COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 67023 CITY OF SOLON : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION STEVE GRAY : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 11, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 93-CRB-1920A JUDGMENT: Affirmed. Stay of Execution is Vacated. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: BLAIR N. MELLING, ESQ. SANDER SCHWARTZ, ESQ. City of Solon Prosecutor 840 Rockefeller Building 31 Columbus Road Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1306 Bedford, Ohio 44146 - 2 - DYKE, J.: Appellant was the owner of a fitness club in the city of Solon. He was cited for failure to acquire a permit for the balloon and the attached pennants, which announced the opening of the fitness club. The balloon was attached to a maintenance vehicle parked in the lot of the club. Appellant pleaded no contest to the charge before the Bedford Municipal Court judge. He was found guilty, fined $100.00 and sentenced to thirty days in jail. The fine was suspended after appellant was found to be indigent. Twenty-seven days of the sentence were also suspended. The execution of sentence has been stayed pending this appeal. Appellant asserts one assignment of error. I THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BALLOON CONSTITUTED A SIGN AS DEFINED IN THE CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SOLON. Appellant argues that the vehicle to which the balloon was attached does not qualify as a structure, therefore the balloon is not a "sign" as defined in the Solon Codified Ordinance: As used in this chapter, "sign" means a structure or part thereof, or any device attached to a structure or painted or represented directly or indirectly on a structure, which shall display or include any letter, work, model, banner, pennant, insignia, device or representation used as, or which is in the nature of, an announcement, direction or advertisement. Solon Codified Ordinances 1484.02. - 3 - The term "structure" is not defined within the Solon Codified Ordinances. However, the accepted rule of statutory construction holds that: Language employed in a statute should be accorded its common, ordinary and usually accepted meaning in the connection in which it is used, and statutory provisions should be given a fair and reasonable construction in conformity to their general object in order to effectuate such object and purpose. Mutual Building & Co. v. Efros (1949), 152 Ohio St. 369. The general object of an ordinance requiring one to obtain a permit before erecting a sign is to allow the municipality some control over the number and kind of signs in the city. Interpreting the word structure to include a maintenance vehicle in this case accords a common, ordinary meaning to the word as well as effectuating the purpose behind the ordinance. Appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The municipal court's decision is affirmed. The trial court's order of a stay of execution is vacated. - 4 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, J., AND NUGENT, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .