COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60820 JANNIE PENNINGTON : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CAROLYN McGUIRE : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JULY 2, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 176,209 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: FRANK T. ZOBEK Attorney at Law 1616 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: DAVID L. DOUGHTEN Attorney at Law 2000 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 1 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J.: Defendant-appellant, Carolyn McGuire, timely appeals the decision of the common pleas court which granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Jannie Pennington, in the amount of four thousand seventy-one dollars on appellee's complaint and against appellant on appellant's counter-claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Appellee testified at the bench trial that sometime in the middle of June, 1988, she began receiving daily phone calls from appellant, who accused her of having appellant's ex-husband's child. Although appellee admitted to having an affair with appel-lant's ex-husband, she continuously denied having his child and attempted to explain that the child in question was adopted. The phone calls continued into September, and became more threat- ening in nature. Appellee testified that appellant threatened to kill her. In the first week of September, appellant began threatening to kill appellee's daughter. On September 15, 1988, appellee received another phone call from appellant at approximately 8:45 a.m. This time, appellant stated she was going to come over to appellee's home and kill her and then go to her daughter's school and kill her daughter. After the threatening phone call, appellee called the police. - 2 - She then walked her daughter to school. When she returned, she sat on her front porch and talked to her cousin, who lives nearby. Thereafter, appellant drove up to appellee's home and parked her car in front of appellee's house. Appellee stated appellant got out of her car, rushed across the lawn and up the stairs, and slammed appellee into the screen door. In the ensuing struggle, appellee was thrown to the floor, where appellant scratched her face, neck, chest and eyes. As appellant choked appellee, appellee hit appellant on the head with an empty mayonnaise jar. Appellant rolled over, and appellee managed to get on top of her. Appellee screamed at the appellant, "This is not your ex-hus- band's child!" As appellee offered to let appellant go, appellant kneed her in the groin and continued to scratch her face. Appellee held appellant to the ground until the police arrived. On cross-examination, appellee stated she hit appellant once with the mayonnaise jar when appellant was on top of her and twice when appellee managed to get on top. At some point during the struggle, appellee shattered the mayonnaise jar on appel- lant's knee. However, appellee stated, the appellant continued to fight her during the entire incident. Appellant readily admitted she called appellee approximately ten to twenty times starting in mid-July. She further testified she called appellee the morning of the incident in question. - 3 - How-ever, appellant stated appellee invited her over to talk about her ex-husband and the child. Accordingly, appellant drove to appellee's house, parked in front of her home, and proceeded up her stairs to the front porch. However, when appellant initiated a conversation, appel- lee grabbed her. To protect herself, appellant grabbed appellee back, and the two began to wrestle. Appellant stated appellee's nephew came out onto the porch and gave appellee a broomstick. They continued wrestling when appellee's mother also came out, grabbed appellant, and told appellee to kill her. At some point during the struggle, appellee and appellant fell to the ground where they took a short break to catch their breath. The strug- gle continued, however, until appellee gained a decided advan- tage, whereafter she proceeded to hit appellant on the head with a pop bottle. Further, when appellee lost the pop bottle, she was given the mayonnaise jar by a relative and continued to batter appellant with the jar. Based on the above evidence, the trial court found in favor of appellee and awarded her three thousand seventy-one dollars in compensatory damages and one thousand dollars in punitive dam- ages. Appellant timely appeals, raising two assignments of error. Because appellant's assignments of error are interre- lated, we will consider them jointly. They state: I. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF ON THE APPELLANT'S COUN- TERCLAIM WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. - 4 - II. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT FINDING FOR THE APPELLANT ON HER COMPLAINT IS AGAI- NST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Appellant contends the trial court's judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, appellant argues appel- lee initiated the fight and is thus liable for battery. Second, appellant argues that, assuming she did initiate the fight, ap- pellee used excessive force in repelling the alleged attack. Appellant's arguments lack merit. Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence go- ing to all the essential elements of the case will not be re- versed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 279. We will make every reasonable pre- sumption in favor of the trial court's judgments. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77. Furthermore, the weight to be given the evidence and witness credibility are pri- marily for the factfinder. Shore Shirley & Co. v. Kelly (1988), 40 Ohio App. 3d 10. A person is subject to liability for battery when she acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact and when a harm-ful contact results. Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St. 3d 98; Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), 25 Section 13. Con-tact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of person- al dignity is offensive contact. Love, supra. - 5 - An actor is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend her- self against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which she reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally upon her. Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), 98, Section 63. However, if the actor applies a force to another which is in excess of that which is privileged, she is liable for only so much of the force as is excessive. Id., at 122, Section 71. In the present case, competent, credible evidence exists supporting the trial court's judgment. Appellee testified that appellant initiated the affray. Moreover, appellee first hit appellant with the mayonnaise jar when appellant was on top of her, choking her. Appellee hit appellant two additional times with the jar; however, appellee testified that appellant contin- ued to fight her during the entire incident. Therefore, this court cannot say the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court was free to find appellee's testimony more credible than appellant's. Accordingly, appellant's two assignments of error are not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this ap- peal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J. CONCUR JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .