannot serve as an excuse. Id. at 141. Appellant argues that he had no control over the parked vehicles which blocked his half of the road. We disagree. In the instant case, the appellant had at least two options within his control. Appellant did not have to follow the car directly in front of him. He could have waited until appellee, traveling with the right of way on the proper side of the road, had passed safely before proceeding as mandated by the plain language - 5 - 1 of R.C. 4511.25 (A)(2). We see no difference between the "stopped" line of vehicles and active conduct described in McWilliams and the "parked" vehicles and reactive conduct described in the instant case. Under McWilliams, neither "obstruction" made it "impossible" to comply with R.C. 4511.25(A) which mandates drving on the right half of the road. Hence, neither "obstruction" excused the prohibited conduct of driving left of center. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee on the issue of liability as no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to whether appellant's conduct in driving left of center was excused. See, Civ.R. 56(B) Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered. 1 R.C. 4511.25 Lanes of travel upon roadways, states in relevant part that: (A) Upon all road ways of sufficient width, a vehicle . . . shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: * * * (2) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided, any person so doing shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance to constitute an immediate hazard. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, C.J., AND BLACKMON, J., CONCUR ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .