COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60698 : : STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : -vs- : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND DENNIS WILLIAMS : OPINION : Defendant-Appellant : : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 13, 1992 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-243530 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Cuyahoga LIBERT PINTO, Esq. County Prosecuting Attorney 920 Terminal Tower JOSEPH RUSSO, Assistant Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Prosecuting Attorney Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATTON, J.: Defendant-appellant Dennis Williams ("defendant") appeals from his convictions of one count of a violation of the drug law (R.C. 2925.11) with a prior conviction and one count of possession of criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24), to wit: a razor blade, wire hanger and rolling papers. The record reveals the following facts: Patrolman Damon Glaser ("Ptl. Glaser") testified that he and his partner, Patrolman Patrick Woods ("Ptl. Woods"), while patrolling a known high drug trafficking area, noticed a vehicle, later identified as belonging to appellant, parked in a parking lot at the Garden Valley Apartments at approximately 7:30 a.m. Ptl. Glaser testified he saw a male leaning into the driver's side window. As the officers approached in their marked vehicle, the unidentified male fled on foot into the projects area after noticing the police. Ptl. Glaser parked the vehicle nearby and both officers approached appellant's vehicle. Apparently fearful for their safety, Ptl. Glaser asked the occupants of the vehicle, appellant and one Joco Millner, to exit and the men were patted down for 1 weapons. None was found. As the officers were removing the vehicle's occupants, Ptl. Glaser saw what he believed to be cocaine on the driver's side of the vehicle where appellant was seated. The substances found indeed tested positive as cocaine, 1 Appellant was tried jointly with Joco Millner but separately appeals. -3- .10 grams. In fact, three rocks of crack cocaine were found on appellant's side and four others were discovered on the passenger's side of appellant's vehicle. Also, a piece of a wire hanger, rolling papers and a razor blade were found on the vehicle's floorboard. Ptl. Glaser testified that the items found on the floorboard were commonly used in smoking crack cocaine or rolling marijuana cigarettes. On cross-examination, Ptl. Glaser acknowledged that the seven rocks of crack cocaine were contained in a cellophane wrapper, apparently taken from a pack of cigarettes. However, Ptl. Glaser testified he did not recall the origins of the wrapper. He stated he could have placed the rocks in the cellophane so as not to lose them. Ptl. Wood also testified. His testimony corroborated that of Ptl. Glaser. However, Ptl. Wood stated he found the cellophane wrapper on the driver's side of the vehicle. Upon cross-examination, he reviewed the police report and stated that the report was absent any mention of the cellophane wrapper. The defense presented the testimony of Millner. Millner testified that he and appellant were out "joy riding" and drinking the evening before the day of their arrests. They went to two bars and then parked in the Garden Valley Apartments' parking lot at 10:30 p.m. The men stayed there and drank because they were too intoxicated to drive. Millner passed out around midnight but testified he recalled it was raining heavily until -4- 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. Millner testified that an unknown female entered the vehicle looking for appellant in the early morning hours. She was sitting in appellant's vehicle beside Millner. An unknown male was leaning in the car talking to her. Millner first stated this female was in the passenger's side of appellant's vehicle but then later stated she was seated in the driver's side. During this time, appellant was in the middle of the parking lot when the police approached and arrested him. According to Millner's testimony, the police searched the unknown male and then released both the male and unknown female. Millner denied the existence or possession of crack cocaine and any of the items discovered in appellant's vehicle. Appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony essentially corroborated Millner's version of events. However, appellant averred that, while Millner was passed out, he went to the store to purchase cigarettes after the sun woke him up. When he returned, he decided to throw away an empty bottle of wine he and Millner had drunk the evening before. As he was walking away from his vehicle en route to the garbage can, the police pulled into the parking lot and exited their vehicle. Appellant walked towards the officers and, upon request, produced his driver's license. Appellant claims the officers arrested him pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant for two traffic tickets. He denied being in his vehicle at the time of his arrest and further denied knowledge of the crack cocaine or its presence in his vehicle. He now appeals and assigns two errors for our review: -5- I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL. II. THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. I. AND II. In appellant's first assignment of error, he argues the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of knowledge in each offense. Essentially appellant avers that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient in this case to support his convictions. In appellant's second assignment of error, he contends that the verdicts are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the officers' testimony was conflicting, the origins of the cellophane package were unexplained, and the various criminal tools found had inconsistent uses (i.e., rolling papers were allegedly found but no marijuana was discovered; crack cocaine was allegedly found but a pipe was not found). In support of appellant's first proposition, he cites State v. Kulig (1974), 37 Ohio St. 2d 157, that the circumstantial evidence produced on an essential element must be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence. This case, however, has been overruled by State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus: Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof. When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable -6- theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. *** (Holland v. United States [1954], 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150, followed; State v. Kulig [1974], 37 Ohio St. 2d 157, 66 O.O.2d 351, 309 N.E. 2d 897, overruled.) An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.) R.C. 2925.11 prohibits drug abuse and provides in pertinent part: (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance. R.C. 2923.24 prohibiting the possession of criminal tools reads in pertinent part: (A) No person shall possess or have under his control any substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it criminally. (B) Each of the following constitute prima-facie evidence of criminal purpose: (1) Possession or control of any dangerous ord- nance, or the materials or parts for making dangerous ordnance, in the absence of circumstances indicating such dangerous ordnance, materials, or parts are intended for legitimate use; (2) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or article designed or specially adapted for criminal use; (3) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or article commonly used for -7- criminal purposes, under circumstances indicating such item is intended for criminal use. The essence of appellant's argument is that the jury should have believed his testimony rather than that of the officers. His argument is unconvincing. A simple denial as to knowledge or possession of the drugs or criminal tools is not sufficient to reverse appellant's convictions. The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in a criminal proceeding are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, first paragraph of the syllabus; State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 169. Thus, a reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict where there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all elements of an offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In this case, the evidence was certainly substantial and was not conflicting to such a degree as to render the verdicts against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ptl. Glaser and Ptl. Wood testified that rocks of crack cocaine and various items typically used for drug-related activity were discovered in appellant's vehicle. Also, Ptl. Wood indeed testified as to the origin of the cellophane wrapper. Appellant's blanket denial does not render the verdicts against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the first and second assignments of error are overruled. -8- Judgment affirmed. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rule of Appellate Procedure. ANN McMANAMON, J., and JOHN F. CORRIGAN, P.J., CONCUR JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .