COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60355 STATE OF OHIO : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : EUGENE D. CANADY : OPINION : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 16, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CR-252820 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: KEVIN CAFFERKEY Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: JOSEPH LoPRESTI 922 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 PAUL MANCINO, JR. 75 Public Square, Suite 1016 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Also Listed: EVERETT A. CHANDLER 815 Superior Avenue, #2020 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- SPELLACY, J.: On May 8, 1990, defendant-appellant Eugene D. Canady ("appellant") was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury for one count of Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02; one count of Abuse of Corpse, in violation of R.C. 2927.01; and one count of Tampering with Evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12. At his arraignment on May 10, 1990, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges set forth in the indictment. On May 16, 1990, appellant filed a motion to suppress any oral and written statements made by him in violation of his constitutional rights. On July 23, 1990, appellant's case was called for trial. Initially, the trial court addressed appellant's motion to suppress. The trial court found that the "basis of the motion raises the entire panorama of evidence that existed in this case prior to the arrest of the defendant." Thus, the trial court concluded that it would not be practical to have a separate proceeding on appellant's motion to suppress. On July 24, 1990, the jury was duly impaneled and sworn and then opening arguments were made by the State and the defense. The first witness to testify for the State was Gilbert Evans, who resided at 3874 East 146th Street, in the city of Cleveland, Ohio. Gilbert Evans testified that on April 28, 1990, he was taking a break from cutting his lawn, when his neighbor, Vera Gladden, summoned him to the area behind her garage. He -3- went behind her garage and saw three garbage bags and smelled a "real bad" odor. Gilbert Evans said that he took a closer look at the garbage bags and observed a bone sticking through one of the bags. He also saw what appeared to be a jacket on top of the bag. Suspecting the worse, Gilbert Evans immediately went to his home and called the Cleveland Police. Eventually, the Cleveland Police, including several homicide detectives, arrived on the scene and began to investigate. The State then called Detective William A. Cunningham from the Cleveland Police Department's Homicide Unit. Detective Cunningham arrived at the scene in question at approximately 8:00 P.M., on April 28, 1990. He stated that he was responsible for taking photographs, making measurements of the scene, and interviewing witnesses. Detective Cunningham provided extensive testimony regarding the scene supported by several photographs and other exhibits. Detective Cunningham further testified that three garbage bags were found at the address of 3870 East 146th Street and that appellant lived in a "catty-corner" direction behind said address. The next witness to testify was Detective James Svekric, also from the Homicide Unit. Detective Svekric testified that he was assigned to the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office on the morning of April 29, 1990. He was instructed to be present when the Coroner's Office opened the three garbage bags. -4- Detective Svekric stated that in bag number one, they found a pair of brown loafers, one pair of jeans, and a decomposed 1 right leg of a female. On the leg was a white sock with blue trim and a design of two tennis rackets. Bag number two contained a brown bath towel, a green hand towel, a black leather glove, a used condom, a hair brush, a floral print towel, a large kitchen knife with a serrated edge and one pair of hospital scissors. Finally, in bag number three, they found two face cloths, a Ralph Lauren sweater, a Kent State shirt, a white bra, and the upper torso of a female from the breasts up. The decomposition of the body was in a very advanced state. Dr. Elizabeth Robinson from the Case Western Reserve Dental School testified that she examined the remains which were found in the garbage bags. After comparing the teeth from the remains with the dental records of the victim, Diah Harris, Dr. Robinson concluded that the body found in the garbage bags was that of Diah Harris. The State then presented the testimonies of Detectives John James and John Fransen, both from the Homicide Unit. Both testified that, on April 29, 1990, they executed a search warrant on appellant's residence located at 3867 East 144th Street. At the time of the search, appellant and his mother were present. 1 Subsequent testimony by Jeffrey Wagner, a forensic scientist with the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office, revealed that a condom wrapper was also found in bag number one. -5- It was believed that the upstairs portion of the house was appellant's bedroom. Under the upstairs sink, they found a hacksaw intact, a pair of hedge clippers, one saw blade and a knife with a brown handle. As the hacksaw was being removed, appellant said, "You won't find anything on that." On a nearby ironing board, the Detectives found a used condom and additional condom packages. The detectives also searched the basement of appellant's residence. In the basement, they found a knife in the opening of the chimney and also found two rolls of black plastic garbage bags. The next witness for the State was Dr. Stanley F. Seligman from the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office, who examined 2 the remains of Diah Harris on April 29, 1990. Based on the advanced decomposition of the remains, Dr. Seligman concluded that Diah Harris had been dead at least weeks and possibly months. Dr. Seligman testified that Diah Harris's right leg had been carefully sawed off. According to him, the sawing off of the right leg was consistent with that of a hacksaw. Diah Harris's remains also exhibited several stab wounds that could have been caused by a knife. Dr. Seligman was able to locate the stab wounds on the mid-upper back and in the chest 2 At the time Dr. Seligman examined the remains, he did not know the identity of the person. Subsequently, he learned that they were the remains of Diah Harris. -6- area. He opined that any one of the stab wounds could have been fatal. Dr. Seligman further testified that there was evidence of blunt impacts on the left side of Diah Harris's face and around her left ear. He stated that these injuries were antemortem, or inflicted before death. According to Dr. Seligman, a baseball bat could inflict injuries consistent with those found on Diah Harris. Both Dr. Seligman and Jeffrey D. Wagner, also from the Coroner's Office, testified that they examined the hacksaw which was presented to them by the Homicide Unit. Upon a close exami- nation of the hacksaw, they could conclude that it contained human blood and also had traces of what appeared to be human fat tissue. The State presented the testimony of Thomas A. Wahl, a forensic geneticist with Analytical Genetic Testing Center, located in Denver, Colorado. He testified that on June 7, 1990, he received some items from the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office for genetic testing, including the hacksaw found in appellant's residence. The Coroner's Office also submitted various body parts from the corpse of Diah Harris, in order for Thomas Wohl to make a comparison with the human blood and body tissue parts found on the hacksaw. After conducting a full allotype genetic profile, Thomas Wohl concluded that the blood on the hacksaw could have originated from Diah Harris. He stated that the blood definitely came from a black individual. Thomas Wohl further concluded that the material found on the hacksaw was from a human. -7- James A. Wurster, a criminologist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, testified that he conducted a comparison of the garbage bags in which Diah Harris's remains were found and the garbage bags found in appellant's basement. As far as James Wurster could determine, all the garbage bags came from the same class characteristics and they were all consistent with each other. The State presented several witnesses regarding the condom wrapper found in bag number one, the used condom found in bag number two and the condoms found at appellee's residence. Dale Fowler testified that he was employed with Ansell, Inc., a manufacturer of latex products, including condoms. Dale Fowler identified the condom wrapper, which was found in bag number one, as being made by Ansell, Inc. According to him, in the Cleveland area, that particular condom was only supplied to Case Western Reserve University and the Cleveland Free Clinic. Martin Hiller, the Executive Director of the Cleveland Free Clinic, and Dr. Katherine Bentley, a physician with the Cleveland Free Clinic, both testified that appellant was a patient at the Free Clinic. Detective Fransen testified that the condoms found on appellant's ironing board were the same type as the condom wrapper found in bag number one. This particular condom was the one produced by Ansell, Inc. and distributed to the Cleveland Free Clinic. -8- There were several suspicions that appellant might have beaten Diah Harris with a baseball bat. Thus, the State presented the testimony of Kevin Green, a neighbor and schoolmate of appellant. Kevin Green also knew Diah Harris. Kevin Green testified that for about a year, appellant and Diah Harris had a boyfriend girl friend type of relationship. However, sometime in November, 1989, he did not see the two together anymore. Kevin Green learned of Diah Harris's disappearance on April 2, 1990. After her disappearance, he frequently visited appellant at his residence and struck up several conversations. Each time he spoke to him, appellant would say that he did not know where Diah Harris was. Eventually, a conversation over a baseball bat commenced between Kevin Green and appellant while Kevin Green was at appellant's residence. Kevin Green asked appellant whether he could use his baseball bat. Kevin Green wanted to use the baseball bat in order to protect himself in an upcoming fight that evening. When Kevin Green grabbed the baseball bat, he noticed that there was blood on it. Appellant told Kevin Green that he hit Clarence Sutton in the head with the baseball bat. However, Kevin Green stated that he never saw Clarence Sutton with his head bashed in or with his head bandaged like he was hit with a baseball bat. Appellant gave the bat to Kevin Green, who left with it. Later that day, Kevin Green put the baseball bat into the back seat of Damon -9- Manningham's car. Kevin Green further testified that sometime later in April he called the police and told them about the bat. He had some concerns about the disappearance of Diah Harris and did not want to be associated with a baseball bat with blood. When he spoke to appellant, appellant simply asked him why he turned the bat into the police. Damon Manningham corroborated the testimony of Kevin Green. He stated that Kevin Green put the bat into the hatch of his car. It remained there until the police confiscated it. Damon Manningham provided additional testimony that he knew Clarence Sutton, but he never saw him with a wound to his head. Nor did he ever hear that Clarence Sutton had been struck in the head with a baseball bat. The State then presented the testimony of Joseph Serowik, a scientific examiner with the Cleveland Police Department's Forensic Science Laboratory. Joseph Serowik testified that on April 13, 1990, a baseball bat was submitted to him for examination. Upon an examination of the baseball bat, he observed a red-brown discolorization near the barrel end of the bat. Joseph Serowik performed some tests on the baseball bat and determined that the red-brown stain was human blood. Further tests revealed that the human blood was of Type O. Clarence Sutton had blood type AB. Throughout the extensive investigation into the disappearance of Diah Harris and her ultimate death, a large task -10- force of law enforcement officials interviewed several individuals, including appellant. FBI Special Agent Kenneth Andrews testified that on April 14, 1990, he interviewed appellant at the Cleveland Police Headquarters. Appellant initially told him that he and Diah Harris had a very kind, warm and peaceful relationship. However, later that same afternoon, appellant described an incident in which he and Diah Harris had a verbal argument in which he pushed her down some stairs. During the course of Special Agent Andrews's interview with appellant, a baseball bat was presented to appellant. Appellant denied ever seeing it, ever touching it, or ever having possession of it. After being informed that tests would be conducted on the baseball bat for fingerprints and other evidence, appellant reluctantly admitted that he might have touched the bat in the playground six or nine months earlier while playing baseball. Officer Donald Meel of the Cleveland Police Department testified that on Sunday, April 1, 1990, he responded to a missing person report regarding Diah Harris. Officer Meel eventually interviewed appellant at his residence on the same day. Appellant told Officer Meel that he knew Diah Harris and that she had been at his home on the day before between 11:00 A.M. and 12:00 Noon. Appellant informed Officer Meel that he and Diah Harris had arranged a date for later that Saturday afternoon. However, he never saw her again on Saturday. -11- Appellant stated that the last time he saw Diah Harris was when she got into a green car heading south on East 144th Street. Detective Edward Kovacic from the Cleveland Police Homicide Unit testified that on April 29, 1990, the day after the remains of Diah Harris were found, he spoke to appellant's mother, Endia Canady. When he spoke to Endia Canady, Detective Kovacic showed her some items that had been taken from the garbage bags in which Diah Harris's body parts were found. Endia Canady told Detective Kovacic that a serrated kitchen knife that was found in one of the garbage bags came from her house. She also told him that a pair of scissors appeared to be the kind that she kept in her home and that she had not seen for quite some time. Finally, Endia Canady admitted that the jacket found with the three garbage bags belonged to appellant. The next witness to testify for the State was Homicide Detective Edward Gray, who interviewed appellant on April 29, 1990, in the company of Detective Fransen. According to Detective Gray, appellant was advised of his constitutional rights and he responded that he understood them and that he agreed to talk to them. During the questioning, appellant told the detectives that he and Diah Harris had been dating since the Summer of 1989. At approximately 12:00 Noon, on March 31, 1990, Diah Harris came to his house and woke him up. At that point in the questioning, appellant stated that Diah Harris was "playing him" and, therefore, he began to "play her". Appellant then admitted that -12- he often got mad at Diah Harris when she came over and took money from him or took his phone numbers for other girls. Appellant proceeded to tell Detective Gray that he refused to let Diah Harris into his house and told her to go home. Diah Harris informed appellant that she was going to Nigel's house and this got appellant mad. Appellant went back to sleep while Diah Harris left. Later that afternoon, appellant claimed that he went to Diah Harris's house but no one was home. He decided to go out with a friend that night. He arrived home at about 2:00 A.M. and went directly to bed. He was awakened the next day at 12:00 Noon by Diah Harris's mother. She was looking for her daughter. When questioned about the body parts found by his house, appellant denied that he had done it and that he did not know how the body got there. Then, appellant stated that Nigel probably killed Diah Harris. According to appellant, Nigel, a Jamaican, had previously raped Diah Harris and he also carried big guns. Appellant said that he was afraid of Nigel, because Nigel put a contract out on his life for going with Diah Harris. Officer Renee Carey Bolden, from the Cleveland Police Department's Juvenile Unit, testified that on April 13, 1990, she was present with other officers when appellant was being questioned. At one point, she heard appellant say that he had seen Diah Harris at the Galleria Shopping Mall on the day before. -13- During the same interview, appellant provided the police with a license plate number and a description of a car. Officer Bolden checked on the car, but learned that it belonged to someone in Goshen, Ohio. She also discovered that the car having the license plate number provided by appellant did not match appellant's description. Officer Bolden confronted appellant with this information and he gave her another license plate number. Once again, nothing matched with what appellant provided. On April 28, 1990, at approximately l:30 P.M., Officer Bolden and Detective Benjamin Anderson went to appellant's residence. The officers asked appellant whether he had any information leading to the whereabouts of Diah Harris. Appellant responded that he did not have time to look for Diah because he had been in school and he was busy. He also said that if her "butt" had been where she was supposed to be, none of this would have happened. Officer Bolden later learned that appellant had not been going to school. Detective Benjamin Anderson testified that on April 3, 1990, he interviewed appellant at his residence. Appellant told him that he was a "player". Detective Anderson stated that "player" is a street term meaning a person considers himself wise, and he can do whatever he wants to. According to appellant, Diah Harris wanted to be a "player". On April 10, 1990, Detective Anderson accompanied an FBI agent to appellant's residence in order to find a particular item. Appellant's mother let the officers in and then appellant -14- arrived home soon after. Detective Anderson testified that appellant went into a slight rage because they had been looking for something without his permission. Detective Anderson was also present on April 13, 1990 when appellant claimed that he saw Diah Harris on East Ninth Street after leaving the Galleria. Detective Anderson asked appellant why he did not call the police after sighting Diah Harris. Appellant responded that he had left his wallet and personal items in a public restroom and when he returned they were all gone. Therefore, he had no money to catch a bus to go home to call the police. The State then called Homicide Detective Jon Qualey to testify. Detective Qualey stated that, on April 29, 1990, he interviewed appellant after reading him his constitutional rights. When asked why his jacket was found with the three garbage bags containing the remains of Diah Harris, appellant claimed that he had given his jacket to her. Once Detective Qualey asked appellant about the knife found in one of the garbage bags, he became quiet and lowered his head. At that point, appellant told Detective Qualey that Nigel Chung killed Diah Harris. However, he claimed the whole situation was a "screw-up". Appellant admitted that he paid Nigel Chung $70 to have Diah Harris jumped by some girls in the neighborhood. But, things went too far, and Diah Harris was killed. Apparently, appellant wanted Diah Harris jumped because she was "playing him". Appellant further stated to Detective Qualey that it was Nigel Chung who put Diah Harris's -15- body parts catty-corner to his house. Appellant believed that Nigel Chung wanted it to look like he did it. Detective Qualey obtained an oral statement from appellant on April 29, 1990, and it was put into typed form. In his police statement, appellant admitted that he had previously hired Nigel Chung to have Diah Harris jumped. When Diah Harris came up missing at the end of March, 1990, appellant became suspicious that Nigel Chung had killed her. Appellant denied killing Diah Harris and claimed that he was being framed by Nigel Chung. With regard to the baseball bat, appellant stated that when he gave it to Kevin Green, there was no blood on it. Appellant also stated that Kevin Green probably took the knife. The next witness to testify on behalf of the State was Homicide Detective James Cudo. Detective Cudo testified that his assignment on April 30, 1990 was to show some photographs to appellant, in order for him to identify Nigel Chung. Appellant was shown seven photographs and asked whether he could identify Nigel Chung. Appellant was unable to pick out Nigel Chung's photograph. Instead, he picked out a photograph of another individual. The last witness to testify in the State's case-in-chief was Homicide Detective Parker Adrine. On April 30, 1990, Detective Adrine, along with Detective Jack Bornfeld, interviewed appellant and obtained a statement from him. Appellant said in his police statement that, on March 31, 1990, Diah Harris entered his residence and the two engaged in an -16- argument over sex. Appellant admitted that he became very upset with Diah Harris and punched her in the face. He continued to holler at her and then he "really punched her" again. Diah Harris went flying to the floor and appellant thought that she was dead. Appellant stated that he did everything he could do to revive her, but nothing happened and he became nervous. Appellant looked out his window and saw Nigel Chung sitting in his truck talking to someone. He screamed to Nigel Chung and told him to come upstairs, which he did. When Nigel Chung saw Diah Harris, he responded, "Damn." Appellant further stated that he asked Nigel Chung to get rid of Diah Harris. Thus, he gave him some bags and clothes to put over her, and to make her look like garbage. Appellant also gave him a knife and saw in case Nigel Chung intended to cut her up. Appellant said that Nigel Chung took Diah Harris's body, put it in his truck, and left. In a couple of days, Nigel Chung returned and told appellant that he got rid of her. When asked by appellant where, Nigel Chung answered that it did not matter. Appellant told him that he would get back to him. Appellant told the police that he cooperated with them after Diah Harris's disappearance and helped her mother in the search, because he wanted to throw himself in the clear. He said that he did not tell the truth initially, since he did not want to go to jail. -17- Near the end of its case-in-chief, the State presented the trial court with a motion to compel the production of an alleged confession made by appellant in a letter to his father. Appellant's retained counsel admitted that appellant did prepare a 38-page document, but he claimed that it was given to him and, thus, was subject to the attorney-client privilege. The State responded by arguing that the attorney-client privilege was waived by appellant when the document was forwarded to his father. The trial court then conducted a separate proceeding and heard the testimony of several witnesses as to the admissibility of the alleged confession made by appellant. After hearing the testimony on this matter, the trial court found that the so- called letter or document was initially protected under the attorney-client privilege. However, the trial court further found that the privilege was waived when appellant requested that the document be turned over to a third-party, his father. Accordingly, the trial court ordered appellant's father to produce the document. When appellant's father was unable to produce it, the trial court found him in contempt of court and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff. Since appellant's father was unable to produce the document, the State rested. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim. R. 29. The trial court overruled appellant's motion. -18- The only witness to testify on behalf of appellant was his mother, Endia Canady. Endia Canady was presented with several photographs depicting knives, scissors, and a saw. She could not conclusively say that they were items that belonged to her or were in her house. With regard to a knife with a red handle, Endia Canady stated that she placed it in the basement chimney in order to hide it from appellant when he was younger. Endia Canady testified that their basement was always kept clean. They rarely used it, except for storage. She admitted that she placed a dead bolt lock on the door between the kitchen and dining room, so appellant would not rummage through her things. She put the door up for her own privacy. Endia Canady claimed that appellant was neither violent nor abusive toward her. Appellant was usually by himself and often changed friends. She met Diah Harris in the Spring of 1989 when appellant brought her home and introduced her as his girl friend. While Endia Canady was away from the house, appellant would often have friends over, despite her disapproval. When she told him to stop having people over, he said, "No." Appellant lived upstairs and shared the downstairs kitchen with his mother. On March 31, 1990, Endia Canady went to work at 7:00 A.M. and arrived home at about 4:00 P.M. When she returned to the house, appellant was not home. The first time she saw him on March 31, 1990, was about 9:00 P.M. or 10:00 P.M., when he told her that Diah Harris was missing. According to Endia Canady, she -19- was not aware of anything ever happening in her house on March 31, 1990. At this point, the defense rested. Initially, the trial court overruled appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant then renewed his Crim. R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court overruled the motion. On August 1, 1990, the jury returned its verdict of guilty on all three counts of murder, abuse of corpse, and tampering with evidence. Appellant was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life for murder; one and one-half years for abuse of corpse; and two years for tampering with evidence. The trial court ordered appellant's sentences to run consecutively. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently raised the following assignments of error: I. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT A SEPARATE HEARING INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE ALLEGED CONFESSIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT. II. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR (sic) TRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVE PARKER ADRINE RELATED THE RESULTS OF HIS INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDED HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND OTHER INFORMATION NOT SUBJECT TO CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION. III. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE REASON OF THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPROPER EVIDENCE AND HEARSAY TESTIMONY. IV. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN EVIDENCE CONCERNING CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC TESTS WERE (sic) OFFERED INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT ANY DETERMINATION AS TO THE -20- SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR THESE TESTING PROCEDURES. V. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY REASON OF THE IMPROPER INTERFERENCE WITH THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP BY THE COURT AND THE PROSECUTOR. VI. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. VII. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT OVERRULED A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL WITH REFERENCE TO THE OFFENSE OF MURDER. VIII. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GRANTING A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE OF TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE AS THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. IX. THE COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN OVERRULING HIS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL. X. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND SUBJECTED THE DEFENDANT TO MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED IN THIS CASE. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on his motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court should have conducted a pretrial hearing on the voluntariness of his confession. Pursuant to Civ. R. 12(E), a trial court is required to rule upon a motion to suppress before the trial commences. Crim. R. 12(E) does not mandate an evidentiary hearing on every suppression motion, but one must be held only where the claims in the suppression motion would justify relief and where those -21- claims are supported by factual allegations. State v. Hartley (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d 47, paragraph two of the syllabus; See, also, Solon v. Mallion (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 130, paragraph one of the syllabus. In the instant case, before the trial commenced, the trial court refused to rule upon appellant's motion to suppress. Further, the trial court indicated that it was not going to conduct a separate hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. In fact, the trial court waited until the defense rested to overrule appellant's motion. With regard to the trial court's failure to rule upon appel- lant's motion to suppress prior to trial and its failure to conduct a separate hearing, we find that appellant waived any objection to such omissions. State v. DePaulo (1971), 25 Ohio App. 2d 39. When the trial court informed all parties that it was withholding its ruling upon appellant's motion until a later time and that no separate hearing was being conducted, appellant failed to raise any objection. We find that appellant should have raised an objection to the trial court's action prior to the commencement of trial. See, State v. Weems (Mar. 18, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 43813, unreported. By raising an objection at that time, any error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court. We conclude that any objection about the trial court's failure to rule upon appellant's motion to suppress prior to trial and its failure to conduct a separate hearing was waived. -22- We further find that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his confession. Appellant's suppression motion consisted of bare allegations that the police had no probable cause to arrest him. These allegations were unaccompanied by factual allegations. Moreover, nowhere in his motion to suppress does appellant allege that his confession was made involuntarily. We determine that the trial court was not required to conduct a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, since his claims in the suppression motion did not justify relief and were not supported by factual allegations. Finally, we hold that any breach of Crim. R. 12(E) by the trial court would have been harmless error, since appellant's substantial rights were not adversely affected. In this case, appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses, but he failed to adduce any evidence requiring the suppression of any of his statements. The record does not demonstrate any facts supporting the exclusion of appellant's statements. Cf. State v. Mathis (Oct. 31, 1985), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 49640, 49641, unreported. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in making no findings of fact pertaining to its denial of his motion to suppress. Where factual issues are involved in the determination of a motion to suppress, that trial court shall state its essential -23- findings on the record. Crim. R. 12(E). However, in order to invoke the rule, the defendant must request that the trial court state its essential findings of fact in support of its denial of a motion. Bryan v. Knapp (1986), 21 Ohio St. 3d 164. In the instant case, appellant made no request for any essential findings. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to state its essential findings of fact. In addition, we find that the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress was legally justified and was supported by factual findings in the record. Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. Appellant's second and third assignments of error will be discussed together, since they both raise the argument that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony. Appellant contends that the trial court improperly permitted Detective Adrine, Dr. Seligman, Detective Kovacic, and Detective Moon to provide hearsay statements. Upon a careful review of the trial transcript, we find that appellant raised no objection as to each purported hearsay state- ment he now challenges. In State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held: An appellate court need not consider an error which a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called, but did not call, to the trial court's attention at a -24- time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court. We find that any objections about the trial court's admittance of the alleged hearsay statements herein were waived. We further find that the alleged errors raised by appellant regarding hearsay statements did not amount to plain error. An alleged error does not constitute plain error under Crim. R. 52(B) unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 97. The doctrine of plain error under Crim. R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution and under exceptional circumstances. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. Upon a thorough review of the alleged hearsay statements, we are unable to find error prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellant. We conclude that appellant was not denied a fair trial as a result of the trial court's admittance of said statements. Appellant's second and third assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. Appellant argues in his fourth assignment of error that he was denied due process of law when evidence concerning scientific tests was admitted without establishing a scientific basis for them. Appellant specifically attacks the testimony of Thomas Wahl. -25- As previously noted herein, errors which are not objected to at trial are waived. Williams, supra. In addition, notice of plain error is taken only under exceptional circumstances to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 1. Throughout the entire testimony of Thomas A. Wahl, appellant failed to raise an objection to any portion of it. Therefore, we conclude that appellant has waived the assigned error he now raises. Moreover, we decline to impose the plain error doctrine with regard to Thomas A. Wahl's testimony. We find that a scientific basis was established as to the tests performed by Thomas A. Wahl. Thomas A. Wahl provided an extensive history of his educational background and his professional experience. Further, each time he explained the tests he performed, he stated, in detail, which proper scientific procedures were followed. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled. In his fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as a result of the improper interference with the attorney-client privilege. Appellant asserts that the trial court and the prosecutor improperly interfered with said privilege when an inquiry into appellant's alleged 38-page confession was conducted. -26- Pursuant to Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, every criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668. Implicit within this right is the criminal defendant's right to consult privately with his attorney. Ford v. State (1929), 121 Ohio St. 292. Appellant cites State v. Milligan (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 341, in support of his contention that there was an improper interference with his attorney-client privilege. The Ohio Supreme Court held that: Evidence obtained through the unauthorized interception of a private conversation between a criminal defendant and his attorney is subject to suppression pursuant to Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Milligan, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. In the instant case, the State never intercepted any private conversation between appellant and his attorney. The State merely requested appellant's father to produce an alleged letter written by appellant to him. In Milligan, supra, a telephone conversation between the defendant and his attorney was eavesdropped on and secretly recorded. Milligan, supra, is clearly distinguishable from the case herein. In the instant case, the Cleveland Police heard about the existence of an alleged letter between appellant and his father. There was no indication that the document was protected by the attorney-client privilege. -27- Moreover, appellant has failed to demonstrate how the preparation of his defense was prejudiced by the State's attempt to get access to the alleged confession. The trial court conducted a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the State's motion to compel production of the document. Further, it was established that the document was not subject to the attorney-client privilege. We find that appellant was not denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. Appellant's fifth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. Appellant argues in his sixth assignment of error that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney's failure to object on several occasions. The standard for determining whether an accused was denied effective assistance of counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, supra. In determining whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that the test is whether the accused, under all the circumstances, had a fair trial and whether substantial justice was done. State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 71. First, there must be a sub- stantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client. Second, the defense must be prejudiced by -28- counsel's ineffectiveness. State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, 396-397. An appellate court must indulge a strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide, range of reasonable professional assistance. Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St. 2d 299. A properly licensed attorney is presumed to have competently represented his client. Id. In the instant case, we find that appellant has failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his trial counsel. Admittedly, appellant's trial counsel failed to object at several points of the trial. However, we find that the objections would have been properly overruled by the trial court. We are unable to find that any of the objections that appellant now claims should have been made at trial would have been sustained or affected the outcome of the trial. We determine that appellant fails to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's alleged errors, the result would have been different. Without some illustration of prejudice which resulted from trial counsel's conduct, we must reject appellant's contention of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's sixth assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled. Appellant's seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error will be discussed together, since they all pertain to the -29- propriety of the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, which was made at the close of the State's case- in-chief and renewed after the defense rested. Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of the crimes charged. (A) Motion for judgment of acquittal. The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. "A motion for judgment of acquittal under Crim. R. 29(A) should be granted where reasonable minds could not fail to find each material element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 19, 23. In this case, appellant was charged with Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, which provides in pertinent part: (A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another. In the instant case, appellant's confession of killing Diah Harris was properly admitted into evidence. In his confession, appellant specifically stated that he punched Diah Harris and as a result, she fell dead to the floor. Based solely upon appellant's confession, one could conclude that there was sufficient evidence of appellant purposely causing the death of Diah Harris. Thus, one can conclude that reasonable -30- minds could reach different conclusions as to whether each material fact of murder was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of murder. Appellant was also charged with Abuse of Corpse, in violation of R.C. 2927.01(B) which provides in relevant part: (B) No person, except as authorized by law, shall treat a human corpse in a way that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities. In addition, appellant was charged with Tampering with Evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12, which reads in pertinent part: (A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the following: (1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation; .... In State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held: Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof. When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. -31- We find that there was overwhelming circumstantial and direct evidence supporting appellant's conviction for abuse of corpse and tampering with evidence. There is no doubt that Diah Harris's body was grossly abused. Parts of her body were found in two separate garbage bags in an advanced decomposition state. The evidence was unrebutted that a cutting device was used to dismember Diah Harris's body and then the body parts were discarded. It is undisputed that Diah Harris's body was treated in such a manner as to outrage reasonable community sensibilities. Further, there was sufficient evidence to prove that it was appellant who abused the corpse of Diah Harris. The police confiscated from appellant a hacksaw with human blood and human tissue on it. There was testimony that the blood found on the hacksaw was consistent with that of Diah Harris. The State presented evidence that the garbage bags in which Diah Harris's body was found were consistent and similar with those found in his basement. Furthermore, appellant's jacket was found with Diah Harris's body parts and other items apparently belonging to him were also found therein. We find that there was sufficient evidence produced by the State to convince the jury that appellant committed the offense of abuse of a corpse. With regard to his tampering with evidence conviction, appellant claims that a corpse does not constitute a "thing" in terms of tampering with evidence. We are unable to accept -32- appellant's contention. Appellant provides no support in his averment that a corpse cannot be the subject of tampering with evidence. We, on the contrary, find that a corpse constitutes evidence which can be tampered with. Based upon a careful review of the evidence, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that appellant tampered with evidence, i.e. Diah Harris's corpse. The evidence established that appellant cut Diah Harris's body into parts and attempted to hide them by putting them into garbage bags. We are satisfied that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that all of the elements of tampering with evidence have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to all the crimes charged. Appellant's seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. In his tenth assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Appellant argues that all three convictions for murder, abuse of corpse, and tampering with evidence should have been merged into one sentence. Appellant basically claims that all three crimes are allied offenses of similar import. The test for determining whether crimes are allied offenses pronounced in State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 116, at 117, as follows: -33- In the first step, the elements of the two crimes are compared. If the elements of the offenses correspond to such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other, the crimes are allied offenses of similar import and the court must then proceed to the second step. In the second step, the defendant's conduct is reviewed to determine whether the defendant can be convicted of both offenses. If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses. An examination in this case of the elements of these offenses reveals that a different animus is required with respect to each offense and a violation of one crime does not necessarily amount to a violation of the other crimes. We conclude that the crimes of murder, abuse of corpse, and tampering with evidence are not allied offenses of similar import insofar as they contain dissimilar elements, require a separate animus and proscribe different actions. Appellant's tenth assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled. Trial court judgment is affirmed. -34- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN F. CORRIGAN, P.J., and KRUPANSKY, J., CONCUR LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .