COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67034 : ASAP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiffs-Appellants : : and -vs- : : OPINION : GREGORY NALEPKA : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 9, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Reversed. JUDGMENT: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 236904 DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: MARK O'NEILL, ESQ. THOMAS G. LOBE, ESQ. WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, JR., ESQ. 925 Euclid Avenue Weston Hurd, Fallon, Paisley Suite #400 & Howley Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1407 2500 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2241 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: ASAP Technical Services, Inc. et al., plaintiffs-appellants, appeal a decision from the trial court granting a motion for sanctions and awarding attorneys fees in favor of Gregory Nalepka, defendant-appellee. The sanctions followed a directed verdict for Nalepka in a breach of contract action filed by ASAP, which alleged the breach of a confidentiality agreement. ASAP assigns the following five errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IF IT CONCLUDED THAT MR. SIGMIER SHOULD BE SANCTIONED UNDER CIV.R. 11. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IF IT CONCLUDED THAT MR. SIGMIER SHOULD BE SANCTIONED UNDER R.C. 2323.51. III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SANCTIONING WESTON, HURD, FALLON, PAISLEY & HOWLEY UNDER EITHER RULE 11 OR R.C. 2323.51. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SANCTIONING ASAP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. UNDER R.C. 2323.51. V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A JUDGMENT FOR $10,000 AGAINST ANY OF APPELLANTS BECAUSE THE RECORD WAS LACKING IN COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we find that the trial court erred in ordering sanctions against the defendants. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. In March of 1991, Gregory Nalepka accepted employment with ASAP Technical Services, Inc. (ASAP) as a chemist. ASAP is a laboratory engaged in the testing of soil, air, and water. As a -3- condition of his employment, Nalepka signed a confidentiality agreement. The agreement prohibited him from disclosing ASAP trade secrets and from accepting employment with any competing business within 275 miles of Cleveland for one year. In June 1992, Nalepka resigned his position at ASAP and accepted a job at Ross Analytical Services, Inc. (Ross). Ross, a competitor of ASAP, was also engaged in environmental testing. In August 1992, ASAP's president sought legal advice from the law firm of Weston Hurd. Attorney Jason Blackford reviewed the confidentiality agreement, conducted legal research, and determined that the agreement was enforceable. The case was assigned to Robert Linton who drafted a complaint against Nalepka and Ross. After the complaint was reviewed by Blackford and ASAP's president, it was filed on August 11, 1992. The complaint alleged Nalepka breached the confidentiality agreement. The complaint charged both Nalepka and Ross with tortious interference with contract, interference with advantageous economic relationships, unfair competition, theft and/or conversion of trade secrets, and disclosure of confidential information in violation of R.C. 1333.81. The complaint sought compensatory damages, injunctive relief, attorneys fees, punitive damages, and costs. Three weeks after the complaint was filed, Linton left Weston Hurd. The case was reassigned to Harry Sigmier, a partner at Weston Hurd. In February 1993, Ross entered into a settlement with ASAP and was dismissed from the case. On July 12, 1993, after initial settlement negotiations with Nalepka failed, Sigmier -4- amended ASAP's complaint dropping all claims except for breach of the confidentiality agreement. The case proceeded to trial and, at the end of ASAP's case, the trial court entered a directed verdict for Nalepka. Nalepka filed a motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. The motion was heard in December 1993. On February 15, 1994, the trial court granted sanctions of $10,000 against ASAP and attorney Harry Sigmier, and Weston Hurd. This appeal followed. ASAP assigns error in the trial court's order of sanctions against ASAP, Sigmier, and Weston Hurd. ASAP's motion for sanctions was based on both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, and the trial court did not specify which authority formed the basis for its sanctions award. Having no guidance from the trial court as to the basis for its sanctions order, we will analyze the propriety of sanctions under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Civ R. 11 provides in pertinent part: The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. *** For willful violation of this rule an attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court's own motion, may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule. ASAP argues the trial court had no basis for imposing sanctions against Sigmier under Civ.R. 11 because Sigmier did not -5- sign the original complaint. We agree. "The language of Civ.R. 11 indicates that the attorney, whose signature appears on the document, has reviewed the document and found that it meets certain requirements imposed by the rule. Only the attorney who signs the document makes such a representation, and he is the attorney to be held accountable for violations of the Rule." Weiner, Orkin, Abbate & Suit Co., L.P.A. v. Nutter (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 582,588. Because Sigmier did not sign the original complaint, he could not be sanctioned under Civ.R. 11. We also find that Sigmier was not subject to Civ.R. 11 sanctions based on the amended complaint. Although Civ.R. 11 authorizes sanctions against an attorney who signs a groundless complaint, an attorney is not subject to sanctions where he has a reasonable belief that his claim was supported by good ground. See Haubeil & Sons Asphalt & Materials, Inc. v. Brewer & Brewer Sons, Inc. (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 22, 23. Nalepka signed a confidential- ity agreement with ASAP that prevented him from accepting employment at a competing facility for a period of one year after leaving ASAP. The evidence showed Nalepka accepted employment at Ross Laboratories less than one month after leaving ASAP. Ross was a competitor of ASAP. Under the circumstances, Sigmier reasonably believed that ASAP had a valid breach of contract action against Nalepka. Consequently, he is not subject to sanctions under Civ.R. 11. Additionally, we find neither Sigmier's signature on the amended complaint nor Linton's signature on the original complaint -6- subjected Weston Hurd to sanctions under Civ.R. 11. In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group (1989), 493 U.S. 120,125- 126, the Supreme Court held the signature of an individual attorney, even when purportedly made on behalf of his law firm, authorizes a court to impose sanctions only against that individual. Also, Civ.R. 11 does not authorize the imposition of sanctions against a party. Accordingly, we find no basis for the imposition of sanctions against the defendants under Civ.R. 11. We must now consider whether the trial court's order of sanctions was proper under R.C. 2323.51. R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) provides, in pertinent part: ***At any time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one days after the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous conduct. R.C. 2323.51(B)(4) provides, in pertinent part: An award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section may be made against a party, his counsel of record, or both. Frivolous conduct is defined as conduct that obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to a civil action or which is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. R.C. 2323.51(A)(2). Sigmier took over as the lead attorney on the case just three weeks after the original complaint was filed. Ross was later dismissed from the action pursuant to a settlement. After -7- conducting several depositions and reviewing the facts of the case, he amended the complaint to eliminate all remaining claims against Nalepka except the breach of contract claim. Nalepka argues Sigmier unduly delayed amending the complaint and forced him to spend a considerable amount of time and expense preparing to go to trial on the claims listed in the original complaint. However, we find it significant to note that Sigmier did not draft the original complaint. Sigmier amended his complaint before trial after realizing through discovery and investigation that his best claim against Nalepka was for breach of contract. There is no evidence that Sigmier unduly delayed amending the complaint in order to "harass or maliciously injure" Nalepka. Instead of proceeding to trial on claims which, through investigation, he discovered to be questionable, he opted to streamline his complaint to include only the claim in which he had a reasonable good faith belief. His decision to amend the complaint resulted from a careful consideration of the complaint and the available evidence and could not reasonably be held to constitute frivolous conduct. The subsequent entry of a directed verdict against him does not, in and of itself, render unreasonable Sigmier's belief in the validity of ASAP's breach of contract claim. Whether a pleading is warranted under existing law or supported by some good faith argument for a change in existing law is a question of law and we need not give deference to the trial court's determination. Tomb & Assoc. Inc. v. Wagner (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 363, 366. Based upon -8- our review of the evidence, we find that the filing of the amended complaint was not frivolous conduct as that term is defined in R.C. 2323.51(A)(2). Finding no basis for the imposition of sanctions under Civ.R. 11 or R.C 2323.51, we reverse the decision of the trial court. Judgment reversed. -9- This cause is reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellee their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES D. SWEENEY, P.J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the Court and time .