COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61096 MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANIES, : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CHARLES K. WEBSTER, ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellants : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 8, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 184,924 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Thomas E. Dover Gary L. Nicholson GALLAGHER, SHARP, FULTON & NORMAN Bulkley Building 1501 Euclid Avenue Seventh Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For defendants-appellants: Gary S. Andrachik ANDRACHIK & WEBSTER 2200 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 David M. Maistros 800 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113NAHRA, - 2 - NAHRA, P.J.,: Charles and Helen Webster and their children Mary Elizabeth Webster, Patricia Jane Webster and Michael K. Webster appeal from the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of their insurer, Motorists Insurance Companies. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Margaret Ann Webster, daughter of Charles and Helen Webster, was involved in a car accident as a passenger in a car owned by Therese Reed and operated by Shawna Reed. She died as a result of her injuries. The Websters made a claim against Shawna and Therese Reed. The Reeds' insurer, Motorists Insurance Companies, settled the claim by paying the $100,000.00 limits of that insurance policy. The Websters also made underinsured motorists claims against their own insurer, also Motorists Insurance Companies. Charles and Helen Webster each held policies with limits of $500,000.00. Both policies include the following clauses under the heading "Other Insurance": If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. If this policy and any other policy providing similar insurance apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability under all the policies shall be the highest applicable limit of liability under any policy. Under the heading, "Two or More Auto Policies", both policies also state as follows: -3- If this policy and any other insurance policy issued to you by us apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. The policies also define "you" to include not only the named insured but also the spouse, if a resident of the same household. The Websters' claims were submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators unanimously awarded the Websters a total of $1.2 million. Motorists Insurance Companies brought a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare that the anti- stacking and setoff provisions of the insurance policies applied to limit their liability to the Websters to $400,000.00 ($500,000.00 payable on the Websters' policies minus the $100,000.00 already paid to the Websters on Therese Reed's policy). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Motorists Insurance Companies, and denied the Websters' summary judgment motion. The Websters brought this timely appeal. Appellant's assignments of error are interrelated and will be addressed together. They state as follows: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT MOTORISTS' DENIAL OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION TO A POLICY HOLDER (SIC) BECAUSE THAT INDIVIDUAL IS THE SPOUSE OF THE OWNER OF ANOTHER POLICY ISSUED BY THE SAME COMPANY IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3937.18(A)(2) OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PURPORTED ANTI-STACKING LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACTS INVOLVED IS AMBIGUOUS AND UNCLEAR AND IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE -4- CONTRACT AND AS SUCH IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires automobile liability insurance policies to provide underinsured motorist coverage equivalent to the amount of automobile liability coverage. However, R.C. 3937.18(G) also provides that automobile liability insurance policies that include underinsured motorist coverage "may include terms and conditions that precludes stacking of such coverages." In Karabin v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 163, the insured had two automobile insurance policies with the same insurer. Both policies had the same amount of maximum coverage. Both policies also stated as follows: TWO OR MORE AUTO POLICIES If this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you by us apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. The insurer in Karabin paid the limits of coverage under one policy but refused to make a second payment of the limits under the second policy. The Ohio Supreme Court found in favor of the insurer. It held in paragraph one of the syllabus as follows: The unambiguous language of former R.C. 3937.18(E) [now 3937.18(G)] permits insurance carriers to include provisions in automobile insurance contracts which preclude stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. The court explained at p. 166 that "stacking" means the aggregation of coverages. It found that the above-quoted anti- stacking provision was unambiguous. It also found that the provision was clearly and conspicuously set forth in the policy. -5- Accordingly, the court concluded that the provision was valid and enforceable pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G). Appellants argue that they are being denied underinsured motorist coverage in violation of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). We disagree. Motorists did not deny coverage in an attempt to evade the requirements of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). Instead, Motorists paid the highest applicable limit of one policy, which is all they were required to pay pursuant to the anti-stacking provision of the policy and R.C. 3937.18(G). Compare to Karabin, supra. Appellants also claim that the anti-stacking provisions are unclear and ambiguous because different anti-stacking language appears under two different headings, "Other Insurance," and "Two or More Auto Policies." The meaning of a contract is to be gathered from a consideration of all its parts, and no provision is to be wholly disregarded as inconsistent with other provisions unless no other reasonable construction is possible. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 119, 121. Read in context, these two different anti-stacking provisions are understandable and not inconsistent. The provision under "Other Insurance" refers to insurance provided by a different insurer. It refers to "other applicable similar insurance." In contrast, the "Two or More Auto Policies" section refers to situations like the one at bar where the same insured has more than one insurance policy from the same insurer, because it refers to "this policy and any other insurance policy issued to you by us." These provisions are clearly set forth under -6- appropriate bold-faced headings and are not ambiguous or inconsistent. See Karabin, supra, Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46 and Estate of Laura Donnell v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. (June 2, 1988), Cuyahoa App. No. 55100, unreported (identical language enforced). Appellants rely on Wood v. Shepard (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 86 in support of their arguments. However, Wood v. Shepard did not overrule Karabin, see supra, and is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Wood v. Shepard, the single insurance policy at issue had $100,000.00 "per person" limits and $300,000.00 "per accident" limits. The precise holding of that case is that separate wrongful death claims of survivors against an insurer cannot be limited to the "single person" limit of liability in the insurance policy. In that case, however, the survivors did not claim that they were entitled to more than the $300,000.00 "per accident" policy limits. See p. 90. In this case, the insurer is not attempting to limit its liability to the $250,000.00 "each person" limit of the policies. It admits liability for the full $500,000.00 "each accident" limit of the policies (minus the $100,000.00 setoff), but refuses to pay $500,000.00 twice, once for each policy. According to the valid anti-stacking provision which limits coverage to the maximum limits of any one policy, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Motorists. Appellants' assignments of error are overruled. Affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. CORRIGAN, JOHN F., J., and SWEENEY, JAMES D., J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .