COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61056 MICHAEL A. SHORE : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION OHIO EDISON COMPANY : and : HEAD MERCANTILE COMPANY, INC. : : Defendant-appellees : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 1, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 173,402 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: DANIEL S. WHITE Attorney at Law 23200 Chagrin Boulevard Beachwood, Ohio 44122 For defendant-appellee JOHN PARIS Ohio Edison Company: Attorney at Law 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 (Cont.) - 0 - (Cont.) For defendant-appellee LEONARD B. SCHARFELD Head Mercantile Co.: Attorney at Law 1905 The Superior Building 815 Superior Avenue, N.E. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 1 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Michael Shore, timely appeals the trial court's granting of the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants-appellees Ohio Edison Company and Head Mercantile Company, Inc. in favor of appellees on appellant's complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The pertinent facts are as follows: Appellant owned real estate located at 5626 Wallace Boule- vard, North Ridgeville, Ohio. Appellant executed and delivered an authorization card requesting electrical service to be fur- nished at that address from appellee Ohio Edison Company. Appellant agreed to pay for the electrical service until said authorization was terminated in writing. Appellant entered into an agreement for the sale of said real estate to a third party on October 29, 1985. The agreement provided that utility bills incurred thereafter were to be paid by the real estate agent and/or mortgage holder. However, appellant did not terminate his agreement to be responsible for payment of the electrical service with appellee. Appellee Ohio Edison Company sent a bill to appellant c/o Robert Sanders at appellant's old home address of 5626 Wallace Boulevard, North Ridgeville, Ohio in the amount of - 2 - $145.75 for electrical service used from November 15, 1985 to December 13, 1985. Appellee sent several notices of the bill to appellant at that address, the service address, but never re- ceived payment of the bill. On May 1, 1986, Ohio Edison Company referred the matter for collection to appellee Head Mercantile Company. Appellee Head Mercantile Company sent two collection letters to the address and, on June 11, 1986, appellee called appellant at his business phone number. Appellant stated to appellee that he disputed being responsible for payment of the debt in ques- tion. On September 3, 1986, the appellees filed a lawsuit for collection of the debt. On September 15, 1986, the escrow agent handling the sale of appellant's real estate paid the full amount of the unpaid bill and, on September 17, 1986, the case was settled and dismissed with prejudice. Appellee notified the appropriate credit bureaus that the case had been settled and dismissed by the trial court. On July 25, 1989, appellant filed a complaint alleging that appellees acted with willful and wanton misconduct in filing a lawsuit, resulting in appellant's failure to obtain credit from the First State Bank of Hinton, Oklahoma, miscellaneous office expenses, and damage to appellant's personal and credit reputa- tion. After substantial discovery, appellees filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted by the trial court on May 22 and 23, 1990. - 3 - Appellant now timely appeals, raising two assignments of error for our review. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY APPEL- LEE OHIO EDISON COMPANY. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY APPELLEE HEAD MERCANTILE CO., INC. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment on appellant's malicious prosecution action where a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the first and second elements of a malicious prosecu- tion claim: that appellees maliciously and without probable cause instituted a civil action against appellant. Appellant also con- tends that he has established the fourth element of a malicious prosecution claim: that the filing of the civil action resulted in a seizure of property consisting of a denial of credit by a third party. These arguments are without merit. Civ. R. 56 provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and, viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of - 4 - the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Petrey v. Simon (1984- ), 19 Ohio App.3d 285. The essential elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution; (2) lack of probable cause; (3) termination of the prosecution in favor of defendant; and (4) arrest of the person or seizure of property. Crawford v. Euclid Nat'l. Bank (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 135. In the present case, no genuine issue of material fact exists to support that appellees acted maliciously or lacked probable cause in filing a civil lawsuit to attempt to secure payment of a bill for electrical service from appellant for electricity used from November 15, 1985 to December 13, 1985. It is undisputed that appellant authorized appellee Ohio Edison to provide electrical service at that address and that he agreed to pay all bills for the service until said authorization was termi- nated in writing. Since the appellant never terminated responsi- bility for service in writing, the appellees properly determined that he was responsible for payment of the bill. In addition, no evidence exists to support that property of the appellant was seized as a result of the filing of the civil action. Appellant alleges that he suffered a seizure of property consisting of a denial of credit from the First State Bank of Hinton, Oklahoma. However, the appellant has not set forth any facts demonstrating what amount of credit was denied by First - 5 - State Bank and whether the denial of credit resulted from any actions of appellees in reporting the collection lawsuit to the credit bureau. Furthermore, since the evidence establishes that appellant had over sixteen thousand dollars' worth of credit available to him from other credit grantors, we cannot find that appellant's voluntary application for more credit was a seizure of property. See, Crawford v. Euclid Nat'l. Bank (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 135, 137. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment since no genuine issue of material fact exists to support all of the essential ele-ments of a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Assignments of Error I and II are overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J. KRUPANSKY, J. CONCUR JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .