COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60301 STATE OF OHIO : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : ANTHONY BYARSE : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 14, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-242098. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Donald Green, Esq. Assistant Public Defender Room 307, Marion Building Cleveland, OH 44113-1569 -2- DAVID T. MATIA, C.J.: Defendant-appellant, Anthony Byarse, appeals from his conviction for two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51. The appellant argues that his conviction for two counts of receiving stolen property was insufficient as a matter of law. The appellant's appeal is not well taken. I. THE FACTS A. RESIDENTIAL HOME IS BURGLARIZED On July 24, 1989, the residential home located at 3912 East 153 Street, Cleveland, Ohio was burglarized. Check books and credit cards were stolen from inside the home while a 1983 Chevrolet Chevette was also stolen from the residential home. The discovered thefts were reported to the Cleveland Police Department. An investigation of the burglary and theft resulted in the discovery of the automobile, checks and credit cards while in the possession of the appellant. The appellant was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property. B. THE APPELLANT IS ARRAIGNED On November 17, 1989, the appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Cuyahoga County for two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51. On November 17, 1989, the appellant was arraigned whereupon a plea of not guilty was entered to both counts of the indictment. C. THE JURY TRIAL AND SENTENCE OF THE TRIAL COURT -3- On December 13, 1989, a jury trial was commenced with regard to the two counts of the indictment. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the appellant guilty of both counts of receiving stolen property. Immediately upon discharge of the jury, the trial court sentenced the appellant to incarceration within the Correctional Reception Center, Orient, Ohio, for a term of two years as to each count of receiving stolen property. In addition, the trial court ordered that the sentences of incarceration run consecutive to each other. D. THE DELAYED APPEAL On September 14, 1990, this court granted the appellant leave per App. R. 5(A) to file a delayed appeal. II. THE SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The appellant's sole assignment of error is that: ANTHONY BYARSE'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS, WAS DENIED WHEN HE WAS CONVICTED OF AND SENTENCED FOR THE CRIME OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY WHICH WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. A. ISSUE RAISED: CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE The appellant, through his sole assignment of error, argues that his conviction for two counts of receiving stolen property was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence adduced on behalf of the state did not exclude all reasonable theories of innocence and thus the appellant's conviction was not supported -4- by sufficient evidence as mandated by State v. Kulig (1974), 37 Ohio St. 2d 157. The appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO A CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, examined the standard of review to be applied by an appellate court when reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence and held that: An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.) State v. Jenks, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus. In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Jenks established a new standard of review which is to be applied to circumstantial evidence and the Supreme Court of Ohio further overruled the holding of State v. Kulig, supra. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof. When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any -5- reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. Therefore, where the jury is properly and adequately instructed as to the standards for reasonable doubt a special instruction as to circumstantial evidence is not required. (Holland v. United States [1954], 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 followed; State v. Kulig [1974], 37 Ohio St.2d 157 66 O.O.2d 351, 309 N.E.2d 897, overruled.) State v. Jenks, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus. C. EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION In the case sub judice, both direct and circumstantial evidence were presented by the State of Ohio during the course of trial in an attempt to establish the elements of the offense of receiving stolen property which are as follows: 1) receive, retain or dispose of property of another; and 2) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it has been obtained through the commission of a theft offense. This circumstantial and direct evidence adduced at trial established that an automobile, checks and credit cards were stolen from a residential home located at 3912 East 153rd Street, Cleveland, Ohio. (Tr. 24, 25, 26, 27.) In addition, the evidence adduced at trial clearly shows that the automobile, checks and credit cards were found while in the possession of the appellant. (Tr. 49, 51, 53.) Upon application of the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence as established in State v. Jenks, supra, this court can but find, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of -6- the offense of receiving stolen property proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the appellant's conviction for two counts of receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence and the appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. NAHRA, J. and FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA CHIEF JUSTICE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .