COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67371 IN THE MATTER OF: : TARISE OSBORN : : : JOURNAL ENTRY : : AND : : OPINION : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 2, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court Division Case No. 9401945 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For defendant-appellant JAMES A. DRAPER, ESQ. Tarise Osborn: Cuyahoga County Public Defender ARTHUR A. ELKINS, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender 307 Marion Building 1276 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For appellee State of STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. Ohio: Cuyahoga County Prosecutor ROBERT DUBYAK, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center-8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Defendant-appellant-master Tarise Osborn ("Osborn"), date of birth September 21, 1976, appeals from his adjudication of being a delinquent child by reason of having committed the offense of Robbery [R.C. 2911.02(A)] concerning a starter jacket owned and 1 worn by the fifteen year old victim, Joey Hardy ("victim"). For the reasons adduced below, we affirm. A review of the record on appeal indicates that the date of the offense was February 7, 1994, at the close of the school day, and the location was outside of Max Hayes High School in Cleveland, Ohio. At the adjudicatory hearing, five witnesses testified on behalf of the prosecution. The first witness was the victim, who testified in pertinent part as follows (R. 11-25): (1) as he was standing outside the school, ten to twelve boys came up to him and demanded his coat and when he resisted, he was struck a number of times while the coat was forcibly removed from his person; (2) approximately six of the assailants ran away with the coat, while 1 R.C. 2911.02, Robbery, provides: (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall use or threaten the immediate use of force against another. (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of robbery, an aggravated felony of the second degree. - 3 - three or four other children gave chase; (3) he could only identify one of the assailants, that person not being Osborn; (4) after the incident, the witness went to the principal's office; (5) the witness thinks Osborn was participating in the offense, but could not positively identify him because he did not recognize Osborn. The second witness was Mr. Cornell Jones, who testified in pertinent part (R. 26-54): (1) he is twenty-one years old and was riding past the school in a car in the company of Mr. David Gundic at the time of the offense; (2) he witnessed a group of approximately ten males taking a jacket from another youth, then disperse into two groups during the get-away; (3) the witness and his friend, Mr. Gundic, stopped, at which time Mr. Gundic and the witness ran after the person who took the jacket; (4) Mr. Gundic caught the person with the jacket and returned the jacket to the victim, but the assailant who had the jacket, a person other than Osborn, escaped; (5) the duo then returned to their car and drove away in search of other assailants; (6) a short time later, the duo stopped to talk to the principal, Mr. Fibbs; (7) Mr. Fibbs had already caught one of the assailants, so the duo drove on in search of other assailants who Mr. Fibbs had seen running up the street; (8) the duo caught the sprinting Osborn, who physically resisted his apprehension, and delivered Osborn to the principal's office; (9) he has no doubt that Osborn was present at the offense because the witness saw him beating the victim. - 4 - The third witness was Mr. David Gundic, who generally corroborated the testimony of Mr. Jones, adding in pertinent part the following (R. 55-69): (1) he is twenty years old; (2) the assailant who had the jacket was Osborn, who initially escaped, but was caught by the witness a short time later after the meeting with the principal; (3) Osborn was observed by the witness beating the victim; (4) it was the witness who initially retrieved the coat; (5) he has some prior felony convictions, but could not remember the identity and/or dates of all the offenses. The fourth witness was the high school principal, Mr. Theodis Fipps, who testified as follows (R. 70-84): (1) he responded to the scene of the beating, and observed the victim on the ground, bleeding, and Osborn and about five other persons running away from the scene being pursued by Messers. Jones and Gundic; (2) he apprehended one of the males, Mr. Campbell, before he could get into a house near the school; (3) Osborn was brought back to the school by Messers. Jones and Gundic; (4) when the witness questioned Osborn about the incident, Osborn denied any involvement and denied that he was at the area where Mr. Fipps had observed him; (5) Messers. Jones and Gundic gave the witness the victim's jacket and Osborn's jacket. The fifth witness was Cleveland Police Officer Christopher Harper, who testified in pertinent part as follows (R. 84-94): (1) he and his partner responded to the school following a complaint of - 5 - a robbery on the date of the offense; (2) from the information that was gathered, Osborn was placed under arrest. At this point the prosecution rested. Following a motion for acquittal, which the trial court denied, the court adjudicated Osborn as being delinquent, sentencing him to confinement for a period not to exceed the attainment of age twenty-one by Osborn. This appeal followed presenting two assignments of error. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHEN THE CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. II THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF ROBBERY IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2911.02(A). The standard of review relative to an assignment of error based upon manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence is provided in State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273: Thus, in reviewing both weight and sufficiency of the evidence, the same test is applied. The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of facts. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. It must be kept in mind by the appellate court that the jury heard all the evidence and was instructed as to the law and as a result found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the relevant inquiry does not involve how the appellate court might interpret the evidence. Rather, the inquiry is, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 - 6 - S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-574. (Emphasis added.) See Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, and State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 O.O.3d 340, 383 N.E.2d 132. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the conviction is supported by the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence which demonstrated that Osborn, in attempting or committing the offense of theft used force against the victim. Assignments overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. PATTON, C.J., and SPELLACY, J., CONCUR JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .