COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60465 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JOHN STROTHERS : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : MAY 14, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-234410 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES MARGARET NANCY JOHNSON, ESQ. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR P.O. BOX 06199 MICHAEL S. NOLAN, ASST. Cleveland, Ohio 44106 Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - J.F. CORRIGAN, J., Appellant, John Strothers, appeals from his convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. Appellant was indicted by a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury on January 6, 1989 for six counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, three counts of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01, two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05, one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02., and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11. Each count contained a firearm specification. Initially, appellant pled not guilty to these charges, but later withdrew that plea, and pled guilty to four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of kidnapping, and one count of felonious assault. The firearm specification was deleted from each of these charges and the remaining counts were nolled. Appellant now brings this delayed appeal. II. For his first assignment of error appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea without ascertaining whether appellant knowingly entered such plea. When entertaining a guilty plea in a felony case, a trial court is required to follow the mandates of Crim. R. 11(C)(2), which specifically provides that: - 3 - "(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: "(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. "(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. "(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself." Adherence to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) requires an oral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enables the court to determine fully the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea of guilty or no contest. State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 343, paragraph two, syllabus. In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has established that a trial court need only substantially comply with the mandates of Crim. R. 11 when accepting a guilty plea. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 86. - 4 - A review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that the trial court substantially complied with Crim. R. 11 during its dialogue with appellant. The trial court advised appellant of the nature of the offenses charged, the possible sentence, including the maximum sentence for each offense, and that the offenses were non- probationable. The court further determined that appellant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was satisfied with the representation he had received and understood the effect of his guilty plea. The court advised appellant of the rights he would be waiving by entering a guilty plea, including those rights set forth in Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c). Finally, the court determined that no threats or promises had been made to appellant with regard to a plea of guilty, and that such plea was in fact voluntarily and intelligently made. It is clear that the trial court complied with the mandate of Crim. R. 11(C), therefore, we find that appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. III. For his second assignment of error appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to make a timely ruling on his motion for shock probation. Prior to entering his plea of guilty, appellant was advised by the trial court that his sentence would be non-probationable. - 5 - Nonetheless, appellant applied for shock probation. The trial court has not ruled upon that motion. Where the trial court fails to rule upon a motion for shock probation in the time allowed by R.C. 2947.061, the court loses jurisdiction to rule on the matter. State v. Delaney (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 47. In Delaney this court found that "[T]he court's failure to rule earlier was tantamount to an earlier denial of that motion, when the trial court thereby lost jurisdiction to grant the motion." Delaney, at 48. Furthermore, absent a violation of some constitutional or statutory standard, the trial court's decision to grant or deny shock probation is not reviewable. Id. In the case, sub judice, there can be no prejudicial denial of a constitutional right because there is no reasonable possibility that a court could have granted appellant's motion. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J., and ANN McMANAMON, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .