COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60824 ROBERT B. NELSON : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION MARY LOUISE NELSON : : Defendant-appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MAY 28, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. DM-168,273 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: LAWRENCE E. STEWART Attorney at Law The Atrium Office Plaza, #850 668 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3060 For defendant-appellee: JAMES R. SKIRBUNT SHARON A. SKIRBUNT ROBERT G. REMIS 300 National City Bank Bldg. 629 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 1 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J.: Appellant, Robert B. Nelson, appeals from the decision of the common pleas court, domestic relations division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The marriage between appellant and appellee, Mary Louise Nelson, was dissolved in a judgment entry journalized on April 21, 1986. Incorporated into the dissolution decree is the parties' separation agreement, dated March 19, 1986, which provides, in pertinent part, that appellant "shall pay alimony to the Wife (appellee) until such time as the Wife remarries, cohabits or dies, *** which ever shall first occur ***." On July 1, 1989, appellant notified appellee that he was discontinuing alimony payments due to his belief that appellee was cohabitating with another man. On July 28, 1989, appellee filed a motion to show cause and a motion for attorney fees. Appellant subsequently filed a Motion for Refund of Alimony Paid Post-Cohabitation. The motions were heard by a referee who, in her report, recommended that appellee's motions be granted and appellant's motion denied. Appellant duly filed objections. Thereafter, the trial court, in a journal entry, approved the referee's report and recommendation and overruled appellant's objections. This appeal follows. - 2 - The pertinent facts elicited at the hearing before the referee are as follows: Appellant had made each and every alimony payment up to July 1, 1989, but none since then. Suspecting that appellee was coha- bitating with another man, appellant hired Professional Investi- gations and Security sometime near the end of 1987. However, due to the structure of the apartment complex wherein appellee resided, no conclusive results were obtained. Thereafter, in April of 1988, appellee purchased a house on Palmerston Road in Shaker Heights. Appellant re-employed Profes- sional Investigations, and Art Talifiarro was assigned to conduct the investigation. On the basis of Talifiarro's report, appel- lant concluded that appellee was cohabitating with Alex Vargo. Consequently, appellant terminated alimony payments. Art Talifiarro testified that he became re-involved in the investigation of appellee on April 28, 1989. Talifiarro took notes during the course of his investigation as he observed the events to which he testified. Talifiarro used his own discretion as to the times during which he took surveillance. Usually, Talifiarro surveyed appellee's Palmerston residence from his car parked across the street in a school parking lot. Talifiarro testified at length to observing Alex Vargo and/or his car at appellee's Palmerston residence late in the evening and early the next morning on numerous occasions from May, 1989 to mid-July, 1989. It is undisputed that Talifiarro never spent an entire - 3 - evening into the following morning on surveillance of appellee's premises. Appellee testified that she met Alex Vargo in January of 1987. She stated she did not have sexual relations with him until September of that year. Appellee admitted that Vargo spent the night with her approximately two to five times per week from September to December of 1987. From January, 1988 to June, 1988, appellee and Vargo spent approximately two to three nights together per week. However, due to a misunderstanding regarding Vargo's use of a key to appellee's residence, appellee broke off her relationship with Vargo in June of 1988. Their relationship recommenced in October of 1988 with overnight visits approximate- ly twice a week. After appellee moved into her Palmerston house in April, 1989, Vargo spent approximately four to five nights per week with appellee. Appellee stated she felt insecure in her new home. Eventually, however, as her dog Spot became house trained, Vargo spent less nights at appellee's home. Thereafter, from July of 1989 to the time of the hearing, Vargo spent approx- imately two nights per week with appellee. Appellee further testified that Vargo did not keep any clothes or toiletries at her residence and that Vargo did not receive any mail or phone calls at her residence. Appellee lists her daughters as persons to contact in case of emergency on various personal documents. Further, her daughters are listed as the death beneficiaries in appellee's Keough plan, life insur- - 4 - ance policy, and appellee's will. Vargo keeps no furniture or personal property at appellee's residence. Appellee's Palmerston home is titled in her name solely, and she has no joint assets or joint bank accounts with Vargo. Vargo is not authorized to use any of appellee's credit cards. Vargo is never allowed in appellee's residence unless he is invited and does not undertake any chores or perform any type of maintenance, with a few limited exceptions, on appel-lee's residence. Moreover, Vargo does not pay rent or utilities incurred at appellee's residence although they sometimes share the cost of a meal. Appellee describes her relationship with Vargo as being non-exclusive, with no plans of marriage or ever sharing living arrangements. Finally, neither party has ever borrowed money from the other. The parties' two daughters both testified at the hearing. Each more or less corroborated appellee's testimony with respect to the frequency of Vargo's overnight stays. Each further stated their mother spoke of her relationship with Vargo as being a caring and loving, but non-exclusive, relationship. Alex Vargo also tes-tified at length regarding the frequency of his over- night stays with appellee, the non-exclusiveness of their rela- tionship, and as to the economic arrangements relative to their relationship. Vargo's testimony also substantially corroborated appellee's tes-timony. Based on the above evidence, the referee determined that appellee and Vargo were not cohabitating "in as much as they were - 5 - not living together by even the most liberal understanding of that term" and, further, "their finances were totally separate and independent." The referee recommended that appellant's motion be denied and appellee's motions granted. After objec- tions were filed, the trial court approved the referee's finding and recommendations and overruled appellant's objections. Appellant timely appeals, raising two assignments of error for our review. Appellant's first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPROVED AND ADOPTED A REFEREE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT BY APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS AND SPECIFIC CITATIONS TO THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT WAS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN UNRELIABLE BECAUSE IT WAS LEGAL- LY INSUFFICIENT AND OMITTED OR IGNORED THE MATERIAL FACTS PRESENTED AT THE HEARING. Appellant argues that his "documented objections" to the referee's report and recommendation show that the referee's find- ings are improbable and unreliable. Consequently, appellant argues the trial court was under an affirmative duty to substan- tially address the merits of his objections which, he contends, the court failed to do. Appellant argues, in essence, that the trial court did nothing more than give its rubber-stamp approval to the referee's report and recommendation. This argument lacks merit. Pursuant to Civ. R. 53, it is the primary duty of the trial court, and not the referee, to act as the judicial officer. Normandy Place Assoc. v. Beyer (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 102, 105. Referees serve only in an advisory capacity to the court and have - 6 - no authority to render final judgments affecting the parties. Nolte v. Nolte (1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 227, paragraph 2 of the syllabus. Indeed, the court must approve the referee's report and enter it upon its own record in order for that report to have any valid or binding effect. Beyer, supra. As this court has held: The report of the trial referee must contain a statement of facts forming the basis for the referee's recommendation to the trial judge. Absent such a statement, the court cannot adopt the recommendation because it lacks the necessary information to make the required independent analysis of the case. Nolte, supra, paragraph 1. "Even in the absence of any objection to a referee's report, the trial court has the responsibility to critically review and verify to its own satisfaction the correct- ness of such a report." Cork v. Bray (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 35, 38-39, quoting Beyer, supra. This court has consistently condemned practices of a domes- tic relations court which lead to "rubber stamping" of the refer- ee's report. See, Nolte, supra; Haag v. Haag (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 169; Staggs v. Staggs (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 109. These practices include use of a single document to serve as both the report of the referee and recommended journal entry and the court's failure to expressly rule upon a party's objections to the report. Haag, supra, paragraph 2 of the syllabus. In the present case, the referee's finding of fact and conclu-sions of law consists of over six typewritten pages summa- - 7 - rizing the relevant testimony of all material witnesses, includ- ing that of appellant's chief witness, Art Talifiarro. Further, the trial court's journal entry approving the referee's recommen- dations is a separate document which specifically overrules appellant's objections. Apparently, appellant takes issue with that portion of the trial court's journal entry which overrules his objections and approves the referee's recommendations because said portion appears to have been stamped in the middle of the document. How-ever, this is not the practice condemned by this court in Nolte, Staggs and Haag. Pursuant to Civ. R. 53, an independent review of the pleadings, referee's report and objec- tions is all that is re-quired of the trial court in adopting, rejecting or modifying said report. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is over- ruled. Appellee's second assignment of error follows: THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED INCORRECT RULES OF LAW TO DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF COHABITATION AND THEREBY FAILED TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE NELSONS' SEPARATION AGREEMENT. Essentially, appellant argues the trial court erroneously adopted a definition of "cohabitation" to include some degree of financial interdependence. Appellant asserts the plain language of their separation agreement precludes this result. Finally, appellant contends that had the trial court construed their separation agreement applying correct legal standards, the evi- - 8 - dence establishes cohabitation as a matter of law. These argu- ments lack merit. In interpreting separation agreements, the trial court must presume that the ordinary meaning of the language employed evin- ces the intent of the parties. Roller v. Roller (Oct. 5, 1989), Cuya-hoga App. No. 55988, unreported, at 5. Where the term "cohabitation" is used in a divorce decree in the sense that it will alter obligations created in the decree, Ohio courts have long since looked to whether the parties have assumed obliga- tions, including support, equivalent to those arising from a ceremonial marriage. See: Bussey v. Bussey (1988), 55 Ohio App. 3d 117; Miller v. Miller (Sep. 5, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 49279, unreported; Taylor v. Taylor (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 279; Fuller v. Fuller (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 253; and Bromberg v. Bromberg (Apr. 7, 1983), Cuya-hoga App. No. 45263, unreported. Indeed, this court in Bromberg adopted the following definition of "co- habitation" as found in Black's Law Dictionary 236, (5th Ed., 1979): To live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually mani-fested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual rela- tions. Accord, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 218, (1979). Thus, the trial court did not err in approving the referee's conclusion that the definition of cohabitation includes some degree of financial interdependence. Ohio courts have consis- - 9 - tently held as much. See, Bussey, supra; Miller, supra; Taylor, supra; Fuller, supra; and Bromberg, supra. Moreover, the ordi- nary meaning of co-habitation includes some degree of financial interdependence. See, Black's Law Dictionary 236, (5th Ed., 1979); and Webster's New Col-legiate Dictionary 218, (1979). Finally, appellant argues that the evidence establishes co- habitation as a matter of law. However, the question of cohabi- tation is to be determined by the trier of facts. Bussey, supra, at 119; Taylor, supra. If the judgment of the trial court is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essen-tial elements of the case, it will not be reversed by an appellate court as being against the manifest weight of the evi- dence. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77. In the present case, the testimony of appellee, Alex Vargo, the parties' two daughters, and Doris Vargo support the trial court's judgment. The testimony of appellant's chief witness, Art Talif- iarro, at best supports the conclusion that appellee and Alex Vargo spent numerous nights together. However, the record is totally void of any evi-dence that appellee and Vargo lived together or that they were in any way financially interdependent. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is over- ruled. Judgment affirmed. - 10 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domes- tic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, C.J. ANN McMANAMON, J. CONCUR JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .