COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61219 STUART SATULLO : : : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : GARY B. GARSON : OPINION : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 22, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 176269 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: JEFFREY H. FRIEDMAN 1370 STANDARD BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: W. CRAIG BASHEIN R. WILLIAM BASHEIN CO., L.P.A. THE ILLUMINATING BUILDING 55 PUBLIC SQUARE - SUITE 1200 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 -2- SPELLACY, J.: On September 15, 1989, plaintiff-appellee Stuart Satullo ("appellee") filed a complaint against defendant-appellant Gary B. Garson ("appellant-Garson"). Appellee alleged that appellant- Garson owed him the sum of $23,300 for services rendered. In an amended complaint filed on September 18, 1989, appellee added defendant-appellant Lee Haendiges ("appellant- 1 Burkons") as a defendant. Appellee alleged that both appellant- Garson and appellant-Burkons contracted with him for professional services and owed him $23,300 for said professional services rendered. On November 3, 1989, appellant-Garson filed an answer to appellee's complaint. Appellant-Garson basically denied appellee's allegations set forth in his complaint. Appellant- Burkons never filed an answer to appellee's complaint. On December 19, 1990, a bench trial commenced. Appellee first called Eli Manos to testify. Eli Manos testified that he had been a lawyer since 1958 and his area of specialty was eminent domain. During his practice, Eli Manos often used the services of appraisers in various types of cases. In fact, he retained the services of appellee on numerous occasions. Eli Manos further testified that he was quite familiar with the fees that appraisers would charge. With regard to this case, Eli Manos reviewed the appraisal report prepared by appellee 1 Lee Haendiges now goes by the name of Lee Burkons. Thus, she will be referred to as appellant-Burkons in this opinion. -3- concerning thirteen properties in the Cleveland area. The appraisal was of thirteen properties as of July 21, 1981 and 2 eleven of the thirteen properties as of August 26, 1986. It was Eli Manos's opinion that the fair and reasonable fee for appellee's appraisal was about $35,000. Eli Manos stated that for such an appraisal prepared by either appellee or any other appraiser, he would expect to be charged $35,000. Appellee next testified in his own behalf. Appellee testified that he was first contacted by appellant-Garson on November 4, 1987 by telephone. Their first conversation concerned the possibility of appellee performing some appraisal work on behalf of appellant-Garson. A meeting between the two was set up for November 12, 1987 at appellant-Garson's office. Appellee stated that he met with appellant-Garson on November 12, 1987 and was informed that appellant-Garson represented appellant-Burkons in a divorce action against Roger Haendiges. He was told that the divorce action had issues concerning several properties, and appellant-Garson needed appraisals for said properties for August 21, 1979, July 21, 1981 and August 26, 1986. Appellee further testified that he indicated to appellant-Garson that appraisals would be difficult to make without several documents. At that point, appellant- Garson told appellee that he had previous appraisals, financial 2 Two of the properties were sold on July 9, 1982 and January 29, 1986. -4- statements, insurance reports and other information about the properties. Appellee said that he and appellant-Garson discussed his fees at this November 12, 1987 meeting. Appellant-Garson also told appellee that he needed the appraisal report by January 5, 1988, since the divorce trial was scheduled for February 15, 1988. Also, at the November 12, 1987 meeting, appellee and appellant-Garson reviewed a chart that provided a list of the properties intended to be appraised. Appellee denied that he entered into any negotiations about providing only high or low values of the properties. He claimed that he would never specify values before he appraised the property. Appellee testified that he immediately started on the appraisal project on November 12, 1987. However, appellee needed the information and various documents he previously requested, thus, on November 25, 1987, he went to appellant-Garson's office and was given several papers and documents. Once appellee had all of that, he correlated the paper and conducted an independent appraisal on each of the properties for the dates in question. Appellee said that by agreement with appellant-Garson, he zeroed in on the dates of July 21, 1981 and August 26, 1986. Appellee testified that his company stopped all other work and focused solely on this project for appellant-Garson. However, on December 21, 1987, appellee received a telephone call -5- from appellant-Garson instructing them to stop work, because the divorce case might be settled and the trial was postponed. Appellee claimed that he was very close to finishing the appraisal, therefore, he completed the work, just in case it was needed later. He believed that if he stopped the work and was subsequently asked to continue, it would have taken him twice as long to complete it. Appellee said that in January, 1988, he telephoned appellant-Garson, in order to find out the status of the divorce case. Appellant-Garson told appellee that he would keep him posted, but he never returned appellee's telephone calls. Appellee testified that he was going to Florida at the end of January, 1988 and did not want to be in Florida if appellant- Garson wanted the appraisal. Thus, appellee typed up the appraisal and forwarded it to appellant-Garson. Appellee stated that he only billed appellant-Garson for work rendered up to December 21, 1987, the date on which appellant-Garson instructed appellee to stop. Appellee sent appellant-Garson an itemized bill for $23,300. He did not bill him for all the work through January, 1988, which would have been between $30,000 and $35,000. The last witness called by appellee was appellant-Burkons. Appellant-Burkons testified as if she was being cross-examined. She only testified that she authorized appellant-Garson to do all things necessary with regard to gathering information concerning the value of her ex-husband's property. -6- Appellant-Garson testified on behalf of the defense. He testified that he was retained by appellant-Burkons in order to represent her in a divorce action. He was retained by appellant- Burkons in June or July 1986 and the divorce complaint was filed on August 26, 1986. Appellant-Garson further testified that appellant-Burkons and her ex-husband, Roger Haendiges, entered into a separation 3 agreement on July 21, 1981. It was appellant-Burkons contention that the separation agreement might have been invalid, because Roger Haendiges failed to make a full disclosure of the values of his properties and net worth at the time of the execution of the separation agreement. Therefore, appellant-Garson contemplated the use of an appraiser to testify as to the values of the properties at the time of the separation agreement. Appellant-Garson claimed that he initially contacted appellee by telephone on November 4, 1987 and set up a meeting for November 12, 1987. On November 12, 1987, appellant-Garson asked appellee to review some documentation and provide him with a "range of values" as to what a "full blown appraisal" would be on the properties. According to appellant-Garson, he told appellee that if his range of the values were beneficial to appellant-Burkons' divorce case, he would retain appellee as an appraiser and provide him 3 Appellant-Burkons and Roger Haendiges continued to cohabitate and have an "on again-off again relationship" until the filing of the divorce. -7- with more information. Appellant-Garson stated that he informed appellee that if the range of values was too low, he would not need a full appraisal. In such a case, appellee told appellant- Garson that there would only be a nominal charge for his services. Appellant-Garson claimed that at the November 12, 1987 meeting, he never authorized appellee to begin work on a formal appraisal report. Appellant-Garson did admit that he gave appellee some materials on November 12, 1987 and November 25, 1987, but those materials were supposed to be used to determine a "range of values." Appellant-Garson claimed that after his meetings with appellee, appellee never provided him with a range of values. In fact, appellee sent a letter to appellant-Garson on December 18, 1987 requesting more information. Appellant-Garson's response to appellee was to hold off on the range of values because the divorce case had been continued. Appellant-Garson told appellee that he would get back to him as soon as he knew where the divorce case was heading. Appellant-Garson said that the next contact he had with appellee was in early February, 1988, after he received appellee's appraisal and a bill for $23,300. Appellant-Garson telephoned appellee and told him that he did not authorize the work done by appellee, since no range of values was provided and he previously told appellee to stop work. Appellant-Garson immediately sent appellee a letter to confirm his position. -8- Appellant-Garson further claimed that he never looked at or received the appraisals, until after the instant lawsuit was filed. In November, 1988, after the divorce case was settled, appellant-Garson called appellee in an attempt to work out a nominal fee for the work he allegedly authorized. Appellant- Garson said that he tried to resolve this problem with appellee into 1989, but appellee ultimately filed this lawsuit. On January 3, 1991, the trial court issued a memorandum to counsel and a judgment entry, whereby, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee and against appellants in the amount of $23,300. The trial court concluded that appellee was "retained to actually appraise the said properties and he was in the process of conducting such appraisal" when appellant-Garson instructed him to stop work on December 21, 1987. The trial court found that "an expert real estate appraiser could not determine the value or a range of values" without conducting an appraisal of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court held that appellee was "entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services as an appraiser from September 12, 1987 to December 21, 1987." It was found that the $23,300 award was reasonably based upon appellee's estimate given to appellant- Garson and appellee's expert's testimony. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently raised the following assignments of error: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR APPELLEE WHERE APPELLEE FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE -9- ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT. A. APPELLEE FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A "MEETING OF THE MINDS." B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HIS SERVICES WHERE THE APPELLEE'S SERVICES WERE OF NO VALUE TO APPELLANT. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING FOR APPELLEE IN THE AMOUNT OF TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,300.00) WHERE APPELLEE FAILED TO PRESENT ANY COMPETENT OR CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE SAME. Appellants' assignments of error will be discussed together, since they argue that the trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. at 279. It is well established that all reasonable presumptions consistent with the record will be indulged in favor of the validity of the judgment under review by an appellate court. Jaffrin v. DiEgidio (1949), 152 Ohio St.2d 359. An appellate court will give deference to the findings of the trier of fact, since it weighs the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Seasons Coal Co. v. City of Cleveland -10- (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77. Appellants initially argue that appellee failed to present any evidence that there was a "meeting of the minds." Therefore, appellants contend that appellee failed to establish a necessary element of a contract. In order to constitute a valid contract, there must be a "meeting of minds" of the parties which is achieved by both an offer and acceptance of the contract's provisions. Noroski v. Fallet (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 77, 79. In the instant case, we find that the parties entered into a contract when appellant-Garson met with appellee on November 12, 1987. At the November 12, 1987, appellant-Garson offered to appellee to enter into a contract under which appellee was to perform appraisal services. The evidence demonstrated that appellee accepted the offer and commenced work on the project. Appellee's acceptance was also evidenced by the November 25, 1987 meeting with appellant-Garson. At the November 25, 1987, appellee requested additional information and documents in order to complete the appraisal work. Appellant-Garson promptly responded by providing appellee with the documentation. We conclude that competent credible evidence was presented showing that the minds of appellee and appellant-Garson came together, and that appellee performed services in consideration of the meeting of minds. -11- Appellants next argue that the trial court erred in finding that appellee was entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services where appellee's services were of no value to them. At trial, appellant-Garson testified that he did not look at appellee's appraisal until the instant lawsuit was filed. However, appellant-Garson had the appraisal in hand in February, 1988 when appellant-Burkon's divorce case was still pending. Appellant-Burkon's divorce case was not settled until November, 1988. We find that appellee's appraisal was of value to appellants with regard to appellant-Burkon's divorce case. Appellee's appraisal was available to appellant-Garson throughout the pending of appellant-Burkon's divorce case. Appellant-Garson had access to valuable information regarding Roger Haendige's properties. We conclude that appellees' appraisal was of value to appellants, thus, appellee was entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services. Finally, appellants contend that the trial court's award of $23,300 was not supported by the evidence. Appellee testified that the total bill for the appraisal would have been between $30,000 and $35,000. However, he only charged appellant-Garson for the value of his services through December 21, 1987, when appellant-Garson instructed him to stop work. -12- Appellee presented the testimony of Eli Manos, an expert in 4 eminent domain cases, who used appraisers on many occasions. Eli Manos testified that the final appraisal prepared by appellee was worth about $35,000. He believed that the demand for $23,300 was too low for the final appraisal. Giving deference to the trial court as the trier of fact, we are unable to say that the trial court's award of $23,300 was against the manifest weight. Based upon appellee's evidence and appellants' failure to rebutt said evidence, we find that the $23,300 award reflected the reasonable value of appellee's services performed for appellants. See, Inger Interiors v. Peralta (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 94. Appellants' assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. Trial court judgment is affirmed. 4 Appellants stipulated to Eli Manos's expertise in eminent domain cases. -13- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, C.J., and ANN MCMANAMON, J., CONCUR LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .