COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60946 STATE OF OHIO : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : RICARDO STOVALL : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JULY 30, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CR-248117 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: JOSEPH RUSSO Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: CHARLES M.MORGAN, JR. 11510 Buckeye Road Cleveland, Ohio 44104 -2- SPELLACY, J.: Defendant-appellant Ricardo Stovall appeals his conviction for selling marijuana (R.C. 2925.03) and possession of criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24). In his sole assignment of error, Stovall contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for 1 acquittal made under Crim. R. 29(A). We find no error and affirm the conviction. I. The following pertinent facts were adduced at trial: During an undercover investigation of the H & K Deli, an informant, accompanied by a police officer, entered the deli to make a "controlled buy." Hosie Harris, owner of the H & K Deli, and his three employees - Stovall, Louis Ward and Freddie Beamon were behind the deli's counter and plexiglass barrier. When the informant placed a ten dollar bill under the plexiglass barrier, Ward retrieved it and gave the informant a packet of marijuana. Harris stood two to three feet, and Stovall stood six to seven feet, from the transaction. Police officers executed a search warrant at the deli several minutes later. They found fifty-one packets of marijuana in the ceiling of a back room. On Stovall, they found the ten dollar bill used by the informant to purchase the marijuana, an additional six hundred eighty-six dollars, and a packet of 1 Stovall's assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEN- DANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 29A. -3- marijuana. On Harris they found over one thousand dollars, and on Beamon, they found two packets of marijuana. The police officers did not find any money or drugs on Ward. A police officer testified that Beamon attempted to flush two additional packets of marijuana down a toilet. II. Stovall contends the trial court should have ordered an entry of judgment of acquittal for the charge of selling marijuana. "Pursuant to Crim. R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 261, syllabus. R.C. 2925.03 provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o person shall knowingly *** sell *** a controlled substance ***." Marijuana is a controlled substance. R.C. 3719.01 and 3719.36. The complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, provides in pertinent part, "[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall *** [a]id or abet another in committing an offense ***." Stovall argues that neither his presence in the deli nor his possession of the ten dollar bill used by the informant to purchase the marijuana is sufficient to sustain a conviction. We disagree. To be convicted of aiding and abetting a party must assist, incite, or encourage the principle. State v. Sims -4- (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 56, 58; see, also, State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St. 3d 20, 25. Aiding and abetting may be demonstrated by both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Cartellone (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 145, 150. Although neither mere presence, State v. Widner (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 267, 269, nor actions after the fact, State v. Woods (1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 1, 6, are sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting, inferences may be made from a party's presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed. Cortellone, supra, at 150. The standard of proof for circumstantial evidence is the same as it is for direct evidence. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph one of the syllabus. "[Thus, w]hen the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction." Id. The trial court was presented with evidence that fifty-one packets of marijuana were hidden on the premises. Further, everyone involved with the deli, except for Ward, who actually sold the marijuana to the informant, had large sums of money, marijuana, or both in their possession. Finally, several minutes after the transaction took place, Stovall, possessed, in addition to a large sum of money and a packet of marijuana, the ten dollar bill used by the informant to purchase the marijuana. -5- Reviewing the evidence adduced at trial, we conclude the trial court did not err when it found reasonable minds could infer that Stovall knowingly aided and abetted Ward in selling marijuana to the informant. III. Stovall also contends the trial court should have ordered an entry of judgment of acquittal for the charge of possessing criminal tools. R.C. 2923.24 provides in pertinent part, "[N]o person shall possess or have under his control any substance, device, instru- ment, or article with purpose to use it criminally ***." Stovall argues the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to demonstrate he intended to use the money within his possession criminally. We disagree. Reviewing the evidence adduced at trial, we conclude the trial court did not err when it found reasonable minds could infer that Stovall intended to use the money, either the ten dollar bill used by the informant to purchase marijuana or the additional six hundred eighty-six dollars, with a criminal purpose. Accordingly, Stovall's assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. NAHRA, P.J., AND JAMES D. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .