COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67077 GEORGE A. LONG, et al : : Plaintiff-appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION MAXINE GRINNELL : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MARCH 16, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 225,646 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee JAMES J. TUREK Yellow Freight NANCY F. ZAVELSON Systems, Inc. : Attorneys at Law 113 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For defendant-appellant: TIMOTHY X. McGRAIL Attorney at Law 55 Public Square, #1100 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 LAWRENCE S. BENJAMIN Attorney at Law 24500 Chagrin Boulevard, #101 Beachwood, Ohio 44122 - 2 - DONALD C. NUGENT, J.: This is an appeal from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas finding in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., on its complaint for property damages against defendant-appellant, Maxine Grinnell, and against Ms. Grinnell on her counter-complaint for personal injuries and property damages against Yellow Freight Systems and George Long. This case arose out of an automobile accident between a tractor-trailer operated by George Long and owned by Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. and an automobile owned and operated by Maxine Grinnell. Ms. Grinnell's mother, Genevieve Cigler, was a passenger in Ms. Grinnell's automobile at the time of the accident. Prior to trial, the claims of Mr. Long and his wife, Nancy Long, for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Ms. Grinnell were settled and dismissed with prejudice. It was also stipulated that the claims of Ms. Cigler for personal injuries against Ms. Grinnell, Mr. Long and Yellow Freight Systems had a value of $12,000 and would be determined in accordance with the resolution of the remaining parties' liability, as established at trial. This cause proceeded to trial before the court on Yellow Freight System's claim for property damages against Ms. Grinnell and on Ms. - 3 - Grinnell's claims for personal injuries and property damages against Yellow Freight Systems and Mr. Long. Prior to trial, the remaining parties entered a stipulation which included the amount of property damages sustained by each. The collision between the parties occurred on Interstate I-90, also known as the Shoreway, just west of the I-90/Route 2 merger. With respect to the condition of the I-90/Route 2 merger, the parties stipulated: 4. On the night of the incident, only one westbound lane was open to traffic proceeding on I-90 just before said roadway adjoins Route 2. The single open lane for traffic on I-90 approaching said merge area remains intact all the way past the scene of the accident. Throughout that span, no other lane merges into the single open lane from I-90. Also, on the subject night, two westbound lanes were open on Route 2. Prior to the point where the two westbound lanes of Route 2 adjoin the single lane from I-90, described above, the two westbound lanes shift to the south. Thus, traffic that had been in the right-hand land of westbound Route 2 was shifted into what had been the left lane. Traffic in the left lane was shifted onto a portion of the south side berm. Furthermore, these two westbound lanes of Route 2 remain intact at the point of and west of the point where the single lane from I- 90 adjoins the left lane from Route 2. No other lanes merge into these two westbound lanes feeding in from Route 2 from the merge point all the way past the scene of the accident. Therefore, the two lanes from westbound Route 2 combine with the one lane from westbound I-90 to form three separate lanes. Traffic proceeding in any one of those three lanes east of the merge point need not change lanes or merge into another lane at or west of the point where the lanes adjoin. - 4 - George Long, testifying on behalf of Yellow Freight Systems, was the first witness called at trial. Mr. Long, a fifteen-year employee of Yellow Freight Systems, testified that on September 13, 1991, he and Jim Vargo, another Yellow Freight Systems employee, were dispatched from Richfield, Ohio to Buffalo, New York to pick up cargo and deliver it in Richfield. Both Mr. Long and Mr. Vargo drove separate Yellow Freight Systems tractor-trailers, each measuring approximately seventy-five feet in length (from the front of the cab to the back of the second trailer) and weighing approximately eighty thousand pounds (fully loaded). Mr. Long testified they were in the eleventh hour of a twelve- hour trip heading back to Richfield when they learned over the CB that I-271 was backed up with traffic. Mr. Long spoke with Mr. Vargo over the CB, and the two decided to continue on I-90 westbound, where they would proceed on I-77 southbound to Richfield as an alternate route. Mr. Long testified that his truck was followed by Mr. Vargo's as the two proceeded westbound on I-90. As Mr. Long approached the Wickliffe Spur, where I-90 and Route 2 adjoin, he observed a construction area which caused the right-hand lane of I-90 to be closed. Mr. Long slowed down to approximately thirty-five miles per hour and moved his truck into the left-hand lane of I-90 (the only open lane). Mr. Long testified that he observed a number of police cars on the south side of I-90. By this time, Mr. Long - 5 - stated he was at the bottom of the ramp where Route 2 adjoins with I-90. Mr. Long observed traffic coming in on Route 2. Just beyond the merger point, Mr. Long decided to move into the middle lane. Mr. Long activated his turn signal, checked both sideview mirrors, waited a couple of seconds, and successfully moved into the right- hand (and center) lane. Eight to ten seconds later, Mr. Long "felt something" in the front end of his truck. Mr. Long stated he "felt something in the front end of my truck *** something like pushing me." Mr. Long testified that as his truck was pushed toward the right, he locked up the brakes and the truck turned sharply toward the left, into the meridian concrete wall. Mr. Long's truck hit the meridian concrete wall twice, and then came to a stop. After waiting a few seconds, Mr. Long got out of his truck and observed a "little car stuck on the front end of my truck. And that's the first time I seen the car." Mr. Long waited for the police to arrive and personally observed skid marks which began within the center lane. The skid marks veered into the left lane and into the meridian concrete wall. Mr. Long further testified that he personally observed the tow truck damage the rear end of Ms. Grinnell's automobile while removing it from the scene. Mr. Vargo confirmed Mr. Long's testimony. Mr. Vargo stated that he drove behind Mr. Long's tractor-trailer on the return trip from Buffalo. As Mr. Vargo approached the I-90/Route 2 merger, he observed the construction to which Mr. Long testified. Mr. Vargo - 6 - also observed traffic on I-90 and Route 2. Just past the merger, Mr. Vargo moved into the center lane. A couple of seconds later, Mr. Vargo observed Mr. Long activate his turn signal and proceed into the center lane as well. According to Mr. Vargo, a couple seconds after Mr. Long had entered the center lane, he observed Mr. Long's tractor-trailer veer into the left lane and bounce off the meridian concrete wall. Mr. Vargo next observed a car hooked on the front of Mr. Long's tractor-trailer. The tractor-trailer then bounced a few more times against the meridian wall and came to a stop. Mr. Vargo maintained that the first time he observed Ms. Grinnell's car was after Mr. Long's tractor-trailer had bounced off the meridian wall. After the accident, Mr. Vargo stopped his truck and accompanied police officers to the scene, where he also observed the skid marks beginning in the center lane. Gary Liljenberg was also a witness to the accident. On the night in question, Mr. Liljenberg was traveling westbound on Route 2 and had merged into I-90. Mr. Liljenberg observed the flashing police lights and testified that traffic had backed up a bit. Mr. Liljenberg, traveling in the right-hand lane, slowed down to forty- five to fifty miles per hour and remained focused on a truck just ahead of him and in the center lane. Suddenly, according to Mr. Liljenberg, the entire truck began moving to the left. Mr. Liljenberg stated that debris was flying, and the truck hit the meridian concrete wall. Mr. Liljenberg proceeded past the truck, - 7 - which had come to a stop, and observed Ms. Grinnell's car stuck to the front of the truck. Mr. Liljenberg maintained that the truck traveled straight and did not change lanes until the accident. Mr. Liljenberg further stated that he did not see the car that was involved in the accident until he passed the scene. Maxine Grinnell was called by appellee as if on cross- examination. Ms. Grinnell testified that she was familiar with the I-90/Route 2 merger as she had travelled it every weekend on her way to a trailer park at Camp Perry, just west of Sandusky. Ms. Grinnell testified that she always travelled the same center lane on Route 2 as that lane was maintained and remained open beyond the merger. Ms. Grinnell stated that as she approached the merger, she observed two trucks travelling westbound on I-90. Once past the merger, Ms. Grinnell stated the first truck pulled into her lane without incident. However, seconds later, Ms. Grinnell's mother screamed, "Look out." Ms. Grinnell then observed the tires of the truck in her lane. Ms. Grinnell was uncertain if the tires were the back tires of the cab or the front tires of the trailer. In any event, Ms. Grinnell moved as far to the right in her lane as she could but observed a car in the right-hand lane. Ms. Grinnell next heard a bang on the rear driver's side of her car. Ms. Grinnell felt two impacts, almost simultaneously, and her car was propelled forward. According to Ms. Grinnell, she slowed down only to be hit again and - 8 - "propelled forward and off to the left and pushed around." Ms. Grinnell also testified, "Immediately, my door is hit. I'm hit again, spinning around. I get the car to a complete stop. He has his cab come and hook me and drag me down. ***" Ms. Grinnell, at one point, further described that "[h]is cab comes at me, hits me, puts the headlights through my window, lifts me off and pulls me in that direction." Thomas Beuck, a Euclid police officer, also testified. Officer Beuck was either assisting a motorist or making an arrest on the south side of I-90 when he heard the sound of the collision fifteen hundred to two thousand feet away. Officer Beuck proceeded directly to the scene and observed Mr. Long's truck lying against the wall with a small car engaged in front. The back trailer had tipped and was leaning against the wall while the front trailer remained upward. Officer Beuck was in charge of the scene investigation, prepared an accident report, and obtained statements from all witnesses. Officer Beuck returned the next day with Officer Thomas Yanacek to analyze the skid marks. On cross-examination, Officer Beuck stated that the impact occurred on the right side of the center lane. Officer Yanacek also testified. Much of Officer Yanacek's testimony was stricken, at appellant's objection, as being undisclosed expert testimony on accident scene reconstruction. However, Officer Yanacek to having observed "heavy brake skidding - 9 - that originated within the center of the three temporary lanes veering off to the left where impact was made against the wall." Officer Yanacek's observations are supported by photographs of the accident scene taken the next day and admitted into evidence without objection. After appellee rested its case, Maxine Grinnell testified on her own behalf. Ms. Grinnell reaffirmed her prior testimony, emphasizing that she never changed lanes while proceeding on the I- 90/Route 2 merger and that Mr. Long's tractor-trailer drifted into her lane. Ms. Grinnell added that once the cab of Mr. Long's tractor-trailer hit her car, the cab moved to the left with her car hooked at the front. Genevieve Cigler, Ms. Grinnell's mother, was the last witness to testify. Ms. Cigler corroborated much of Ms. Grinnell's testimony. According to Ms. Cigler, just before the tractor-trailer hit the car, she looked up and observed the truck weaving -- "not keeping its lane." Ms. Cigler mentioned this to Ms. Grinnell, who drove ahead of the truck. Suddenly, Ms. Cigler felt an awful bang near the end of the car. The car flew forward, and glass shattered. Next, Ms. Cigler testified that the car came to an "absolute standstill" when a second bang came from the back side of the car, shattering the windows on the driver's side. Ms. Cigler's head hit the windshield, and her knees hit the dashboard as the truck picked the car up, turned the car toward the cab and tilted - 10 - the car. The car and truck finally came to rest near the meridian concrete wall. Following presentation of evidence, the trial court took the case under advisement. Subsequently, the court issued a decision finding in favor of plaintiff-appellee Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. on its complaint against defendant-appellant Maxine Grinnell. The court also ruled against Ms. Grinnell on her cross-complaint against Yellow Freight Systems and George Long. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were subsequently issued at appellant's timely request. This appeal follows wherein appellant raises the following assignments of error: I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO SUBSTANTIALLY AND SUFFICIENTLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 52 OF THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN THAT IT FAILED TO SET FORTH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT REVIEW BY THE APPELLATE COURT. II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. AND AGAINST MAXINE GRINNELL WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. I. Appellant complains that the following findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to substantially and sufficiently comply with Civ.R. 52: FINDING OF FACT - 11 - Whereas the within matter having been tried to the Court on January 27, 1994, the Court hereby makes the following finding of fact: 1. George A. Long, was not negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle. 2. Maxine Grinnell was negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle and her negligence 100% proximately caused the collision and the damages of Yellow Freight System, Inc., and Maxine Grinnell. 3. As a result of the negligence of Maxine Grinnell, Yellow Freight System, Inc., sustained damages before interest in the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND SEVENTY-NINE AND 47/100 DOLLARS ($19,079.47). 4. Pursuant to a Stipulation entered into by the respective parties, Plaintiff, Genevieve Cigler, sustained damages in the amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($18,000.00) as a result of the collision. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The claim by Yellow Freight System, Inc., for loss of use is denied as matter of law. JUDGMENT WHEREFORE, it is ordered that judgment is rendered against Maxine Grinnell and in favor of Yellow Freight System, Inc., for the total amount of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY AND 60/100 DOLLARS ($23,790.60), such amount being damages sustained in the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND SEVENTY-NINE AND 47/100 DOLLARS ($19,079.47), plus interest from September 13, 1991, at the rate of ten percent (10%). WHEREFORE, it is ordered that judgment is rendered against Maxine Grinnell and in favor - 12 - of Genevieve Cigler for the amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($18,000.00). The Court orders that the judgment entered previously on February 7, 1994, at Vol. 1706, pg. 577, is hereby modified in accordance with this judgment entry. Civ.R. 52 provides, in pertinent part: When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the parties in writing or orally in open court requests otherwise before the journal entry of a final order, judgment, or decree has been approved by the court in writing and filed with the clerk of the court for journalization, or not later than seven days after the party filing the request has been given notice of the court's announcement of its decision, whichever is later, in which case, the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law. The provisions of Civ.R. 52 are mandatory in any situation in which questions of fact are tried by the court without intervention of a jury. In re Adoption of Gibson (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 170; Werden v. Crawford (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 122. The purpose of the rule is to aid the appellate court in reviewing and determining the validity of the trial court's judgment. Gibson, supra, 172; Blevins v. Sorrell (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 665, 672. A trial court ruling which recites various facts and a legal conclusion satisfies the requirements of Civ.R. 52 where, when considered in conjunction with other parts of the trial record, an adequate basis exists upon which an appellate court may conduct its review. Blevins, supra, at 672; Stone v. Davis (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 74. - 13 - It has been further recognized that "findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, because, among other reasons, in cases tried without a jury, testimony is frequently admitted over the objection of opposing counsel and it is often impossible to know whether the testimony, if it was [in]competent, was considered by the court in making its decision. Further, when a judgment is rendered in general terms a reviewing court is not sure whether the case was decided in reliance upon relevant and competent evidence or upon wrongfully admitted evidence, or upon the erroneous application of legal principles." Gibson, supra, at 172-73, quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Battle (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 261, 267; and Professional Business Systems, Inc. v. Koba (May 5, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 45406, unreported. In reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, this court is unable to determine what evidence and testimony the trial court found to be persuasive in reaching its determination. Rather, the trial court's findings of fact set forth legal conclusions, such as that Mr. Long was not negligent while Ms. Grinnell was negligent. Appellant points out that the "expert" testimony of Officer Yanacek was given, over objection, at trial before the court. Although appellant acknowledges that the trial court subsequently sustained appellant's objection to Officer Yanacek's testimony and stated that "the court will disregard the testimony of the police officer regarding any expert testimony he gave," appellant complains that this court has no way of knowing whether the trial court actually - 14 - relied on the stricken testimony. Further, appellant argues that this court will have to weigh the evidence in contravention of Koba, supra. Koba is distinguishable, however, since the appellate court could not determine whether the trial court disregarded the incompetent evidence. In that situation, the court could not hold harmless the trial court's failure to render findings of fact and conclusions of law without weighing the evidence. In the present case, while the trial court's findings of fact fall short of what is contemplated by Civ.R. 52, the trial court sustained appellant's objection to Officer Yanacek's expert testimony. Further, we will presume that the trial court followed its own ruling. State v. Eubank (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 183, 187. Moreover, the trial court's failure to set forth adequate findings of fact does not preclude this court from reviewing the trial court's decision where the only issue in dispute, aside from the adequacy of the findings of fact, is whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, this court has an adequate basis upon which to conduct its review. Blevins, supra; Stone, supra. Appellant's first assignment of error is, accordingly, without merit. II. In appellant's second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court's judgment is against the manifest weight of the - 15 - evidence. Appellant's chief complaint is that there is no evidence that Maxine Grinnell's vehicle ever moved from left to right into Mr. Long's tractor-trailer. Appellant points out that none of appellee's witnesses, i.e., Mr. Long, Mr. Vargo or Mr. Liljenberg, ever testified that Ms. Grinnell drove into Mr. Long's lane. To the contrary, it is contended that the testimony of both Ms. Grinnell and Ms. Cigler established that Mr. Long's tractor- trailer merged into Ms. Grinnell's lane. An appellate court is required to give great deference to the judgment of the trial court when asked to weigh the evidence. Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610. Thus, judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's judgments. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77. Furthermore, the weight to be given the evidence and witness credibility are primarily for the factfinder. Shore Shirley & Co. v. Kelly (1988), 40 Ohio App.3d 10. As the supreme court observed in Seasons Coal, supra, at 80, "The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, - 16 - gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony." In the present case, the testimony of Mr. Long, Mr. Vargo and Mr. Liljenberg supports the judgment of the trial court. Each witness testified that Mr. Long's tractor-trailer maintained its lane until it began drifting to the left and into the meridian concrete wall. Further, the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Long, Mr. Vargo and Officers Beuck and Yanacek, as well as the photographs of the accident scene, establishes that the skid marks resulting from the accident originated in Mr. Long's lane and veered to the left into the meridian concrete wall. Thus, we conclude that competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court's conclusion that Maxine Grinnell's negligence was the sole proximate cause of Yellow Freight System's property damages. The direct and circumstantial evidence presented by Yellow Freight Systems supports the trial court's conclusion that Maxine Grinnell failed to drive within her marked lane. R.C. 4511.33; Sech v. Rogers (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 462. Appellant's final assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 17 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. LEO M. SPELLACY, P.J. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J. CONCUR JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .