COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60573 : STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : CARLOS DELGADO : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MAY 14, 1992 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-213263 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES, ESQ. HYMAN FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Cuyahoga County Public Defender Justice Center, 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street BY: MARGARET OSHUNS ISQUICK Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Assistant Public Defender The Marion Building, Room 307 1276 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J.: Carlos Delgado plaintiff-appellant, hereinafter Delgado appeals the trial court's decision in accepting his guilty plea without determining that he understood the nature of the change. The sole assignment of error challenges the trial court's adherence to Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). For the reasons stated below, we affirm. Delgado was indicted in December of 1986 for two counts of Attempted Grand Theft in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2913.02 and one count of Possessing Criminal Tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. On January 29, 1987, Delgado appeared before the trial court with co-defendants Earl Hooper and Mark Bass. The prosecutor and defense counsel indicated that he was willing to plead to the first two counts of the indictment for Attempted Grand Theft; his co-defendants were to plead guilty to one count of Attempted Grand Theft. The trial court started its inquiry and stated the following: "You have heard what your lawyers have said and the prosecutor has said. Do you know what you are doing here this Thereafter, the trial court informed and determined that the pleas were entered voluntarily and the maximum penalties were understood; the trial court informed and determined that they understood the effect of the guilty pleas and that upon -3- acceptance it may proceed with judgment and sentencing in compliance with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(b); and the trial court informed and determined that they understood their Constitutional rights in compliance with Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c). The trial court asked Delgado and his co-defendants if they had questions about anything, or if there was anything they did not understand and needed explained. Delgado and his co- defendants answered "no". Finally, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas. Delgado entered a plea of guilty to counts one and two for Attempted Grand Theft, both of which are fourth degree felonies. The remaining count against Delgado was dismissed. On March 16, 1987, Delgado was sentenced to eighteen months on each count to be served consecutively. Execution of the sentence was suspended and Delgado was placed on three years probation conditioned upon six months at the Cleveland House of Corrections and assignment to the Alcohol Drug Dependence unit of the Probation Department upon his release. He was also assessed court costs and ordered to pay one third restitution. On February 1, 1989, Delgado was found to be a probation violator and probation was continued. On August 18, 1989, he was found to be a probation violator a second time and his sentence was ordered into execution. Delgado now appeals by leave of court pursuant to App. R. 5(A) and, as his sole assignment of error, states: -4- THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT ACCEPTED A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE WITHOUT ADVISING THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE. Crim. R. 11(C) provides: In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and; (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntar- ily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. (b) Informing him of and determining that he under- stands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 34 and State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 86, has expressed very clear rules on when there has been compliance with Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C)(2), as well as when a criminal defendant has adequately been informed of the nature of the charges against him. In Stewart, the rule is that an evaluation of the circum- stances of the case is necessary to determine if there is substantial compliance with Criminal Rule 11. Citing United States v. Brogan (C.A. 6, 1975), 519 F.2d 28, the Ohio Supreme Court advocates the doctrine that substantial compliance with Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C) is sufficient. Substantial compliance -5- does not require an explanation of each and every element or portion of the indictment. State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 441. Substantial compliance allows the trial court to infer from the "totality of the circumstances" that the defendant understood the charges against him. Id. at the syllabus, paragraph one. Delgado's sole argument is that the trial court did not determine that he understood the nature of the charge. We disagree. In the instant case, the charge of Attempted Grand Theft was stated in the hearing repeatedly and Delgado acknowledged that he understood his plea. He understood the maximum penalty, the effect of his guilty plea and his Constitutional rights. Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN F. CORRIGAN, P.J., and JOHN V. CORRIGAN,* J., CONCUR. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON JUDGE (*JUDGE JOHN V. CORRIGAN, RETIRED, EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS: SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT) N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .