COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 66953 IN RE: JAMIE CARL : : JOURNAL ENTRY : : AND : : OPINION : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 15, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court Division Case No. 9210443 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Appellant-Mother Lisa Carl: CHARLES H. BRAGG 303 East Bagley Road P.O. Box 309 Berea, Ohio 44017 For Appellee Jamie Carl: ARTHUR SCHAMOVIC Guardian Ad Litem 24195 Wendover Drive Beachwood, Ohio 44115 For Department of Human Services: PEARL WATSON Department of Child & Family Services 3955 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 3 - O'DONNELL, J.: Appellant, Lisa Carl, appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of her child, Jamie Carl, to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. On July 21, 1992, the Department of Children Services filed a complaint in Juvenile Court seeking temporary custody of Jamie Carl, (d.o.b. 11-28-89). The child's father, Brian Brown, although properly served in this case, has not entered an appearance. On July 10, 1992, pursuant to R.C. 2151.412, the Department of Children Services filed a case plan which required appellant to attend parenting classes, submit to a psychological evaluation, seek drug treatment, and maintain a stable residence and permanent employment. It also allowed bi-weekly visitation with her child, who remained in foster care throughout these proceedings. On September 9, 1992, the juvenile court declared the child neglected, and awarded temporary custody to the Department of Children Services. Six months later, on March 9, 1993, the Department filed an amended case plan with the court reducing appellant's visitation with her daughter and requiring participation in a residential drug treatment program. On April 26, 1993, appellant pled guilty to petty theft. Sentencing her to time served, the common pleas court referred her to a residential drug treatment facility. - 4 - On May 3, 1993, the Department of Children Services filed a motion seeking permanent custody of Jamie, alleging that appellant failed to follow her case plan. On July 21, 1993, the court held a hearing and seven months later, on February 1, 1994, awarded permanent custody of Jamie to the Department of Children Services. Appellant now appeals from the decision awarding permanent custody of Jamie to the Department and raises two assignments of error. I. For her first assignment of error, appellant contends: THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Appellant believes that she substantially complied with her case plan and would have been ready to receive custody of her child on or before January 21, 1994. The Department of Children Services, on the other hand, maintains that appellant has demonstrated a lack of diligence in following her case plan and that the court's decision granting it permanent custody of Jamie is in the child's best interest. The issue then before us is whether or not the court's decision granting permanent custody of Jamie Carl to the Department of Children's Services is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The award of permanent custody of a child is governed by R.C. 2151.414(B) which provides , in relevant part: - 5 - (B) The court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines *** by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that ***: (1) *** the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents; In the case of In re McCrary (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 601, paragraph 1, headnote, the court ruled: In order to grant motion for permanent custody, trial court must initially find, by clear and convincing evidence, that best interest of the child requires transfer of custody to appropriate agency. R.C. 2151.414(D) lists the factors the court must consider in determining the best interests of the child at a hearing held to determine permanent custody. They include: 1. the reasonable probability of the child being adopted, whether an adoptive placement would positively benefit the child, and whether a grant of permanent custody would facilitate an adoption; 2. the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents ***; 3. the wishes of the child, as expressed ***through his guardian ad litem ***; 4. the custodial history of the child; 5. the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. - 6 - Marta Crespo, a county social worker assigned to this case, testified that the child is well adjusted to her prospective adoptive family and that it would not be in her best interest to sever the stability the child established with that family. Next, we note that the child's interaction with appellant has been limited due to appellant's failure to follow her case plan or maintain the designated visitation schedule. Further, in foster care, the child no longer exhibits fear of separation from her foster mother and is no longer moving from shelter to shelter. Hence, evidence exists in the record to support the first and second factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D). In support of the third factor, Arthur Shamovic, the child's guardian ad litem, filed a statutorily mandated report which indicated that severance of appellant's parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. Lastly, the record reveals that the foster family has provided the child with stability, the child's sleeping irregularities have decreased, and this three-year-old child is at a critical age to develop solid relationships with nurturing role models. Hence, evidence supports the remaining factors as well. We therefore conclude that the judgment of the trial court to transfer permanent custody of Jamie Carl to the Department of Children Services is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. - 7 - This assignment of error is not well taken. II. For her second assignment of error, appellant contends: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING FORTH IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THE DETERMINATIONS IT WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE UNDER R.C. 2151.414(C). Appellant believes that R.C. 2151.414(C) should be read in pari materia with R.C. 2151.414(B) thereby requiring the trial court to set forth in writing the determinations that granting permanent custody is in the child's best interests and that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The Department of Children Services urges that no such determinations were required in this case because they were not requested, pursuant to the statute, by a party. The issue then is whether or not the court complied with R.C. 2151.414(C). The record below reveals that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, but that the court ordered their submission, then adopted those offered by The Department of Children Services. Since the statute requires a court to make findings only if requested by a party, and no request was made here, we conclude that appellant's claimed error under R.C. 2151.414(C) has no merit. - 8 - Furthermore, the findings adopted by the court, although not required, clearly set forth that severance of appellant's parental rights would be in the "best interest of the child" on the basis of her substantial progress in her foster home and the stability and nurturing role models provided therein. (Findings pg. 10). The court also determined that the child could not be placed with either her mother or father at the present time or in the foreseeable future. (Findings pg. 11). This judgment was based on the mother's failure to obtain a permanent residence or show a commitment to drug rehabilitation and the father's total lack of interest in the child. (Findings pg. 11). Accordingly, Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 9 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J. and DIANE KARPINSKI, J. CONCUR JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .