COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67325 : FLORENCE S. VERGON : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : FREDERICK P. VERGON, JR. : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 27, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Division of Common Pleas Court Case No. D-196581 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: MADELON SPRAGUE, ESQ. FREDERICK P. VERGON, JR., ESQ. Millet & Sprague Conquist, Smith, Marshall Four Commerce Park Square, #805 & Weaver Beachwood, Ohio 44122 500 Nat'l City, E. 6th Bldg. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 and GARY A. KAZDIN, ESQ. 75 Public Square, Suite 1020 -2- Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -3- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: Defendant-appellant Frederick P. Vergon, Jr., appeals a judgment for divorce granting alimony to plaintiff-appellee 1 Florence S. Vergon. He assigns eleven errors for our review. Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Florence Vergon filed this action for divorce on August 25, 1989. A trial was conducted in May of 1990 by Judge Patrick F. Gallagher who retired from the bench before journalizing his decision. Judge James P. Celebrezze rendered a decision in place of Judge Gallagher, and the first appeal followed. On November 13, 1991, while the appeal was pending, the parties entered an agreed judgment entry in which Frederick Vergon agreed to pay $1,250 per month in spousal support until the sale of the marital residence and $1,500 per month thereafter. This court reversed the judgment because a successor judge cannot render judgment based upon a predecessor judge's transcript when credibility is a factor. Vergon v. Vergon (Apr. 29, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62436, unreported. In October 1993, the case was reassigned to Judge Cheryl Karner. Judge Karner scheduled the case and all pending motions for trial and cancelled all hearings before Referees. Frederick Vergon filed a writ of prohibition asking this court to declare the 1 See Appendix for assignments of error. -4- November 13, 1991 journal entry void and to prohibit its enforce- ment. At trial, the parties stipulated to the following: Frederick and Florence Vergon were married on December 20, 1966. Both graduated from Denison University in 1966. They have three adult children and have resided separately for over one year. Frederick Vergon graduated from Case Western Reserve University School of Law in 1969 and has been a partner in the law firm of Smith, Marshall & Weaver since January 1987. His earnings from the practice of law have been as follows: 1986, $65,000; 1987, $47,642; 1988, $71,443; 1989, $77,667; 1990, $65,352; 1991, $67,240; 1992, $53,128. For 1993, his taxable income from his partnership was $61,966. His total withdrawals from his partnership in 1993 were $57,273. The partnership also paid a car lease for his use in the amount of $4,476, plus unknown amounts for gasoline and car insurance. He had a total of $36,794.25 in unbilled time; $29,151.57 in accounts receivable from January 31, 1994; and $34,733.01 in accounts receivable from February 10, 1994. Florence Vergon's earnings from employment have been as follows: 1978, $3,105; 1988, $10,437; 1989, $8,372; 1990, $16,856; 1991, $18,363; 1992, $13,593; 1993, $20,815. The marital residence was sold in January of 1992, and the net proceeds were $89,292.79. The parties agreed to divide the proceeds equally with the following adjustments: Frederick Vergon owed $3,084.88 toward the mortgage and owed Florence Vergon $11,350 of past due support. With the adjustments, Florence Vergon -5- actually received $59,081.27, and Frederick Vergon actually received $30,211.52. Frederick Vergon made $39,285 in payments through the Child Support Enforcement Agency from 1989 to 1993, and he also paid $5,000 toward Florence Vergon's attorney fees in 1991. Florence Vergon also received $11,350 in back support from the sale of the marital home. Finally, the parties stipulated to the duration of the marriage, which was from December 1966 to December of 1990. Florence Vergon testified on her own behalf as follows: When they were first married, she was employed as a computer program systems designer, and Frederick Vergon attended law school. Florence quit working to have their three children. She wanted to return to work after their children reached school age, but her husband told her "No wife of mine was ever going to work." Nonetheless, she eventually began working outside the home in 1986. Since 1992, she worked as an account representative for the Cleveland Clinic at an annual salary of $22,000 plus benefits. When Florence Vergon moved out of the marital home in 1990, she only took one bedroom set and those items that had been given to them by her family. In August of 1990, she purchased a 1989 Honda Civic. Mrs. Vergon used $23,000 of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home to purchase a two family house. She lives in one dwelling and rents the other dwelling at a rate of $525 per month. Approximately $10,000 of the proceeds was used to pay attorney -6- fees. At that time, the Honda Civic had a value of $9,000 and a debt of $8,813; she paid off the debt. She also purchased a 1989 Volkswagen Fox at a cost of $4,700 for her twin daughters to drive to and from college. She spent some of the money on paying 1992 and 1993 income taxes, some to pay her daughter's college expenses, and some to pay personal debts. Frederick Vergon was called to testify on cross-examination. He testified the personal property from the home was worth $29,000 but admitted signing an application for a loan that valued the personal property at $9,000. He had four life insurance policies. The Northwestern Life Insurance policy was originally purchased by his father and a nonmarital asset. Two Home Life insurance policies also existed. One has a net cash value of $2,597 and an outstanding loan debt against it of $10,718; $6,500 of the debt was made during the pendency of this action. The other has a net cash value of $81. A New York Life policy has no cash value. Frederick Vergon has a 27 percent ownership in his law firm. After Florence Vergon rested her case, Frederick Vergon testified on his own behalf. He explained his law firm is set up with each partner taking a draw against a capital account. The capital account represents undrawn profits or undrawn revenue. Each partner is required to maintain a $70,000 interest in his capital account before it is distributed. Under the partnership agreement he was supposed to maintain $7,500 in the account over and above the $75,000 in the account. With the death of one of his partners, his partnership share increased to $31,000. The increase -7- required him to maintain $13,000 in the capital account. Because his capital account is now at negative $12,868, he is not supposed to get a draw, but his partners have allowed him to draw a salary of $40,800 until his capital account is at $30,000. Frederick Vergon also testified Florence Vergon took most of the items in the house and valued those items at $30,000. He guessed that her family heirlooms represented half of those household items. Florence Vergon testified on rebuttal that the personal property she took was from family heirlooms given to her by her mother. Madelon Sprague testified about her attorney fees for her representing Florence Vergon. After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the parties a divorce. The trial court's decision, in pertinent part, is as follows: From the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, $3,500 was Frederick Vergon's separate property. The 1989 Honda and 1989 Volkswagen were nonmarital property. The life insurance marital asset was $9,097. Frederick Vergon's interest in his partnership in 1990 was worth $11,000. The parties already divided personal property. The court found there was no reliable evidence Florence Vergon dissipated savings prior to their separation. The marital assets were valued at $105,600 and the parties' division of their -8- assets was held to be equitable considering the nature of the law practice as an asset. In deciding upon the amount of spousal support necessary, the trial court explicitly set forth the factors it considered. Those factors were the relative earning abilities of the parties, their ages and health, the parties lack of retirement benefits, the duration of the marriage, their standard of living, the relative extent of their education, their relative assets and liabilities, and Florence Vergon's contributions as a homemaker. The trial court concluded spousal support should commence January 1, 1991 in the amount of $1,200 a month, until Florence Vergon reaches age 62, until the death of either party, until the remarriage of Florence Vergon or until further order of the Court. The trial court reserved jurisdiction to modify support "in the event of a significant change of circumstances that cannot be foreseen or anticipated." The trial court also provided a modification could not be based solely upon a change in Frederick Vergon's income unless his income was below $40,000 a year or above $88,000 a year. The court also held a change solely upon Florence Vergon's income could not form the basis of modification unless her income was above $30,000. In considering the support due during the pendency of this case, from November 1, 1989 through February 28, 1994, the trial court found Frederick Vergon should have paid 14 months at $350 per month under the original temporary support order and 38 months at $1200 per month under the instant order for a total of $50,500. -9- The trial court gave Frederick Vergon credit for having paid $50,635. He was credited with $135 in his March support payment, ordered to pay $1,065 for March, and ordered to pay $1,200 per month commencing in April. The trial court found Florence Vergon's attorney fees to be in excess of $31,000. It found $11,186 represented legal work done through the first trial, $5,300 represented legal fees for the first appeal, and approximately $8,065 represented legal fees from the second trial. An audit found $15,000 to $16,000 of the fees remained unpaid. Florence Vergon was given credit for having paid $11,000 of the fees, and Frederick Vergon was given credit for having paid $5,000 of the fees. Frederick Vergon had $18,000 of his own attorney fees due. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded he should be responsible for 50% of her fees, and pay $10,000 in addition to the $5,000. Based upon its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court issued its order which, in pertinent part, granted the divorce, decreed that the assets of the parties have been divided, ordered spousal support as set forth in its findings, ordered $10,000 attorney fees to be paid at the rate of $200 per month without interest, ordered spousal support, and ordered attorney fees to be taken from Frederick Vergon's wages. Frederick Vergon now appeals from this decision. In reviewing the propriety of a trial court's determination in a domestic relations case, the standard of review is "abuse of discretion." Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144. The abuse of -10- discretion standard applies to orders relating to alimony and orders involving the division of marital property. Id. "The term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 at 219, quoting State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157. In his first assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion by retroactively applying R.C. 3105.18, as amended, in awarding spousal support. We disagree. R.C. 3105.18(B) (Effective 4-19-88) provides as follows: (B) In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The relative earning abilities of the parties; (2) The ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties; (3) The retirement benefits of the parties; (4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties; (5) The duration of the marriage; (6) The extent to which it would be inappro- priate for a party, because he will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home; (7) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (8) The relative extent of education of the parties; (9) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties; (10) The property brought to the marriage by either party; (11) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker. -11- R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) (Effective 12-31-93) provides as follows: (C)(1) In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support, which is payable either in gross or in installments, the court shall consider all of the following factors: (a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 [3105.17.1] of the Revised Code; (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties; (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; (d) The retirement benefits of the parties; (e) The duration of the marriage; (f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home; (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (h) The relative extent of education of the parties; (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties; (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party; (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought; (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support; (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities; (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. -12- Both parties agree that the prior version of R.C. 3105.18(B) is the applicable statute for determining sustenance alimony in this case. See Schulte v. Schulte (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 41. While the trial court stated it considered "R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n)," the trial court also specifically used the language of the former statute and found an award of spousal support was "necessary." Furthermore, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court considered the factors set forth in the former statute, R.C. 3105.18(B)(1)-(11). Accordingly, we find the trial court properly applied the former statute, R.C. 3105.18(B) and did not abuse its discretion. In his second assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in awarding sustenance alimony. We disagree. Vergon's second assignment of error simply claims there are no facts set forth in the findings of fact and conclusions of Law indicating the court's analysis or reasons for awarding alimony. Nonetheless, the trial court's twenty-five page opinion sets forth fifteen pages of facts upon which it based its decision to award alimony. In five pages, the court specifically addresses the factors set forth in the former statute, R.C. 3105.18(B). Vergon also points out a sustenance alimony award must provide for a termination date within a reasonable time and upon a date certain; lifetime alimony is only appropriate in marriages of long duration. Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64. The trial -13- court in this case specifically limits alimony until Florence Vergon reaches age 62, although the Vergons' marriage lasted more than 24 years. In reviewing the record and the trial court's findings, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sustenance alimony to Florence Vergon. In his third assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in dividing the marital property of the parties. Vergon first argues the trial court abused its discretion in treating the 1989 Honda and the 1989 Volkswagen as nonmarital property. The record indicates the Honda was purchased during the marriage but had little or no net value to the parties at the time of their separation; the resale value of the car was $9,000, but the loan debt was $8,813. Thus, the marital property value was, at best, $187. The Honda loan debt was paid off and the Volkswagen was purchased with Florence Vergon's share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. Because the automobiles for the most part represent a portion of Florence Vergon's share of the marital home, it was not an abuse of discretion to treat them as nonmarital property. Vergon next argues the trial court abused its discretion in treating certain life insurance policies as marital property when the automobiles were not treated as marital property. The distinction between the life insurance policies and the automobiles is clear. The life insurance policies were purchased over the course of the marriage and were not purchased with the proceeds -14- from the division and sale of the marital home. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Vergon next argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Frederick Vergon's inheritance was $3,500 and not $10,000 or $7,500. This argument raises a question of credibility. It is clear the trial court believed Florence Vergon when she testified the inheritance was only $3,500 and chose to disbelieve Frederick Vergon. Consequently, it did not abuse its discretion. Vergon next argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding the value of Frederick Vergon's interest in his law firm to be $11,000. The pre-trial statement reveals an interest of "(11,000)." While the court took this to mean $11,000, Frederick Vergon clearly intended this to mean a negative $11,000. The trial court found Vergon's interest in his law practice was $11,000, but readily admitted there was no evidence at trial of its actual value. Thus, the trial court erred in assigning an $11,000 value to Vergon's interest in his law practice. Nonetheless, when the trial court calculated the actual division of assets it did not include Vergon's interest in his law practice. The trial court found Florence Vergon received $47,650 in assets and Frederick Vergon received $46,950 in assets not including the law practice. Because the value of the law practice was so speculative, it was not included in this equitable distribu- tion and was not used to divide the marital assets. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's erroneously assigning an $11,000 interest in the law practice. -15- In reviewing the division of marital property under the totality of the circumstances, we find the trial court's distribu- tion of marital assets was equitable, and there was no abuse of discretion. In his fourth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in enforcing void judgments. In reviewing the trial transcript and the entire record, it is clear the trial court conducted a trial de novo. The trial court permitted the use of exhibits previously used by the parties, but they were marked and presented anew in the second trial. There- fore, this assignment of error has no merit. In his fifth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in placing income restrictions on the ability to modify the award of sustenance alimony. "A decreeing court does not have continuing jurisdiction to modify a sustenance alimony award***unless the decreeing court expressly reserves jurisdiction to modify." Ressler v. Ressler (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 17 at the syllabus. Thus, it is within the trial court's discretion to set forth the conditions under which sustenance alimony may be modified. In this case, the trial court set forth monetary income ranges reasonably tailored to the parties' circumstances that would establish what constituted a change in circumstances for purposes of modification. The court provided Frederick Vergon with a range of income from $40,000 to $88,000 in which the court deemed his circumstances would not be changed. We find this range to be -16- reasonable considering the limits set by the court actually represent the range of Frederick Vergon's income for the period of eight years from 1986 to 1991 and considering the nature of Vergon's income is so speculative. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing conditions on the modification of sustenance alimony. In his sixth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in re-ruling on motions previously ruled upon or withdrawn. In its journal entry granting Frederick Vergon an alternative writ of prohibition, this court specifically stated "[t]he trial court has authority over all pretrial areas pending***including, but not limited to, temporary support issues pending a divorce." Vergon v. Celebreeze (Dec. 20, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 65905, unreported. Thus, the trial court had authority to consider pending motions for modification of temporary support and the amount of temporary support due while the action was pending. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit. In his seventh assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in considering evidence of his interest in his law practice. While it is clear the trial court erred in considering the $11,000 value of the law practice, which was not admitted into evidence at trial, the law practice interest was not used to divide the marital assets. See disposition of third assignment of error, supra, p. 11. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion. -17- In his eighth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in punishing him for exercising his rights by ordering him to pay Florence Vergon's attorney fees. Vergon specifically suggests he is being punished for appealing the original judgment which was void, the retrial of the void judgment, and Florence Vergon's attempts to enforce the judgment. We disagree. Awarding attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 90. The only questions for inquiry upon appeal are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and whether there was an abuse of discretion. Id. In the present case, there is no dispute as to counsel's competence, and there is no question the work was performed. Frederick Vergon challenges the reasonableness of the fees in view of this court's previous ruling that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to render final judgment because his term of office had expired. See Vergon, supra. He further suggests it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the trial court's award of attorney fees because it condones prolonged litigation tactics by Florence Vergon by making him bear the cost. See Farley v. Farley (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 351, 357. In the present case, there is no evidence Florence Vergon used trial tactics in an abusive manner. While Frederick Vergon was not to blame for the void judgment, neither was Florence Vergon. -18- Neither party can be blamed because the trial judge failed to journalize his judgment before his term of office expired. Thus, the retrial and appeal became a part of the litigation necessary to reach final judgment. We now address the motions to show cause filed by Florence Vergon to enforce the void judgment. These motions were filed by her attorney in good faith before this court held the original judgment to be void. Furthermore, the trial court noted, and the record supports the conclusion that the excessive amount of fees in this case were in part attributable to Frederick Vergon's lack of cooperation with the discovery, temporary support, and Florence Vergon's attempt to purchase a new home. Finally, we turn to the question of fees for the previous appeal of this matter. "Five conditions must exist before a trial court awards appellate attorney fees as alimony: (1) the supported spouse needed such assistance; (2) the supporting spouse has the ability to pay; (3) the appeal must have been taken or resisted by the supported spouse in good faith; (4) there was reasonable ground for the supported spouse's appellate position; and (5) the amount of the fees allowed is reasonable." Lee v. Lee (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 113 at 116-117. In the present case, Frederick Vergon challenges whether the Florence Vergon resisted the appeal in good faith. Although her attorney admitted she believed the original judgment would probably be reversed, there is no evidence she was not representing her client in good faith. -19- After carefully reviewing the entire record including motions to show cause, and reviewing issues involving discovery, spousal support, and the division of property, we find the award of attorney fees was reasonable. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion. In his ninth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in overruling his motion for restitution. We disagree. Frederick Vergon's motion for restitution seeks over $100,000 in restitution that he allegedly "paid out." He argues he "paid out" the amount of temporary support and Florence Vergon's share of the proceeds of the marital home. While the trial court properly gave him credit for the $50,635 in temporary support he paid pending trial, there is no justification for giving him credit for his wife's share of the proceeds of the marital home. By asking for restitution for his wife's share in the marital home he suggests that her contributions, working while he was in law school, raising three children, and working as a homemaker, have no value to the marriage. This use of restitution is absolutely meritless. Frederick Vergon did not "pay out" over $100,000. Therefore, the assignment of error has no merit. In his tenth assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held an "[a]ppellate court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent, credible -20- evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the trial court." Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610 at the syllabus. Vergon argues the trial court erred in finding the Honda and Volkswagen to be nonmarital property. Nonetheless, there was evidence the Honda, which was purchased during the marriage, had no net resale value at the time of the parties' separation, and both cars were paid off with Florence Vergon's proceeds from the marital estate. Vergon next argues finding his partnership interest worth $11,000 was error. It was a clear error to assign an $11,000 value to the partnership interest, but because it was not used in determining the equitable distribution of assets, it was harmless error. Vergon next argues not finding his spouse dissipated $4,000 of their joint savings is error. Although Florence Vergon did have a separate checking account, she clearly testified the money in her checking account came from money she earned. Vergon next argues the trial court failed to take into consideration his negative capital account with his law partnership. In its findings of fact, the trial court clearly considered Vergon's assertion that he had a negative capital account and owed his law firm $31,000. Nonetheless, the trial court found the actual value of it to be so speculative that it could not be used in the division of marital assets. -21- Vergon also argues it was reversible error for the trial court to accept his wife's need to pay attorney fees and not to accept his need to pay attorney fees. Finally, Vergon argues the trial court set out to punish him by believing Florence Vergon's testimony. Because these arguments raise questions of credibility, and there exists competent, credible evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, great deference should be given to the decision of the trial court. See Myers at 614. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit. In his eleventh assignment of error, Vergon argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial because of the reasons stated in assignments of error one through ten. Because we find no reversible error in the first ten assignments of error, this assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -22- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Domestic Relations Division of Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES D. SWEENEY, P.J., and NUGENT, J., CONCUR. (JUDGE NUGENT CONCURRED IN THIS JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING ON JULY 4, 1995.) PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. -23- APPENDIX I. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING SPOUSAL SUPPORT UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE 3501.18, AS AMENDED, WHICH WOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETRACTIVELY. [sic] II. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE SUSTENANCE ALIMONY. III. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIVIDING MARITAL PROPERTY. IV. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ENFORCING JUDGMENTS THAT HAD BEEN HELD TO BE VOID BY THIS COURT AND IN FAILING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT A TRIAL DE NOVO. V. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PLACING RESTRIC- TIONS ON THE ABILITY TO MODIFYTHE AWARD OF SUSTENANCE ALIMONY. VI. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RE-RULING ON MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY RULED UPON OR WITHDRAWN. VII. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE NOT ADMITTED AT TRIAL. VIII. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PUNISHING THE DEFENDANT FOR EXERCISING HIS RIGHTS. IX. THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RESTITUTION OR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR SUMS PAID OUT IN SPOUSAL SUPPORT PURSUANT TO A VOID JUDGMENT ENTRY OF DIVORCE. X. THE COURT'S JUDGMENT ENTRY OF DIVORCE WITH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. .