COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60686 MELBA FURCSIK : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JAMES L. MAYFIELD, ET AL. : : Defendant : : [Appeal by Gould, Inc. : : Defendant-appellant] : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : JULY 2, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CP 136,973 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: RICHARD F. SMITH, ESQ. KEITH A. SAVIDGE, ESQ. 668 Euclid Avenue 800 Baker Building Suite 535 1940 East 6th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 2 - J.F. CORRIGAN, J., Defendant Gould, Inc. appeals from the order of the trial court which reversed and remanded plaintiff Melba Furcsik's workers' compensation action for consideration of an additional injury. We modify this ruling and affirm it as modified. I. On September 27, 1985 plaintiff, an employee of Gould, Inc. tripped and fell over an airline as she was getting up from her chair. Thereafter, on October 2, 1985, plaintiff filed an application for workers' compensation and medical benefits with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, in which she indicated that she had sustained injury to her right hip and knee. The bureau subsequently received various medical reports pertaining to this claim which indicated that plaintiff was being treated for lower back pain. In November 1985, the employer obtained an independent examination of plaintiff which focused upon plaintiff's chief complaint of lower back pain. A staff hearing officer subsequently allowed plaintiff's claim for contusion to right hip and right knee. Plaintiff appealed from this ruling to the Regional Board of Review indicating: "The Staff Hearing Officer failed to recognize the lumbar condition and, trochanter bursitis condition as being directly related and hence a flow through condition attributed to the fall or in the alternative if viewed as a pre-existing condition, substantially aggravated by the original incident." - 3 - The Board of Review affirmed, and plaintiff filed a further appeal to the Industrial Commission which was denied. No specific disposition was made regarding the injury to plaintiff's lower back, however. Plaintiff then commenced this appeal to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, alleging that she had sustained injury to her lower back as a result of the fall. The employer moved to dismiss the action, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's lower back claim since it had not been litigated administratively. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 1990. Thereafter, the trial court determined that plaintiff had asserted the lower back claim below, but this claim was never specifically considered. The court then reversed and remanded the matter back to the Industrial Commission. The employer now appeals. II. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS; OR ALTERNATIVELY, IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE." For its first assignment of error, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's appeal because the lower back claim was not raised in plaintiff's initial application or thereafter, and was not considered below. - 4 - Pursuant to R.C. 4123.84, an injured employee is required to give the Industrial Commission or the Bureau of Workers' Compensation notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured, within two years after the injury. Dent v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 187, syllabus. This rule likewise applies to additional claims for "flow-through" or residual injuries which develop in a body part for which injury has not been originally alleged. Clements v. Wean United, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 342, 346-347; Edwards v AT & T Technologies, Inc. (1989), 42 Ohio St. 3d 119, 120. Pursuant to R.C. 4123.95, however, R.C. 4123.84 is to be liberally construed in favor of employees and dependents of deceased employees. Accordingly, the notice which must be given to the Commission or Bureau need not be given on any particular form or on any particular blank of that form. Toler v. Copeland Corp. (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d 58, syllabus. Finally, in Zavatsky v. Stringer (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 386, 401-402, the Supreme Court noted that claims which are raised administratively must first be considered by a district director: "Smith v. Krouse (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 369, involved a decision of the Industrial Commission which found 'that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled but not due to the allowed injury in this claim ***.' (Emphasis added.) In Smith, claimant had been granted the right to participate for 'low back strain; multiple contusions' sustained in 1971. Claimant never made any application to the Bureau of Workers' Compensation asserting any additional conditions or any loss or impairment of any - 5 - other bodily functions allegedly as due to and the result of her injury. The motion which precipitated the proceedings which eventually came to this court was one simply requesting that she be declared permanently and totally disabled. If claimant had made a claim pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 4123.84 by filing a written notice claiming 'loss or impairment of bodily functions developing in a part or parts of the body' not previously specified, such a claim, after proper notice, would be heard by a district director pursuant to Rule 4121-3-15, Ohio Adm. Code (formerly IC/WC-21-15), which specifically provides, in sub-paragraph (B)(1)(d) thereof that '[w]here the claimant seeks to secure allowance of a disability not previously considered *** the matter shall first be considered by a district director.'" In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that although it was not listed on her initial application, plaintiff did raise a claim for lower back injury with the Bureau and the trial court properly remanded the matter to the Industrial Commission for disposition of this claim. We note, however, that there is no basis for the trial court's reversal of the Commission's other rulings pertaining to plaintiff's hip and knee, and this portion of its ruling is therefore stricken. The first assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part. III. "THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE." The relevant law was set forth in this court's disposition of the previous assignment of error. - 6 - As to the weight of the evidence, we note that: "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 77, 79-80. In this case, it is indisputable that the Bureau received various medical reports which indicated that plaintiff had sustained lower back injury in connection with her fall, and that plaintiff pursued at least one administrative appeal on the basis that compensation was not granted for this claim. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff did provide the Bureau with written notice that this body part had been injured. In addition, because the record of the administrative proceedings does not reflect any specific disposition of this claim, the matter was properly remanded to the Industrial Commission as to this claim alone. The second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is modified to indicate that the matter is remanded to the Industrial Commission solely for determination of plaintiff's claim for lower back injury, and as modified, is affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellant and appellee will equally share the costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, C.J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .