COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60474 SIDONIA BENEDEK, ET AL. : : Plaintiffs-appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION J & E MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL.: : Defendants-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 21, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 141197 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: For Defendants-Appellees: W. CRAIG BASHEIN, ESQ. KEVIN PAYNE, ESQ. 1200 Illuminating Building 1535 Leader Building 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 1 - DYKE, J.: On December 15, 1985, appellant was injured as she stepped out of the elevator at the third floor of her apartment complex on her way to her apartment. As she left the elevator she slipped in a puddle of water which had accumulated on the linoleum floor immediately in front of the elevator. Appellant filed a complaint with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on December 14, 1987. The complaint alleged that the appellant's injuries were a result of the negligence of the owners of the apartment complex. The appellees moved for a directed verdict at the close of appellants' case. The court granted the motion and entered a verdict in appellees' favor. Appellant asserts one assignment of error. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS' CASE. Civ. Rule 50 allows a court in a jury trial to grant a motion for directed verdict when: After construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, [it] finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party .... - 2 - Based upon the evidence submitted, construed most strongly in appellants' favor, we find that the trial court properly granted appellees' motion for a directed verdict. The law in Ohio requires an owner of property to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises to prevent injury to those rightfully on the property. See Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1958), 18 Ohio St. 3d 203, and Tyrell v. Investment Assoc., Inc. (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 47. Evidence was submitted at trial to show that the appellees did exercise ordinary care in keeping the common areas free from tracked in water. Carpeted runners were placed over the floor of the lobby from the entrance to the elevator. The elevator floor itself was carpeted. Twice each day a maintenance person inspected the common areas to make certain all was in order. These precautions showed a level of reasonable care in maintaining the premises. Even if the testimony of appellant, Mr. Benedek, is presumed true, that he had informed the maintenance person of the water in front of the elevator on other occasions, the law does not require that the appellees do more than they did to prevent liability for any accidents. The trial court indicated, in ruling on the motion for directed verdict, that it was the appellants' responsibility to prove that the standard of care required more than the appellees had done to prevent tracked in water. Appellants did not do so. - 3 - The Ohio Supreme Court has dealt with the standard of care issue before in regard to the duty owed to business invitees by store owners. Owners or lessees of stores, ... are not insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen ... It is not the duty of persons in control of such buildings to keep a large force of moppers to mop up the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas, for several very good reasons, all so obvious that it is wholly unnecessary to mention them here in detail. Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 203, 204, quoting S.S. Kresge Co. v. Fader (1927), 116 Ohio St. 718, 723-24. The Ohio Supreme Court also relied upon a line of cases involving the duties owed by business owners to their invitees when the Court found that a landlord has no duty "to keep common areas of the leased premises free of accumulated ice and snow." LaCourse v. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 209, 210. The Supreme Court proposed one exception to the holding of LaCourse: It is only where it is shown that the owner had superior knowledge of the particular danger which caused the injury that liability attaches, because in such a case the invitee may not reasonably be expected to protect himself from a risk he cannot fully appreciate. - 4 - LaCourse v. Fleitz, at 210. The appellants have not introduced evidence to show that the appellees had superior knowledge. Appellants had lived in the apartment complex for twenty-two years. Mrs. Benedek knew that the floor surface at the entrance to the third floor was linoleum. She was in a position to protect herself from possible injury. The exception of superior knowledge attributable to the owners is not applicable in this case. Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it required them to produce expert testimony going to the issue of the landlords' standard of care. Because the duty owed by landlords is established by case law and statute, it is certainly not incumbent upon plaintiffs to provide expert testimony on this issue. However, the error was harmless because the appellants failed to provide evidence as to each element of the negligence claim rendering the directed verdict appropriate. Appellants introduced evidence on the elements of the appellees' standard of ordinary care and of appellant, Mrs. Benedek's, injuries. They have failed, however, to introduce evidence from which a reasonable inference could be made that appellees breached their duty to exercise ordinary care. The appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The trial court's grant of appellees' motion for directed verdict is affirmed. - 5 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. J.F. CORRIGAN, J., AND ANN MCMANAMON, J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE ANN DYKE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .