COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 66990 NATIONAL INSURANCE : ASSOCIATION, ET AL. : : Plaintiffs-Appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION GABRIEL HALTON, ET AL. : : Defendants-Appellants : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 2, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-185727 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant, Church Mutual Insurance Co. NICHOLAS J. FILLO (#0016649) FILLO & SISKOVIC 1520 STANDARD BUILDING 1370 ONTARIO STREET CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Plaintiff-Appellee, Frank Pridgett, Jr.: JULIAN COHEN 1020 STANDARD BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Plaintiffs-Appellees, Roshea Johnson and Cathy Johnson: RUSSELL KORNBLUT 1835 MIDLAND BUILDING 101 PROSPECT AVENUE, WEST CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 (Continued on Next Page) -ii- For Defendant-Appellee, Gabriel Halton: CHRISTOPHER HORN (#0026048) 3122 EUCLID AVENUE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 JOSEPH R. TIRA QUANDT, GIFFELS, BUCK & ROGERS 800 LEADER BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 Also listed: For Plaintiff, National Insurance Association: JENNIFER HAYS GORMAN MURRAY K. LENSON 900 BOND COURT BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 For Christ Temple Church: LEWIS EINBUND SKYLIGHT OFFICE TOWER - SUITE 270 1660 WEST 2ND STREET CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113-1498 - 2 - 2 SPELLACY, P.J.: Church Mutual Insurance ("CMI") appeals from the entry of summary judgment in its declaratory judgment action and raises the following assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES PRIDGETT AND JOHNSONS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINDING THAT AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE EXISTED AS TO A JANUARY 3, 1989 AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC COLLISION RELATIVE TO A POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY APPELLANT CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IN THAT SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS GRANTED CONTRARY TO RULE 56 OF THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GOVERNING SAID MOTION AND WAS FURTHER GRANTED CONTRARY TO LAW. I. A. This appeal arises out of a January 3, 1989, automobile accident involving a van, driven by Gabriel Halton, and two pedestrians: Frank Pridgett and Roshea Johnson. After Pridgett, Roshea Johnson, and Cathy Johnson, Roshea Johnson's wife, brought an action against Gabriel Halton and Christ Temple Church ("Church"), CMI, which insured the Church, and National Insurance Association, which insured Gabriel Halton under a non-owner policy, brought separate declaratory judgment actions seeking a determina- tion of coverage. Both insurers asserted that no coverage existed because Gabriel Halton owned the van on January 3, 1989. These three actions were consolidated. - 3 - 3 Pridgett and the Johnsons then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that coverage existed because the Church owned the van on January 3, 1989. The trial court denied this motion. Later, the case was reassigned and the successor judge reconsidered and granted the motion. B. Evidentiary material reveals the following: At some point, Bishop Stanley Halton, pastor at the Church, sold the van to Gabriel Halton, his son. Although Bishop Halton and Gabriel Halton identified a receipt for the sale of the van dated November 1, 1988, and signed by Bishop Halton, they were unable to remember when the receipt was written. During deposition testimony, Gabriel Halton stated that he paid the $500 purchase price after the January 3, 1989, accident. Bishop Halton averred that: 4. Sometime in November, 1988, discussions took place between Affiant and his son, Gabriel, regarding the sale of the said van to Gabriel Halton. No specific price was mentioned by Affiant but affiant's wife set a price of $500.00. 5. Prior to Thanksgiving of 1988, Gabriel Halton used the van on occasion but the van was also used by the Church, particularly on Sundays, for the transport of parishioners. 6. During the Thanksgiving holiday of 1988, Gabriel Halton was arrested for a traffic infraction and was found guilty of driving with a suspended license. 7. As a result of the infraction noted above, Affiant and the Church determined that Gabriel should not operate the van until his driver's license was reinstated and he obtained liability insurance. - 4 - 4 8. To Affiant's knowledge, Gabriel's license had been reinstated and Gabriel had obtained insurance under a non-owner policy, all of which took place prior to January 3, 1989. 9. Affiant has been informed that an accident occurred on January 3, 1989. According to information received by Affiant, his son Gabriel was operating the van and struck two pedestrians. 10. On the day in question the van was owned by the Church. 11. On the day in question, Gabriel Halton was operating the van with the permission of the Church. 12. Affiant states that subsequent to the accident Gabriel Halton paid the sum of $500.00 for the purchase of the van, however, no receipt was written memorializing the $500.00 payment. 13. It was the intention of the Church that title to the van would be transferred to Gabriel Halton, when new license plates would be obtained for all Church vehicles, specifically, title would be transferred on or about February 1, 1989. (Bishop Halton's February 6, 1992, Affidavit). Gabriel Halton averred that: 7. I did not pay the $500.00 or any money to purchase the van until after the accident of January 3, 1989. 8. With regard to my purchase of the van, prior to the accident taking place the intention was for me to purchase and get title to it in February 1989 when the licenses were renewed for all the Church vehicles. (Gabriel Halton's January 29, 1992, Affidavit). Risa Watson, the Church's secretary, averred that: 5. Gabriel Halton used the van with the permission of the church during the fall of 1988. 6. There was a period of time when Gabriel Halton did not operate the van because of a problem involving - 5 - 5 his driver's license. To my recollection this period of time was late in 1988. 7. The receipt dated November 1, 1988 in the amount of $500.00 presumably paid by Gabriel Halton to the church for the purchase of the van was not issued on November 1, 1988 but, in fact, was issued sometime after January 3, 1989. 8. Title to the van was not transferred until February 1989. (Risa Watson's February 14, 1992, Affidavit). On November 8, 1988, the Church extended the license plates on the van through February 28, 1989. On December 5, 1988, Gabriel Halton obtained non-owner insurance with National Insurance Association. On December 6, 1988, the Church paid a quarterly premium to CMI that included coverage for the van. At the scene of the January 3, 1989, accident, Gabriel Halton told police officers that the Church owned the van. He later told Pridgett that the Church owned the van and that he had non-owner automobile insurance. On February 16, 1989, the Church cancelled its insurance for the van and on February 24, 1989, it obtained a duplicate copy of the van's title. The Church never transferred the van's title. During deposition testimony, Bishop Halton stated: Q. Did you notify anybody about the fact that this accident occurred on January 3, 1989 associated with the church? Did you notify anybody? A. No, I don't think I did, because we sold the bus. He [Gabriel Halton] owned the van, so we didn't discuss it. - 6 - 6 (Bishop Halton's August 30, 1991, Deposition, Page 29). Bishop Halton further stated: Q. Do you know if in the winter of 1989 this Ford van was used to transport church passengers? *** A. It wasn't used then. Wasn't used. Q. How about in the winter of '88? A. It wasn't used. Q. How do you know that? A. We done got rid of it, got rid of the bus somewhere in that time, '88, latter part of '88, I would say. (Bishop Halton's August 30, 1991, Deposition, Page 40). Bishop Halton went on to state: Q. I want to know very simply whether you sold the van to your son before he got in this accident on January 3rd of 1989. A. Yes, yes. (Bishop Halton's August 30, 1991, Deposition, Page 53) During deposition testimony Gabriel Halton stated: Q. Is there a question as to who the owner of the van was on January 3, 1989? A. As far as I'm concerned? Q. Yes. A. I was. *** Q. So then at the time of the accident -- let me get this straight. - 7 - 7 You purchased the -- the ownership of this vehicle, as far as you are concerned, (sic) occurred at the time money was exchanged? *** A. No. Q. Did I misunderstand you, sir? A. My purchase of their vehicle is the day when the keys were handed to me and I was told this is my vehicle. *** Q. Okay. Do you remember the date when you were told, this is your vehicle, here are the keys? A. About November. Q. About November? A. Right. (Gabriel Halton's August 30, 1991, Deposition, Pages 48-50). II. In its assignment of error, CMI contends the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment. A. First, we address CMI's argument that the trial court lacked authority to reconsider the motion for summary judgment. CMI asserts the motion for reconsideration was a nullity. Although motions for reconsideration after final appealable orders are nullities, motions for reconsideration after interlocutory orders are proper. Pitts v. Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.3d 378, fn. 1; Bodo v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 499, 504; Civ.R. 54(B). - 8 - 8 CMI next argues that the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the predecessor judge prevented the successor judge from reconsidering it. A successor judge, however, may reconsider rulings made by predecessor judges. Couto v. Gibson, Inc. (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 407, 415; State, ex rel. Ruth v. Hoffman (1947), 82 Ohio App. 266; Meyer v. Gulf Oil Corp. (May 7, 1980), Hamilton App. No. C-790081, unreported. Finally, CMI argues that under C.P.Sup.R. 4 the successor judge is prevented from reconsidering the motion for summary judgment. We disagree. C.P.Sup.R. 4 provides, in part: As used in these rules, "individual assignment" system is that system in which, upon the filing in, or transfer to, a division of the court of a civil case, or upon arraignment in a criminal case, a case immediately is assigned by lot to a judge of the division, who becomes primarily responsible for the determination of every issue and proceeding in the case until its termination. Under this system, all preliminary matters, including requests for continuances, shall be submitted for disposition to the judge to whom the case has been assigned or, if the assigned judge is unavailable, to the administrative judge. C.P.Sup.R. 4 requires the use of the individual assignment system to ensure only one judge is assigned to a case; it does not require that only the originally assigned judge rule on motions for summary judgment. We find, therefore, that the successor judge could properly reconsider the motion for summary judgment. - 9 - 9 B. Second, we address CMI's argument that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment. We review the entry of summary judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 35, 39. Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is proper when: No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against who the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. It should be entered cautiously; doubt must be resolved, and evidence construed, for the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359. "The criteria found in R.C. 1302.42(B), and not the Certificate of Title Act, identify the owner of a motor vehicle for purposes of determining insurance coverage in case of an accident." Smith v. National Mut. Ins. Co. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 150, syllabus. R.C. 1302.42(B) provides: (B) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place ***. - 10 - 10 Reviewing the evidence most strongly in favor of CMI, we find that the discrepancies between the affidavits and depositions create a genuine issue concerning ownership of the van on January 3, 1989. Summary judgment, therefore, was inappropriate. Accordingly, CMI's assignment of error is well taken to the extent indicated. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings. - 11 - 11 This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Journal Entry and Opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellees their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. HARPER, J. and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .